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Against a background of increasing authority, autonomy and regulatory power in the
institutions of multilateral global governance this thesis draws on four case studies - The
International Monetary Fund and The Mexico Peso Crisis 1994-5; The World Bank and the
Arun-3 Dam Project 1995; The Group of Seven and the Halifax Summit, 1995; and The
Conference on Disarmament and the extension and renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1995 - to examine the implications for accountability. I begin by looking at two assessments of
globalisation and the issues these pose for accountability in MGG. This is followed by a review
of four theoretical perspectives, each of them placing a different emphasis on the prospects for
accountability in MGG. The issue of accountability is then explored further through a paradox
that results from the relationship between transparency and secrecy: on one hand there is a
discourse of transparency which promises to deliver accountability, on the othec hand seccecy
remains a dominant feature of MGCI. The concepts of transparency and secrecy are developed
theoretically and empirically. In the case of secrecy by looking at its inherent ambiguity and the
different interpretations that make secrecy both a positive and negative force in the governance
process. The idea of transparency has gained wide usage amongst critics and practitioners of
MGG. I argue that the increased use of transparency requires that greater analytical clarity be
attached to it in order to assess its uses and abuses. A typology is developed to explore the
extent to which the concept of transparency is useful as a source of accountability. I conclude
from my findings that tensions over the ambiguities of secrecy and the limits of transparency
will continue and that what is required is an approach that looks to the different political
motives and interests of each case to uncover the rationale for transparency and/or secrecy.
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Introduction
'... this should be our main concern in the coming years: how to make the IMF, the World
Bank, GATF, the G-7, and all those who dominate the global system accountable to
humans everywhere. We may not be able to get rid of these institutions in the foreseeable
future, but we can hold them accountable. So accountability should become our battle cry
for the coming years' (Muzaffer, 1994: 151)
Muzzafer's words express a growing concern that the institutions of multilateral global
governance need to be made more accountable to the people of the world. With the ending of
the Cold War and the emergence of globalisation as a key feature of contemporary social life,
greater attention is being focused on the institutions of multilateral global governance (MGG).
Some commentators believe that globalisation has led to a growth in the scope of their
authority, regulatory power and autonomy, resulting in the reconstitution of political authority
beyond the state (1-lolton, 1998: 80; Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 47). This has been
compounded by the 'intensification and interconnectedness of relations between states and
societies' in the economic, political, security and environmental spheres (McGrew, 1992: 23).
The recent economic crises in East Asia and Russia illustrate the ways in which advanced
western societies are no longer isolated from events happening beyond their territorial borders.
The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and G-7 are now taking more responsibility
for the way the world is governed. These apparent changes in the mode of governance have led
to concerns about the extent to which these institutions of MGG can and should be held
publicly accountable.
2The 1 990s has also seen the emergence of a new orthodoxy that has brought to the fore the
ideas of openness and transparency, resulting in what I term the discourse of transparency'.
The idea of transparency has been stimulated, it is claimed, by the trend over the past decade
towards democratisation, economic globalisation and the marketisation of society (Florini,
1998: 52). The discourse has become applied most frequently to the workings of a wide range
of public and private sector governance institutions as a means of making them more
accountable. It is presupposed that accountability and governance practices are enhanced when
there is access to and clarity of information about the workings of institutions and
organisations. This rationale supports the claim that the application of transparency provides a
means to enhance the accountable nature of MGG (Brautigam, 1991: 22).
Transparency is constrained by practices and strategies of secrecy. An obvious tension exists
between greater openness and the belief that efficiency and confidentiality in governance
processes often presuppose secrecy. Therefore, a central aim of this study is to explore the
nature of the relationship between transparency and secrecy. At the heart of this tension
between openness and secrecy is a paradox. On one hand, there exists a discourse of
transparency supported by both the critics and advocates of MGG which promises to deliver
accountability in institutions. On the other hand, secrecy which remains a dominant feature of
MOG is the antithesis of openness and undermines public accountability.
The introduction is organised around four main sections: the first sets out to identify and
elaborate on the nature of the problem that globalisation and trends towards global governance
pose for accountability. The second defines the key concepts of the thesis: multilateral global
governance; accountability; transparency; and secrecy. The third sets out the arguments in
Discourse in this sense refers to the different interpretations that gives meaning to a particular concept or ide& See George, 1994:
29-30.
3brief. The final section addresses methodological considerations including research design, case
selection and answers some potential problems.
The Nature of the Problem
There has been growing recognition that the process of globalisation has transformed
mechanisms of national governance and now includes a wide array of institutions of
multilateral global governance (Held and McGrew, 1993; Hoim and Sorenson, 1995: 5
Keohane, 1998: 83). Critics argue that one consequence of the intemationalisation of the state
has been an elevation in the regulatory power and authority of these institutions without a
corresponding increase in their accountability (Deacon, 1997: 205). The significance of this
internationalisation of the state is highlighted by Shaw who asserts that, 'just as state
institutions constitute the ultimate authoritative institutions within the national context, so
global state institutions are beginning to be consolidated as the highest authoritative institutions
onaworid scale' (1994: 188).
Whilst institutions of MGG have come to have a greater significance upon the lives of people
these institutions are remote (both geographically and psychologically) from those
constituencies most affected by their decisions (Parry, 1994: 10). The internationalisation of
the state has led to an extension of unaccountable power beyond the control of national
societies which has resulted in one commentator asserting that there has been a transfer of
power '... on important social and economic issues to unaccountable supranational
bureaucracies' (Robinson, 1995: 375). Cahn argues, for example, that decision-making in
MGG contains no provision for public participation and is shielded from public scrutiny by
institutional secrecy (1993: 161). They are exclusive organisations, making secretive decisions
which lack any public accountability (Bradlow and Grossman, 1996: 28). It has been argued
4that the remoteness of institutions of MOO from the usual forms of public accountability
means that mechanisms need to be introduced to make them more accountable to domestic civil
society (Keohane, 1998: 94).
Some commentators believe that economic globalisation has caused what has been labelled the
'defective state'. This idea suggests that states have lost a significant degree of authority and
are unable to insulate themselves from the forces of economic globalisation and market forces
with state power being eroded (Strange, 1995b: 56; Camilleri & Falk, 1992: 94; Naisbitt,
1994; Horsemann & Marshall; 1995 178-9; Held, 1995: 110). From this perspective
globalisation is irreversible and the intensification of economic activity makes effective national
governance problematic. In part this has resulted in the internationalisation of the state.
Although created by states, over time these institutions have come to establish their autonomy
and the idea of governance beyond the state. These developments have led some commentators
to argue that such powerful global political actors need mechanisms that can hold them to
account (Florini, 1998: 52).
The view of the defective state is not without its critics many of whom argue that states still
remain the central mechanism of governance and that the effects of globalisation upon the state
have been exaggerated (see Barry Jones, 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1995, 1996; Hirst, 1997:
206-2 15; Weiss, 1997; Evans, 1997). It is claimed that this has fuelled a myth of globalisation
which acts to undermine public accountability through the claim that the intensity and scope of
economic globalisation make effective governance beyond that of market mechanisms
impossible. Some of these critics believe that under present conditions, globalisation and the
internationalisation of the state serves to de-politicise the function of MGG by presenting its
policies as both necessary and politically desirable (Gills, 1997: 11-17).
5It is argued by some commentators that the economic institutions of MGG support the
principles of the market and give authority to the policies and ideology of transnational
liberalism (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 164)2. Advocates believe that market orientated
policies (underpinned by a need for openness) drive out bad governance practice and enhance
accountability. Hence good governance has been closely connected with the ideas of
accountability, transparency and participation (World Bank, 1991). For example, in the on-
going Asian financial crisis, market forces have highlighted inefficient and corrupt governance
in a number of countries. It is claimed by the IMF that the only way to regain confidence and
stability in the Asian economies is to make the political and economic systems more open,
transparent and accountable. The role of the IMF is to ensure compliance with the agreed
norms of the market driven global economy and if necessary these norms should be imposed as
part of the conditions attached to an IMF loan (Florini, 1998: 56-7).
Alternatively, critics believe that deference to market forces obfuscates the issue of MGG
responsibility by presenting the market as the most effective means of accountability, ignoring
the social and ecological consequences of following these policies (Peck and Tickell, 1994:
325). There are also questions about the extent to which the principles of good governance have
been implemented within the institutions of MGCI. Furthermore, critics claim that a limited and
apolitical usage of transparency would hinder the case for accountability in MGG and assert
that a more substantive transparency is required that includes participation in the decision-
making process (Bradlow and Grossman, 1996). Differences over the meaning of transparency
may obfuscate the extent to which the idea of transparency is adequate as a source of
accountability in MGG.
2 l'his includes reducing government intervention, the privatisation of publicly owned industries, with openness in economic and
governance activity and policed by MOO (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 165).
6The significance of the alleged lack of accountability in MOO is compounded by the autonomy
of these institutions. The extent of this autonomy is contested: '...the Fund and the Bank are not
autonomous institutions acting in a vacuum ... they are controlled by their shareholders it is
these governments that determine the framework within which the Fund and Bank operate, and
which thus bear the final responsibility ...' (Woodward, 1993: 6). Others argue that due to their
complex nature the institutions are more than simply an extension of their national membership
at the global level (Shaw, 1994: 21). Multilateral forms of global governance have an
institutional logic of their own which may result in the development of a particular institutional
culture (Parry, 1994: 10). Thus organisations like the World Bank and the G-7 can be viewed
as independent actors, devising and implementing policies in arenas separate from the national
domain (Imber, 1997: 218). As a consequence, multilateral global governance can have an
impact on world politics in ways that are partially independent of the states that created them
(Williams, 1994: 39).
The issues identified in this section lead to three key questions that can be simply stated:
How have different assessments of globalisation and theories of global politics informed the
discussion on accountability in MOG? Does the discourse and practice of transparency enhance
or undermine accountability in MGG? Is secrecy necessary for the effective and responsible
working of MOG? These issues will be addressed in the thesis and returned to directly in the
conclusion to see what answers can be provided.
7Defining the Key Concepts
Multilateral Global Governance
Although widely used by international relations (IR) scholars, global governance is a contested
concept and its use as a distinct analytical concept is disputed due to its use as a 'catch all'
phrase (Hewson, 1996: 186; Smouts, 1998: 81). The idea of governance implies the idea of
control and regulation in the exercise of public policy (Reinicke, 1998: 4). Traditionally this
has been the primary function of the state. However, changes in the mode of governance
reflecting a wider range of governance institutions has meant that the term now incorporates a
variety of 'quasi-governmental institutions' (Brown, 1997: 128; Rosenau, 1992: 4-5; Hirst and
Thompson, 1996: 183). Governance processes, therefore, can take place in areas other than the
formal institutions of the state and new processes of governing are regularly coming into being
(Stoker, 1998: 17).
The concept of global governance is usually applied to the myriad of institutions and actors
both governmental and non-governmental engaged with directing, regulating and overseeing
global matters (McGrew, 1997: 15; Pagden, 1998: 7). At the global level governance
mechanisms can range from the governmental institutions such as the G-7 summits to non-
governmental organisations like Friends of the Earth. To distinguish between these two types of
governance Rengger (1996: 12) labels them multilateral governance and global governance.
The former refers to state constituted institutions: the United Nations, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. These institutions are responsible for regulating global
agreements and policing the global economy with the authority to intervene where necessary.
The idea of global governance embraces a more pluralistic idea of governance that would
include non-government organisations and groups. The idea of a pluralistic, inclusive style of
governance presupposes that global governance should be made up from all sectors of society
8and that these different groupings provide the basis of a more accountable form of governance
(United Nations, 1997: 8).
In this thesis I combine the two terms and refer to multilateral global governance (MGG). I
believe that this serves two purposes. Firstly, it focuses attention on those state-constituted
institutions that are most authoritative and influential in the field of global governance and
where power and authority are still primarily located (Bradlow and Grossman, 1996: 28).
Secondly, by including the term global it suggests the possibility that these institutions can be
inclusive, open, participatory and accountable 4 . I will explore the extent to which this is the
case in later chapters.
Accountability
Traditionally, the principle of the public accountability of governance institutions is portrayed
as '... a powerful antidote to the corrupting effects of power" (Lively, 1975: 127). In essence
democratic accountability means the ability to hold institutions and individuals responsible for
their policies and actions. As Pyper argues, 'the concept of accountability is often judged as a
basic benchmark ... accountable government is deemed to be good government .. .governments
which can be characterised as unaccountable are likely to provide fertile ground for ... every
type of abuse of power' (1996: 1). The institutions of multilateral global governance do not, in
themselves, constitute a world government. Even so they should be viewed as powerful and
authoritative regulatory institutions which have a significant impact upon the lives of people.
Although public accountability can be defined in a number of ways, one generally agreed
definition is the 'effectiveness with which the governed can exercise influence over their
There is a growing body of work dealing with global governance. See for example Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Desai and Redfem,
1996.
Multilateralism has also been interpreted as being an inclusive plural form of governance (see Cox, 1997: xvi).
9governors' (Hyden, 1992: 14). It has been suggested that this can be achieved most effectively
through citizens inspecting and questioning governance processes and activities (Brautigam,
1992: 12). This public accountability is harder to sustain when applied to international
organisations because of the limited extent of access to information and policy-making and the
remoteness of these institutions. 'What exists at the global level are power structures, including
institutions of MGG, that cannot straightforwardly be identified as accountable (Sakamoto,
1995: 138).
Interestingly, a recognition of the need for accountability has become a feature of the internal
policy of many of the institutions that are central to multilateral global governance (World
Bank, 1992: 39-46; 1994a: 29-36). This demonstrates and reflects a growing realisation that
legitimacy and authority are dependent upon accountability (Brautigam, 1992: 9). The
Commission of Global Governance (1995) believe increasing the accountability of MGG is an
integral part of building a new progressive global order. To be seen to be accountable provides
an important means of reinforcing the legitimacy as well as the authority of multilateral
governance. Ironically, by making themselves more accountable the legitimacy and authority of
multilateral global governance can be challenged more easily thereby undermining their
effectiveness. As a consequence I will demonstrate how different notions of what accountability
means are apparent in the theory and practice of International Relations.
Transparency
Transparency has been defined as the process of deliberately revealing actions, policies and
political processes, to make clear the motives behind a particular action (Florini, 1998: 50). As
a consequence transparency and accountability are closely linked as the latter requires the
Brautigam (1991: 12) identifies two other types of accountability: public and legal.
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former so that political processes are made open to the critical gaze of the public.
Accountability through transparency means gaining access to information and greater public
participation in projects, programmes and policies (Beetham and Boyle, 1995: 63; Madeley,
Sullivan and Woodroffe, 1994: 72-73). The idea of transparency suggests the possibility that
the public can gain knowledge of governance processes through access to information and
thereby intervene more effectively in the policy process (Robinson, 1995: 41). According to
Beetham and Boyle there are four key aspects to public accountability: the release of accurate
information; accessibility to information deemed in the 'public interest'; openness to meetings;
and consultation before policy is formulated (1995: 63). What connects all four requirements
for accountability is the need for transparency to make them effective and meaningful.
In the discipline of International Relations transparency has generally been applied narrowly to
explain successful co-operation between states. Mitchell, for example discusses the role of
transparency in promoting compliance and effectiveness in international organisations (1998:
109-130). A more broadly defined conception of transparency includes the principle of
openness to mean access to information and participation within political institutions (Mitchell,
1998: 110). It is this use of transparenc y that I wish to bring and apply to the issue of
governance and MGG.
The concept of transparency raises fundamental questions about the nature of the way in which
we are governed. The discourse of transparency presupposes the universal good of the 'open
society' and provides a possible solution to the problem of secrecy in public institutions. It is
not, however, necessarily the case that complete transparency is or would be a good thing.
Determining the boundaries of transparency requires consideration of a wide-range of factors,
not least the function of secrecy. In society the relationship between transparency and secrecy is
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socially determined. As ideals they would represent two ends of a continuum. At one end would
be complete secrecy and the other, full openness (Feldmann, 1988: 88; Florini, 1998: 50). It
has been suggested that the movement towards a discourse of transparency is gaining
momentum. This reflects the trend towards economic globalisation and democratisation and it
represents a new norm that challenges the traditional secrecy of MGG (Florini, 1998: 52).
Secrecy
Secrecy has been defined by Bok as 'intentional concealment' (1982: 5). It is this intentional
aspect of secrecy that gives its use an important place in explaining political processes.
Although the importance of secrecy in politics is widely acknowledged its study has been
neglected in recent years,(Galnoor, 1977; Teft, 1980; Friedrich, 1972; Goren 1979). Gibbs
believes that the current omission of secrecy as a focus of research is ironic given the increased
practice of secrecy by many governmental institutions (1995: 213). It has been claimed that the
processes of globalisation have enhanced the potential for increased secrecy, not least through
the intemationalisation of the state (Falk, 1995a: 239).
The usual justification for secrecy is that governments have always withheld information or
acted in a covert manner to protect and enhance the national or public interest (Galnoor (ed),
1977; Chapman, 1987; Robertson, 1982; Cox, 1975: 4). From a state-centred perspective, a
lack of openness in both external and internal affairs is legitimate to ensure the protection of the
national interests (Gibbs, 1995: 214)6. But securing effective government, efficiency in the
6 Britain is a good example of a democratic but secretive state, not only in terms of national issues but in a routine manner with
regard to meetings and accounts at both the local and national level (Michael, 1982). Hutton claims that 'there is no presumption that
the activities of the slate should be open and transparent' (1 995a: 3). Other countries vaiy in their commitment to an open political
system. The Swedish political system with its far more open and transparent approach to government (Robertson, 1982). Most
recently this quest for openness has manifested itself in Sweden's relationship with the European Union (EU) in which Sweden is
demanding greater openness in order to promote democracy and reduce public perception of the Union as undemocratic and secretive
(Guardian, 21 .11-95). Sweden believes such action will decrease the democratic deficit associated with the institutions of Europe and
make, in this case, a regional suprastate institution, more accountable to 'the people'. It would appear then that states have different
attitudes to the issues of secrecy and the degree of openness that is desirable. In view of this it is perhaps not surprising that competing
positions exist at the global level.
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governmental process and protecting the privacy of individual groups and organisations
requires secrecy. Depending upon the circumstances secrecy can therefore be considered
legitimate.
The use of secrecy in the governance process is complex and ambiguous. Secrecy allows for
the possibility of behaviour and actions that would not have been otherwise undertaken in the
governance process. Secrecy is favoured by those who want to resist the challenge to their
traditional power and authority that transparency represents. This is usually done by reference
to the traditional norms of privacy and sovereignty (Florini, 1998: 50). Therefore, secrecy is
still considered legitimate and many multilateral institutiofls have been characterised as having
firmly embedded cultures of secrecy.
The Argument in Brief
The thesis will explore the issue of accountability in multilateral global governance by drawing
on the concepts of transparency and secrecy. The key issue to be explored is whether or not the
authority and regulatory power of institutions of MGG can be held publicly accountable. An
emerging discourse of transparency suggests that greater levels of accountability can be
established through increased openness. Opposing this discourse is the continuing existence and
practice of secrecy in multilateral governance. The thesis examines the tension between these
opposing approaches and explores whether the developing discourse of transparency will lead
to increased accountability in multilateral global governance. I argue that a more nuanced
approach to the study of transparency and secrecy is needed looking beyond the apparently
straightforward advantages of openness and the drawbacks of secrecy. There are occasions
where openness may be harmful and secrecy can be beneficial. The presumption that
transparency is inherently beneficial must therefore be challenged.
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It has been remarked upon that, as yet, the study of global governance, does not have a clear
focus (Groom and Powell, 1994: 81). I argue that the issue of accountability represents an
important extension of the research agenda into global governance in the JR literature. Robert
Keohane asserts that 'combining global governance with effective ... accountability will be a
major challenge for scholars and policy-makers alike in the years ahead.' (1998: 94). In this
thesis I take up his challenge.
I develop original typologies for transparency and secrecy. The typology of transparency
highlights both the limits and possibilities of this concept for accountability. The typology of
secrecy emphasises the ambiguity that surrounds its use. I introduce the idea of the discourse of
transparency and examine the extent to which this is merely rhetoric or has empirical
substance. I demonstrate that there are many aspects of accountability in MGG that remain
either undeveloped or ignored by much of the mainstream literature. I use the case studies to
demonstrate empirically the arguments explored in Chapters 1-3.
In my conclusion I make a number of claims: firstly, that the discourse of transparency is
applied strategically and its use does not reflect increased openness in MGG. Secondly, that the
concept of good governance has not been adopted or applied universally to MGG although
there are examples of partial implementation. Thirdly, that secrecy remains an important part
of the governance process, despite the discourse of transparency. Fourthly, globalisation and
the internationalisation of the state do not enhance the prospects for accountability in MOO.
Fifthly, more accountability does not necessarily result from increased transparency. In my




To examine the issue of accountability in multilateral global governance I have drawn on a
number of case studies. The principal research method employed is documentary analysis.
Primary materials were collected from a wide range of media and electronic sources, official
publications of government, non-governmental publications and institutions of multilateral
global governance, some internal documents and personal interview material. The research also
involved paying close attention to a wide range of relevant secondary academic literature in the
fields of international relations, political studies, sociology and philosophy. The thesis adopts
an interdisciplinary approach and rejects the traditional divisions between disciplines
(Wallerstein, 1987: 312). The analysis of governance, its aims, methods and relationships
requires an eclectic approach because of the interaction with a wide range of political,
economic and social factors (Brautigam, 1991: 4; Goldblatt, 1998: 2).
Case Selection
The thesis examines four key institutions of MGG and contained within each is a more focused
case: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Mexican Peso Crisis 1994/5; the Group
of Seven (G-7) and the Halifax Summit 1995; the World Bank (IBRD) and the Arun-3 Dam
Project; the Conference on Disannament (CD) extension and renewal of the nuclear weapon
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1995. They were selected for the following reasons:
1. The four institutions are generally considered to be the most important in their respective
areas of multilateral global governance and reflect the four global spheres identified by
15
McGrew (1992: 23): political and economic management (G-7); economic stability (IMF);
development and the environment (IBRD) and military security (CD).
2. The institutions are usually considered to be amongst the most secretive because of the
traditionally highly sensitive nature of economic and security issues. Therefore, it will be
informative to see to what extent transparency occurs and has made a difference. Other
forms of MGG which are traditionally considered more open and participatory, such as
human rights, have not been included in the study.
3. All the cases occurred within a 12 month time frame, and at a time when the discourse of
transparency was beginning to be actively discussed and applied in multilateral global
mstitutions.
4. The case studies do not provide exhaustive accounts but rather are used to highlight salient
issues. On this basis general conclusions can be drawn about the discourse of transparency
and secrecy in relation to accountability in global governance.
The use of case studies is not without its problems and in the Social Sciences their value has
been questioned (Ragin, 1992: 1-2: 217). The most common criticism is that they do not allow
for wider generalisations because each case is based upon a particular set of events. To
generalise from specific cases requires that findings be qualified to reflect the deficiency in
using case studies.
Conversely, others have praised the use of case studies as being the most practical way of
generating conclusions that are meaningful and useful (Ragin, 1992: 225). Case studies are
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useful in helping to answer the question 'what is going on?' The purpose of a case study can be
to gather information so that description and analysis of what is happening in a real world
situation can be made (Dixon, Bouma and Atkinson, 1987: 107-8). It is in this sense that the
case studies will be used by examining the details of a particular case to see whether the
commonalties and differences generated by each case can inform a wider set of conclusions
about the nature of accountability in MOO.
Methodological Problems
A distinctive methodological problem when looking for empirical evidence of secrecy is that
secrets, by their very nature, are difficult to expose. The institutions under investigation are
generally closed to outside observers. In a study of the IMF, Stiles recalls that he was only able
to gain direct access through personal contacts with high ranking IMF staff (1991: 3).
Ferguson in another study of the IMF notes that, 'unless the analyst has been a participant-
observer, he faces insurmountable problems in arriving at a full and analytically defensible
portrayal of what goes on in the IMF' (1988: 12). These problems are compounded when the
attempt is made to compare degrees of secrecy with levels of openness, as other studies have
made clear, the dilemma for the researcher is that 'secrecy involves reduced observability and
an increased potential to deny access to others' (Warren and Laslett, 1980: 26).
A methodology is required to overcome these problems posed by secrecy and to explore further
the difference between the rhetoric and reality of transparency in multilateral global
governance. Both Ferguson (1988) and Stiles (1991) have successfully analysed the contents of
official IMF publications to highlight inconsistencies between the public policy and its
implementation. In view of their success I will also adopt this approach to see what disjuncture
exists between the discourse of transparency and secretive practices. In addition to this I will
17
examine other primary sources, including media reports and the archives of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). Analysis of the primary information is then used to assess the
theoretical arguments generated by the secondary materials in the first three chapters.
I will also apply the methodology successfully used by Bok (1982) who in her classic study of
secrecy looks to challenge a number of taken for granted assumptions about secrecy. She is
interested in whether traditional justifications for secrecy are legitimate. It is possible Bok
claims, that through examining where secrets have subsequently become exposed to make some
judgement about whether the reassurance given for secrecy were justified and the limits placed
upon transparency were necessary (1982: 115).
Summary and Chapter Outline
It has been suggested that 'the line between openness and secrecy can only be drawn socially'
and that the tension between secrecy and openness can oniy be legitimately reconciled through
societal consensus' (Feldman, 1988: 88). It remains to be seen whether a consensus exists in
the practices of MGG. In Chapter 1 I examine assessments of globalisation and theories of
MGG and explore the implications for accountability. Chapter 2 examines secrecy, the
ambiguity in its use and the implications for MGG of the different functions, types and theories
of secrecy. Chapter 3 introduces the idea of transparency as a force for change and relates it to
the principles of good governance. A typologv is developed to highlight competing
interpretations and conceptions of transparency. I use the case studies (Chapters 4-7) to
illustrate the theoretical discussions and conclude by making some general observations about




Multilateral Global Governance and the Politics of
Accountability
By adopting the phrase the politics of accountability my intention is to focus attention upon the
issue of accountability and put it at the centre of my analysis of multilateral global governance
(MGG). Interest in the issues of accountability of MGG has been fuelled by the processes of
globalisation, the intemationalisation of the state, and the shift towards the implementation of
global public policy (Shaw, 1994: 3; Cox, 1997; Linklater, 1998: 31; Reinicke, 1998). The rise
of globalisation and the alleged shift in regulatory authority from governments to global
governance institutions raises critical issues about the way the world is governed, not least the
extent to which the institutions of MGG can be held to account. As a consequence, the role of
MGG and the issue of accountability needs to be explored further, particularly as it has been
claimed that 'accountability is the most crucial element of governance' (Williams and Young,
1994: 84). This claim rests upon the belief that 'power and authority lies at the heart of
governance' (Brautigam, 1992: 3). The traditional separation between those that govern and
those that are governed, means that mechanisms are required to ensure that the former do not
misuse their authority and power over the latter 7 . Establishing the principle and practices of
accountability in MGG is fundamental to achieving this end.
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first looks at two contrasting assessments of
the impact of globalisation on the state: the end of the state; and the myth of globalisation. It
This distinction has traditionally onl y been applied to governance at the national level.
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seeks to demonstrate that both these interpretations of globalisation have consequences for the
politics of accountability in MGG. In the second, I outline four theoretical positions to see how
they infonn the discussion on accountability. I explore the way the issue of accountability has
been addressed by each of the perspectives, and the prospects for accountability in MGG.
Globalisation, Multilateral Global Governance and
Accountability
It is presumed by many commentators that over the past thirty years (and particularly the last
ten) world politics has undergone a number of significant changes with globalisation the driving
force behind them. This has led some to assert that globalisation is a qualitatively different
phase in world politics, a break from the past and the key feature of the contemporary world.
(Hoim and Sorenson, 1995: 1 Strange, 1996: 7-9; Cox, 1994: 45-46; Agnew and Corbridge,
1995: 164-227; Vogler, 1996: 194-195; Luard, 1990: 33, Pearson, 1994: 4; Scholte, 1997:
14). One significant aspect of globalisation has been its impact on the way we are governed.
One of the defining characteristic of the contemporary era has been the expansion of MGG. It
is generally agreed by the advocates of change that states and societies can no longer isolate
themselves from the rest of the world, or from the effects of economic, environmental and
political globalisation, and as a consequence many governance decisions are now made at the
global level (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Rosenau, 1992; Groom and Powell, 1994: 81)8.
Debates about the nature of governance at the global level have been fuelled by two broad
interpretations of the impact of globalisation upon the state. One I term the 'end of the state',
the other I call the 'myth of globalisation'. It is not my intention to resolve all the issues put
• Others argue that the spread of global governance is a process that has been developing over the past 100 years and can be traced
back to the last centuly. Murphy (1994) takes his starting point as 1850. In the intervening years the numbers of International
Governmental Organisations (IGOs) has increased from 37 in 1909, to 123 in the 1950s, 10337 ifl 1986 (Zacher, 1992: 65).
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forward by these divergent sets of ideas 9 . My aim is to show how these two different views of
the effects of globalisation upon the state, raise important issues for accountability in MGG.
The 'End of the State' Thesis
Advocates of the 'end of state' thesis argue, to differing degrees, that the authority and
legitimacy of the state is being undermined by globalisation. This argument has implications for
accountability because it presupposes that state sovereignty has been eroded and there has been
a loss of state autonomy to market mechanisms and multilateral global governance (Schmidt,
1995: 75). The divide between national and global decision-makers has become ever-more
blurred, with state-based governance being undermined by transnational and multilateral global
governance (Drucker, 1993: 142; Williams, 1996: 115: 118; Held, 1993, 1995). National
governments appear to have ceded control over domestic policy whilst at the same time the
variety of quasi-governmental institutions have flourished. It has been suggested in a wide
range of literature that these changes have resulted in what has been described as the
'diminished nation-state' or 'defective state' thesis (Strange, 1995a; I 995b: 55; Cable, 1995:
23). The internationalisation of the state has come about because of this loss of authority, and
has raised concerns as to whether these institutions of MGG 'transcend ... existing forms of
democratic accountability' (McGrew, 1 997a: 12).
At its most extreme, a 'hyper-globalization' school argues that the state has declined or is in
the process of terminal decline (Perraton et al, 1997: 257). Kenichi Ohmae proposes that the
spread of global markets have created the 'dysfunctional state' (1993: 78). From this
perspective states are no longer able to manage economic policy, and as a consequence, he
For a recent attempt at analysing contemporary debates about the nature of the state under conditions of globalisation see Clark,
1998.
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argues, they should withdraw from this area of governmental activity (Ohmae 1993: 78).
According to Ohmae, national economic controls have become redundant due to the advances
in technology and the burgeoning role of global markets. Consequently, any country that
attempts to resist market-friendly policies will ultimately be forced to comply or risk their
financial stability (Perraton et al, 1997: 257). National barriers have become unable to resist
the mobility of capital and the impact of new information technologies, hence the idea of the
'borderless world' (Ohmae, 1995: 1-5). Ohniae believes these changes represent a positive
development as economic structures become more important than political ones. Ultimately, he
envisages a world where market forces determine political processes with intervention in the
governance of markets unnecessary (Hirst and Thompson, 1995: 423; Hirst, 1997: 341).
There is also a less extreme view of the 'end of the state' (see Cable, 1995: 23; Strange 1994:
210). According to Strange, new technology, interdependent markets, the internationalisation of
production and the growth of international business, have brought the authority and legitimacy
of the state into question by eroding the state's traditional capacity to govern (1996: 5). In
effect, the state has retreated from traditional areas of governance in the economic sphere, and
regulatory power has shifted to institutions of MGG (1996: 161). Strange qualifies her view of
state decline by arguing that states are not obsolete (distancing herself from Ohmae), but she
nevertheless implies that the authority of the state is being undermined. However, she remains
sceptical as to whether authority is being transferred into institutions of MGG (Strange 1996:
161). Recently Held has suggested that states, whilst retaining the capacity to act effectively in
certain areas, have created other locations of governance, including institutions of multilateral
global governance (1998: 389)'°.
ao Held appears to have recently shifted his position to a more nuanced appreciation of the relationship between the state and
globalisation. See his analysis ofglobalisation in Marxism Today Nov/Dec J 998: 24-27.
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The 'end of the state' thesis is tacitly endorsed by Western governments and multilateral
institutions like the IMF, World Bank and G-7. They reason that due to economic globalisation
national policy options are limited and have become increasingly shaped by the global
economy. Many politicians approve of this state of affairs because it is widely believed that the
policy options that encourage globalisation result in economic growth and an increase in
national wealth (Quershi, 1996: 30; Economist, 20-9-97: 19). This view is often presented as
the 'common sense' approach to globalisation by politicians and the commercial sector, and is
underpinned by neoliberal ideology. It is a widely held belief that resisting economic
globalisation would be counter productive and largely ineffective due to the inevitability of
global competitive forces (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 319). For example, Jacques Chirac, the
French President, was reported as saying at the G-7 Lyon Summit that globalisation is
unstoppable (Guardian, 1-7-96). Similarly, Tony Blair believes that there is no alternative to
economic globalisation. In a recent radio interview he resigns himself to this, describing
globalisation as being 'the way of the world' now (1998).
From this perspective the irreversibility of globalisation is stressed, as is the relative
ineffectiveness of undertaking a national economic policy that conflicts with the rules of the
market. In response to global processes states have resorted to internationalise decision-making
in an attempt to manage the international economic system more effectively (Cable, 1995: 37).
Implicit in the belief of the inevitability of globalisation is a belief in the efficiency of the
markets and an unwillingness to challenge their authority. This shift towards the primacy of
economic issues is reflected in the decline in the traditional political differences over economic
management between the left and right (Cable, 1995: 43). By ignoring global markets a country
risks its currency coming under attack by financial speculators (Evans, 1997: 67). Markets are
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a form of global governance in their own right complete with market authority, rules and norms
of behaviour. These arguments have a number of consequences for the way in which we think
about accountability and MOO. Firstly, accountability implies the ability for the governed to
hold the governors or decision-makers responsible for their actions. Some commentators have
claimed that when these decisions are being made at the global level then '... the myth of
accountability is difficult to Sustain' (Horsman and Marshall, 1995: 221). Governance at the
global level means that at the national and local level citizens and social movements are
distanced from decision-making, resulting in the de-politicisation of economic and political
processes. This de-politicisation of global economic activity undermines the whole rationale of
holding those that govern us to account. As states lose their authority, and markets gain in
authority, it is more difficult for citizens to hold political elites to account for events over which
they apparently have little control.
The dominance of a neoliberal market-led agenda means that there has been a shift in
regulatory power from states to markets, and that the role of MOO is to support a systematic
policy of privatisation and deregulation in national economies (Strange, 1995a: 296). Issues of
accountability become blurred as the market regulates itself with minimal interference from
states and institutions of MGG. As a consequence governance responsibilities become market-
led, with the role of MOO to police the implementation of market reforms in national policies.
The dominance of the market over state governance mechanisms obfuscate clear lines of
responsibility in decision-making in the name of greater efficiency. This makes it more difficult
to clearly identify which governance institutions should be accountable. Critics argue that the
market is not a perfect means of allocating resources, and that governmental intervention is
often necessary to offset market failures (Galbraith, 1997: 5-7; Hirst and Thompson, 1995:
428-30).
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Thus, the end of the state thesis raises important issue about accountability in MGG. Firstly,
the internationalisation of the state, undermines national autonomy and shifts governance
mechanisms away from locations of popular accountability. Secondly, reinforced by the logic
of the market, political issues become subsumed by the need of a neoliberal economic agenda.
This de-politicises the political activity of MGG and prioritises the logic of world markets and
in turn leads to a lack of accountability economic governance activity.
The Myth of Globalisation
The 'end of the state' thesis has proved controversial and many writers claim that the alleged
loss of state power and authority is a myth. The proponents of the myth of globalisation differ
in their interpretations. Some argue that the idea of a global economy creating a powerless state
is simply wrong. This view takes a broadly sceptical position and challenges the idea that
anything fundamental has changed in world politics (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, Hirst, 1997;
and Weiss, 1997). Another group views globalisation as an ideological device in the expansion
of global capital, and that the most significant issue in the contemporary world is to understand
the function of this myth in restructuring the relationship between the state and global
capitalism (Gill, 1992, 1995; Cox, 1994, 1996a; Scholte, 1997: 452). A more balanced
perspective reads globalisation as a multi-dimensional process that includes both continuities
and change. From this perspective the state maintains a large degree of authority whilst at the
same time alternative global forms of governance have become more significant with the state
playing an important role in this process (Perraton et al, 1997 and Evans, 1997). From this
perspective the global, national and local interact with each other, and states retain a key role in
this re-constitution of world order (Holton, 1998: 186).
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Those commentators who view globalisation as essentially an ideological device argue that
globalisation acts to reinforce a positive neoliberal agenda characterised by global markets and
non-state intervention (Cox, 1996b: 23-4). Their concern is with the negative social,
environmental, economic and political impact of perpetuating the myth of globalisation. As
Gills argues: 'the ongoing debate on globalisation is indeed a strategic one, and we seek to
change the terms of this debate and alter its intellectual and political direction' (1997: 11). By
strategic commentators mean that globalisation is an ideological as well as economic and
political phenomenon and should be recognised as such.
This perspective believes that the idea of globalisation as inevitable and uncontrollable requires
challenging. Confronting the myth of globalisation allows for the possibility of a more
accountable form of MGG rather than the subversion of politics to economic rationality. If
economic rationality dictates politics, then processes become apolitical and social justice
marginalised by the justice of the markets (Gills, 1997: 12). The role of economic institutions
of MGG is pivotal in the process of market driven governance because these institutions
perpetuate the myth of globalisation and help to ensure that states do not react to popular
opposition and intervene to unsettle the markets. This amounts to what Evans describes as a
'global ideological consensus' (1997: 71-72). One implication of this is that globalisation
becomes a useful device for domestic governments to avoid responsibility for unpopular
policies. Critics of the globalisation process argue that it becomes an excuse for states to no
longer preserve the same level of social welfare (Lewis, 1997). State actors have become
divorced both from their responsibility and the usual mechanisms of accountability. This has
been described by Gill as the 'globalisation of excuses' (1997b). Whilst some of the excuses
offered by globalisation may be legitimate, it has been pointed out that there is a big difference
between governments saying 'there is nothing we can do' and 'we don't want to do anything'
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(Hobsbawm, 1998: 6). This rationale for non-intervention can be extended to the institutions of
MGCi helping them avoid the accusation that globalisation is politically driven. However, Beck
has argued that under these conditions where 'nobody rules' power is at its 'most tyrannical
because nobody can be held to [account]' (1998:15).
Others claim that the most powerful states have adapted to global processes resulting in both
continuities and changes in the governance process (Castells, 1997: 266; Weiss, 1997: 13). The
continuities according to Scholte are that: '... state and interstate relations persist at the core of
governance arrangements in the contemporary globalising world'. Whereas the changes
include: '...the character of the state: its capacities; its constituencies; it's policy-making
processes; its policy-content; and so on' (1997: 428). Scholte claims that the state is not a fixed
and unchanging object: 'the state has retained a pivotal significance in globalising capital, it
has lost its former core attribute of sovereignty' (1997: 442). A significant part of this change
has been the pooling of authority at the global level into forums and institutions of MOG.
Whilst globalisation has undermined certain aspects of the state, the sovereignty and autonomy
of states has been transferred into institutions of MGG. It is claimed that this shift in the
location of governance has resulted in less accountability and surveillance of the governance
processes (Clark, 1998: 482).
In fact, some claim that the process of globalisation has strengthened liberal capitalist states as
they have transferred powers to global regulatory bodies. Rather than states 'surrendering
national competencies ... it is a process of creating power ... exceeding those that might be held
by states acting alone' (Bromley, 1996: 4). The state is being transformed rather than
diminishing in authority. Globalisation and the internationalisation of the state do not signal the
end of the state: instead the state 'is a key element within processes of globalization rather than
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something opposed to them' (Brown, 1995: 56). From this perspective, institutions of MGG
compliment and reinforce the state, with states creating the conditions for economic
globalisation and the institutions of MGG. Evidence that the state has played a central role in
the globalisation process is presented by Eric Helleiner. He has identified three key functions
undertaken by states in the promotion of economic globalisation: i) thiling to implement
effective controls over capital flows; ii) liberalising financial markets; and iii) preventing major
financial crises (1994: 166-172). Thus economic globalisation, promoted by states, has been
reinforced through the institutions of MGG. The IMF, World Bank and G-7 have all advocated
and followed policies that reinforce the economic processes of globalisation. It is still states that
create the rules necessary to underpin the idea of accountability in MGG. Accepting this makes
accountability in MGG an important condition of the current political arid economic conditions
characterised as globalisation.
This view is reinforced by those sceptical writers who believe global processes are not
ungovernable and that regulation of the global economy is possible (Hirst and Thompson,
1995: 408). The sceptical position favours a reaffirmation of a traditional state-centred
argument that privileges the continuing centrality of the state in the governance process.
Implicit within this argument is that the negative effects of globalisation on the authority of the
state have been exaggerated (see McGrew, I 997a, Hirst and Thompson, 1996). What remains
important is the role of policies undertaken by states and the ways MGG undertake to carry
these policies out: 'the central functions of the nation-state will become those of providing
legitimacy for and ensuring the accountability of supra-national ... governance mechanisms'
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 171). The nation-state remains the primary agent to ensure the
accountability of MGG. Similarly, the commentator Will Hutton observes: '[the] global market
needs superintending and policing. Governments could and should co-ordinate their policies to
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manage it ... the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation - are more not less
important' (Hutton, 12-6-95). To undertake the policing of financial markets the institutions of
MGG would need to have more regulatory authority (Jordan, 1996: 85). However, what also
needs addressing is how these institutions, with increased regulatory powers, would be held to
account.
To recap (see Table 1), the 'end of the state' thesis alleges that the internationalisation of
decision-making reflects the declining autonomy of the state and the shift towards market
authority underpinned by the regulatory power and authority of MGG. The logic of the
defective state thesis also pushes governance mechanisms further from locations of popular
accountability. Reinforced by the logic of the market, political issues become subsumed under
the terms of a neoliberal economic agenda. The de-politicising of the political activity of MGG
gives priority to the neoliberal economic agenda over effective wider public accountability of
these institutions. The myth of globalisation literature highlights the way in which arguments
about the inevitability of globalisation and the 'end of the state' thesis needs to be challenged to
re-establish the principle of public accountability. Through recognising that the state has
played an integral role in the globalisation process it creates the rationale and possibility of
holding these regulatory bodies to account. In concluding this section, it is my contention that
the end of the state and the myth of globalisation arguments, raise important issues for
accountability in MGG. However, both these neglect to engage fully with the complexities that
surround this issue and particularly the extent to which public accountability in MGG is
desirable or possible. In the next section I review the way in which different theoretical
perspectives on MOO have addressed the issue of accountability.
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Table One: Two Views on Globalisation and the State
Two Views on	 Consequences for State 	 Consequences for
Globalisation and the 	 Governance	 Accountability
State__________________________ __________________________
The authority and legitimacy of Accountability is undermined as
states is being undermined 	 states cede autonomy to market
leading to claims of defective 	 mechanisms and multilateral
states.	 from of global governance.
State sovereignty has been	 Accountability is weakened as
eroded and there has been a loss the internationalisation of the
The 'End of the State'
	
of state autonomy to market
	 state pushes governance
mechanisms and multilateral 	 mechanisms further from
forms of governance	 locations of popular
accountability.
It has been suggested that
globalisation has led to changes Reinforced by the logic of the
in changing pattern of	 market the issue of public
governance,	 accountability in MGG becomes
subsumed under the terms of a
neoliberal economic agenda.
The de-politicising of political
processes impoverishes the idea
__________________________ __________________________ of accountability in MGG.
The loss of state power is a	 The political agenda needs to be
my th. States retain and have	 re-established over the
increased in power facilitating
	 economic by increasing the
globalisation.	 accountability of MOO.
States adapt to globalisation	 Many decisions made by MGG
and, in many cases have been 	 go unchallenged because
the driving force behind it.	 globalisation is a useful
Myth of Globalisation	 .	 ideological device to avoid
Globalisation acts as an 	 criticism of the economic
ideological device to obfuscate 	 system. This has been described
responsibility for decision- 	 as the 'globalisation of
making at the global level,	 excuses'.
There is a need for more 	 States play an integral role in
intervention and increased	 the globalisation process and
regulatory power of MGG.
	
the creation of institutions of





Perspectives on Multilateral Global Governance and
Accountability
In this section I outline four perspectives on MGG. Each presents a different empirical and
normative account of accountability. They are divided into two groups: state-centred
perspectives and transformationalist perspectives. The former plays down the extent to which
states and the state-system have changed under conditions of globalisation. The latter, to
varying degrees, postulate that a transformation has occurred in the mode of governance and
that the institutions of MGG are an integral part of this change. By utilising this categorisation,
I follow the analytical framework of McGrew, 1997a and 1997b, who has applied it to
questioning whether globalisation has transformed the conditions of territorial liberal
democracy.
The State-Centred Perspective
A traditional state-centred view of MGG defines these institutions as being essentially
dominated by states, with the focus primarily on the way these institutions enhance national
interest (Archer, 1992: 72; Cupitt, Whitlock and Whitlock, 1997: 7). As a consequence there is
an implicit assumption that the character of world politics remains centred around states
despite the processes of globalisation. A key characteristic of this world order is the
continuation of traditional power politics and the international system reflecting the interests of
states. By distinguishing between what occurs inside states (the domestic sphere) from the
outside (the international system) it creates two distinct areas of political activity (described
recently as the 'Great Divide', Clark, 1998: 479)lt• These two spheres of social activity are
"Interestingly, the insideloutside distinction has been applied to the analysis of secrecy in another guise. However, the effect is the
same: it works to exclude actors from political processes. For more detailed discussion, see Chapter 2.
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treated as separate entities with events occurring at the international level deemed beyond the
scope of the usual domestic fonns of public accountability. This helps explain why 'an
aggregation of democratic states [does not] produce democratic multilateralism' (Clark, 1998:
486). Thus, by limiting our view of the world to states and their representatives it acts as an
obstacle to increasing the scope of accountability in MGG.
This separation between what occurs inside the state from events outside the state makes the
possibility for increased accountability, access to information and greater transparency in
institutions of MGG problematic. The issue of wider public accountability within MGG is
considered to be a marginal concern or a non-issue due to the continuing primacy of the state
(Archer, 1992: 78-87). This is compounded by the international system which:' ... puts a
theoretical barrier between state-centred multilateralism and the civil society that lies beyond it'
(Cox, 1997: 104).
Critics of the state-centred approach believe this artificial separation is outdated in an era of
global politics, and that the inside/outside continuum is not as fixed as orthodox international
relations theorists imply. For example, critical social movements are beginning to challenge the
boundaries, and there appears to be some blurring of the distinction (Smith and Bayliss, 1997:
2). Shaw reasons that rather than separate levels of analysis, the complexity of social relations
as a whole need investigating (1994: 99). Instead of maintaining distinct analytical categories,
political processes need to be inclusive of a wide range of actors other than just states (Smith
and Bayliss, 1997: 2). Hence the idea of bringing society into the traditional state dominated
international relations.
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Traditional state-centred international relations place constraints upon the boundaries of
accountability. At the international level accountability in MGG is viewed essentially as an
inter-state affair between state representatives and bureaucrats. This view is reflected in a
series of interviews with the executive directors of the IMF and World Bank, one of whom
responded, 'the Bank cannot intervene between government and its citizens ... Bank interaction
must be with the government that represents the people' (Bischel, 1994:15). The usual
justification is that because the World Bank is not a political actor it has no authority to act as
one. This reflects the traditional inside/outside dichotomy of international relations between
states and societies (Walker, 1993: 1-25). By this means the justification for the demarcation
between the global and national level is continued, and the principle of public accountability in
the sphere of global issues becomes more difficult to sustain.
Challenging this position requires re-thinking the idea of accountability as it applies to MGG.
This view is reinforced by others who believe that fixed ideas about the state can be challenged.
In his critique of the state system, Ashley reasons that what may appear given and immutable is
in fact a social and historical construct: '... the recognisably objective structures of global life,
far from being autonomous and pregiven conditions, are arbitrary and contingent effects that
are imposed in history through practice, and to the exclusion of other ways of structuring
collective existence.' (1989: 253). Because the institutions of MGQ are socially constructed
they can be changed to reflect new ways of social life. The whole idea of questioning traditional
boundaries creates the space for an alternative way of structuring political life, with one
possibility being a change from narrow and exclusive international relations to a more inclusive
world politics (Hansen, 1997: 323324)I2
12 This is something that has been attempted by Walker in his book One world. Many worlds (1988).
33
Trans formationalist Perspectives
The traditional state-centred view has been challenged by three competing interpretations which
question, to varying degrees, the traditional state-centred approach to international relations
and MGG. The processes of globalisation have challenged the idea that MGG is and ought to
remain purely the domain of states. The three theories are neoliberal-institutionalism,
radicalism and cosmopolitan democracy. Despite this, it is my contention that in this literature
the issue of public accountability and the role of transparency in MCXI is not dealt with
adequately.
Neoliberal-Institutionalism13
A distinctive feature of neoliberal-institutionalism is characterising the world as governed by a
plurality of political and non-political institutions and organisations (McGrew, 1992: 20). In
doing so this approach challenges the traditional state-based notion of governance as too
narrow and missing the transnational dimension within governance process (Keohane, 1994:
58). Because of heightened levels of economic interdependence, states have been drawn into
more co-operation in the global sphere, leading to the internationalisation of decision-making
and a decline in state autonomy (Held and McGrew, 1993: 280). Neoliberal-institutionalism
has posed a challenge to the traditional state-centred views of world politics by claiming that
institutions of MUG have become new centres of governance beyond the authority of national
governments (Held and McGrew, 1993: 265; Keohane, 1998: 82).
The interdependence or institutionalist approach has been popular since the 1970s and was initially conceived as a challenge to the
dominance of the realist tradition, reflecting the changing nature of the world as portrayed by people like Keohane and Nye, 1977.
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The neoliberal-institutionalist approach argues that it is wrong to conceive of governance
institutions only in terms of states because this ignores the increasing degree of complex
interdependence that exists at the national level, and the extent to which globalisation has
eroded the power of the state (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Burchill, 1996: 55). As a consequence
institutions of MGG will increase the scope of their activities as states realise their rational
self-interests are best met through institutional co-operation at the global level (1-lurrell and
Woods, 1995: 6). This view implicitly recognises the institutions of MGG as autonomous and
important political actors in their own right (McGrew, 1992: 20).
A crucial component underpinning the neoliberal-institutionalist perspective is the role of the
market in the efficient distribution of goods and services. Economic interdependence means that
the global market is the primary mechanism of resource allocation, and free trade amongst
competing states encourages co-operation as states are drawn into the burgeoning global
economy. Co-operation and not conflict is the order of the day, with multilateral regimes and
institutions providing the forum for co-operation (Burchill, 1996: 37). In a world dominated by
markets, the function of economic institutions is to maintain the most efficient operation of the
markets. This rationale is reflected in the operations and policy recommendations of the IMF,
the G-7 and the World Bank (Cox, 1994: 46).
It is claimed by neoliberal-institiitionalism that markets provide the best means of ensuring
accountability by forcing out inefficient or corrupt governance practices. To do this markets
require access to information and transparency in the economic and political process to
maintain economic stability. When a lack of transparency is apparent, the world markets
become more volatile (for example, see Chapter 4). Thus, a principal justification for
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transparency and increased access to information is to enhance the working of global markets
to ensure their increased efficiency.
For neoliberal-institutionalism a core requirement of international institutions is to ensure and
promote the transparency of actors behaviour to arrive at an intersubjective agreement on the
rules for co-operation. It is claimed by Kratochwil and Ruggie that institutions of MGCI can be
very effective in creating transparency by proliferating a set of shared norms and values (1997:
35). The aim of transparency in this sense is to enhance the trust between participants who
have entered into global agreements. This desire for openness is reflected in a wide range of
multilateral agreements, for example the terms of Non-Proliferation Treaty mean that: '... the
likelihood that any actor can conduct secret nuclear tests.. .is now vanishingly small' (Young,
1992: 178). The behaviour of actors in monitored, thus enhancing the prospects for co-
operation and compliance with the norms and rules of multilateral institution.
Keohane argues that the role of MOO is to reduce uncertainty in the world by improving the
quality and quantity of information available (1983: 161-165). He believes increased access to
information reduces risk and uncertainty, this implies that open governance is preferable to
closed governance. By arguing that openness is beneficial and leads to informal contacts and
the sharing of once confidential internal documents, Keohane believes it will lead to more open
discussion. This sharing of information and greater openness is the means to enhanced co-
operation, building trust and securing the continued existence of the international agreement.
Recently Keohane has raised the question of how institutions of MGG are governed (1998: 83).
He argues that accountability in international institutions can only be attained through
36
'conditions of maximum transparency' (1998: 94). This he suggests can be achieved through
the participation of non-government organisations and new technology, creating an environment
of public scrutiny. In advocating greater transparency Keohane however does not engage with
bow the obstacles to greater access to information and participation will be overcome. He
presents a fundamentally apolitical and technocratic view of reforming the institutions of MGQ
that lacks a political dimension (Long, 1996: 496). Critics of neoliberal-institutionalism
continue to be concerned by the lack of public accountability in the institutions that the
perspective promotes (Burchill, 1996: 58).
Despite identifying a range of actors operating at the global level a key criticism made of
neoliberal-institutionalism is the continuing primacy they give to the state and interstate
relations. Keohane argues that the key role of institutions of MGG is to help states achieve their
goals (1998: 83). As a consequence a number of commentators argue that this perspective
retains some similarities with traditional international relations which maintains the state as the
principal unit of analysis (Dunne, 1997: 158; Long, 1996: 492, Waltz 1998: 385). Sklair
describes the 'transnational model of Keohane and Nye as continuing to conceptualise 'the
state and its agencies as by far the most important actors in the global system' (1991: 4).
However, by maintaining the state as the principal unit of analysis it perpetuates the problems
of exclusion and a lack of accountability in the institutions of MGQ. States remain the key
actors and a more expansive type of transparency and accountability incorporating wider
society is marginalised. The neoliberal-institutionalist perspective does not engage with the
political arguments needed to extend its commitment to transparency to making the institutions
of MGG more accountable.
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This exclusion of wider society is reinforced by the orthodoxy of the neoliberal agenda as it
dominates, constrains and shapes political activity, with the disadvantaged in the global system
powerless to resist (Galbraith, 1997: 5). Globalisation is presented as an inevitable and
unstoppable process which some believe will become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Ferguson,
1992). Its taken for granted assumption about globalisation and world order has resulted in
critics claiming that neoliberal-institutionalism acts as an ideological device to obfuscate the
rationality of economic globalisation.
The implications for accountability are that this separation of the economic from the political
makes it likely that MGG will remain largely unaccountable, despite the rhetoric of
transparency within institutionalism. According to critics, the institutionalist approach presents
a view of MGG which seeks to support and deepen the current institutions of MGG rather than
challenge them (Broadhead, 1995: 663). Neoliberal institutionalism represents 'globalisation
from above' with global market forces dominant over social forces, and accountability viewed
primarily as accountability to the market (Falk, 1995: 172).
Radical Perspective
From this perspective the global order is a reflection of capitalist material and ideological
structures. A central concern of this approach is identif'ing the sources of domination and
power in the social, cultural and economic world which shape, constitute and re-constitute the
prevailing world order (Devetak, 1996: 156; Falk, 1997: 43). This includes not only state
forms but also a wide range of structures of modernity, the latest being globalisation (Devetak,
1996: 156). To reinforce this point Gill claims that a central aspect of the globalisation process
has been the 'internationalisation, transnationalisation or indeed globalization of the state'
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(1993: 9). From this perspective the global re-configuration of power around the
mternationalisation of the state means there are limits upon a more accountable formulation of
MUG. As a consequence accountability, almost by definition, cannot exist without sweeping
changes to the nature of world order.
The radical perspective is concerned with explaining how this shift towards MUG came about
by analysing the trend towards hyper-liberal forms of capitalism. It is argued that the shift in
governance to the global level stems from the crisis occurring within the capitalist economic
system during the 1 970s, characterised by the end of cheap energy and cheap money (Cox,
1996a: 247). This point is reinforced by Stephen Gill who argues that it was the re-structuring
of the global economy on a neoliberal model, and not the Cold War, that was the most
significant event in recent times. The role of MGG in the 1980s and 1990s was central in this
process with the 0-7, IMF and the World Bank supervising a structural transformation of the
global economy (1992: 272).
Thus, according to this perception of the world, the institutions of MUG have become a key
component in the production of dominant social forces. This particular mode of social relations
based upon a capitalist world order comes about due to the interaction between ideas,
institutions and material capabilities (see Cox, 1996: 98). According to Cox, those ideas that
are intersubjective or commonly shared, come to define the nature of social relations. For
example, the IMF and the World Bank through the universal application of the ideas and
policies of the neoliberal development model, 'stabiliz[e] and perpetuate a particular order'
(1996: 99) by creating a hegemonic discourse. The material means to undertake this project are
found in the technological and organisational capabilities of these institutions (Cox, 1996: 98).
The model has been shaped by a combination of capitalist production, the hegemony of the
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United States and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Van der Piji, 1984). The political coherence
of this neoliberal orthodoxy has been determined by the 'historic bloc' of social forces, ideas,
institutions and material capabilities (Gill, 1992: 271). As Cox explains:
'There is a transitional process of consensus formation among the official
caretakers of the global economy. This process generates consensus guidelines,
underpinned by an ideology of globalization ... [this takes place] ... through the
Bank for International Settlement, the IMF and the 0-7. These shape the
discourse within which policies are defined, the terms and concepts that
circumscribe what can be thought and done.' (Cox, 1994: 49).
From this viewpoint globalisation plays an important part in the process of reinforcing the
hegemony of global capitalist interests. The hegemony of globalisation stresses the inevitability
and irreversibility of this process, whereas Cox argues it is a creation of the social, economic
and political structures that create the rules, which support the dominant mode of production
(1996a: 102-109). For Cox one of the most important components for the maintenance of this
world order are the institutions of MGG which he describes as the mechanisms of hegemony.
Multilateral global governance performs an ideological role by legitimising the policies
implemented by international organisations and setting the policy agenda for states. States are
accountable not to their citizens but to the international economic order (Cox, 1994: 45).
Institutions of MGG are central to the maintenance of the global capitalist system, supported
by a discourse of globalisation that denies an alternative.
The implications of this analysis for accountability in MGG are profound as regulatory power
and authority shifts from the domestic sphere to the global, moving the location of governance
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further away from public view. This shift is then legitimised at the national level by political
leaders who maintain they are powerless to resist the forces of globalisation. The result has
been the insulation of capital from popular scrutiny and accountability (Gill, 1992: 269).
According to Cox a consequence of this loss of regulatory power has been the disempowering
of civil society, the primary source of opposition to globalisation (1996a: 113).
A further implication of this analysis is that the discourse of transparency as a means of
accountability in the processes of MGG loses its political and radical content as a source of
opposition (see Chapter 3: sections on top-down and bottom-up transparency). Transparency
becomes associated most closely with market accountability. The logic of the market posits that
everyone benefits from a stable global economy and therefore it follows the logic of
'enlightened self-interest' to both increase transparency in national economic policy and
empower the surveillance role of MGG to ensure no one country is trying to buck the market.
To behave otherwise would, according to market logic, be irresponsible. However, Murphy
points out: '...the structuring of social relations by the promulgation and promotion of
"consensual" norms followed by the construction of institutions to monitor compliance, quickly
becomes an invisible and seemingly benign form of social control' (1994: 114). The result of
this is that these institutions then 'create modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with
the hegemonic social order' (Cox, 1996a: 126). According to Robinson this means that 'even
the fairest, most open and transparent process, administered with perfect impartiality, will not
generate good outcomes if the rules of supranational [institutions are determined by the logic of
free market forces]' (1995: 375).
In his conclusion to Production, Power and Social Order, Cox identifies one source of change
in the world order: the weakening of global hegemony through the mobilisation of counter
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hegemonic historic blocs, the result of which is a diffusion of power (1987: 394). Cox (1997)
believes that a reconstituted civil society provides the basis of a new multilateralism which is
based upon democratic principles including greater accountability. What is required is a
restructuring of multilateral institutions - an approach that has been advocated by the
'Multilateralism and the United Nations' (MUNS) Project (see Gill 1997a: 6-8). The MUNs
Project advocates the need to understand the processes of globalisation, the role of MGG and
the transformation of the inter-state system (Gill, 1 997a: 7). The obstacles to more accountable
forms of MGG appear strong, however pressure from below for an increased role for civil
society continues to challenge these powerful forces.
Critics of this approach point to the way the radical approach places constraints upon agents to
affect the structures of global capital' 4 . If we accept that resistance and the reform of global
capital might be possible, then determining how this could be done through human agency
remains a central concern. Others claim that Cox has failed to comprehend the complex and
multi-dimensional nature of globalisation and the contemporary social order; he is mistaken in
his belief that globalisation has led to an emerging internatidnal structure of authority, the
internationalisation of the state, and a hegemony of transnational social forces (Germain and
Kenny, 1998: 4: 16). Instead states continue to take and make decisions albeit in the context of
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and G-7. This realisation, it is argued, questions the
extent to which authority has been reconstituted around the internationalisation of the state
(Germain and Kenny, 1998: 16). Other criticisms are made by Spegele who asks why is it, as
Cox insists, that a more emancipatory world order 'can only be built through a political
movement capable of uniting sufficient of the segmented elements of existing societies into a
counter hegemonic bloc' (Cox 1987: 403). Spegele goes on to suggest that the possibilities of
For an example of individuals and NOOs mounting a successfW campaign against the World Bank. see case study in Chapter 6.
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this counter hegemonic bloc are limited, and questions whether there is a viable, superior
alternative (form of governance) to MGG available at the global level (1997: 224).
The radical approach of Cox and others has an important contribution to make to the
discussion of accountability in MGG. However, this perspective remains pessimistic about the
prospects for wider accountability. This is because from this perspective the structural
dominance of transnational forces make the possibility of holding institutions of MGG to
account a distant and unlikely proposition' 5 . From this analysis the possibility of increased
levels of accountability in MGG is limited at best and non-existent at worst. As a consequence
accountability becomes a non-issue because transparency, accountability and participation are
largely illusionary.
Cosmopolitan Democracy
The final transformationalist theory to be looked at here is the school of cosmopolitan
democracy. Its starting point is a dissatisfaction with existing modes of governance under
conditions of globalisation (Held, 1997: 296). According to Held globalisation has changed the
spatial limits of governance and the traditional state-centred view is being displaced by a
nascent transnationalism (1995: 91). Due to global processes there is a need to link groups
existing at the national and sub-national level with those institutions of governance at the global
level (Hoffman, 1995: 211). Cosmopolitan theorists believe that the peoples of the world
should and can play an active role in their governance through global institutions in conjunction
with state institutions (Archibugi, 1995: 135). This is underpinned by the belief that the forces
of globalisation have created multiple disjunctures that challenge the traditional state-centred
13 Others have acknowledged this limitation and have attempted to move beyond merel y providing a critique of transnational
neoliberalism through what they describe as a politics of resistance (See Gills, 1997).
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perspective: international law; internationalisation of political decision-making; international
security structures, globalisation of culture and the world economy (Held, 1995: 101-134).
According to Held the changes emanating from developments in these five areas have resulted
in a shift in location and the nature of the governance process away from territorially bounded,
sovereign states (Held, 1995: 135).
In common with neoliberal-institutionalism, advocates of cosmopolitan democracy believe the
process of governance occurs not only in state constituted institutions but in a range of non-
governmental organisations. In contrast to neoliberal-institutionalism, the cosmopolitans
envisage the '... creation of a democratic community which involves and cuts across the
democratic state' (Held, 1995: 13). This change to the democratic community is fuelled by
global processes, and the 'globalisation of modern life' presents new challenges to the way
global politics should be viewed. The forces of globalisation have led to 'new forms of political
community and citizenship in the global age' (Linklater, 1993: 6). This can be viewed as a
direct challenge to Westphalian norms and the traditional distinction between the inside
(domestic polity) and outside (international relations). Cosmopolitan democratic theory rejects
artificial state boundaries. It attempts to establish the connections between different levels of
governance and span the political space between the traditional inside/outside distinction, thus
creating a more inclusive form of polity.
A primary question that Held wants to address is that under conditions of globalisation 'to
whom are decision-makers accountable, and to whom should they be accountable?' (1991b:
204). According to Held, traditional democratic theory has conventionally decreed that
accountability is an issue for national politics. This traditional view is brought into question
because 'the very process of governance can escape the reach of the nation-state' (Held, 1993:
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25). Because public policy is now made in issue areas which transcend national interests
through the mechanisms of MGG there is a need for these mechanisms to be accountable.
As indicated above, Held identifies five disjunctures or developments which have contributed to
undermining the principle of public accountability between citizens and the state. The most
important of these for this discussion has been the 'internationalization of political decision-
making' (Held, 1995: 107). According to Held, national governance has been compromised by
multilateral forms of governance. To his credit he does qualify this statement and points out
that this should not necessarily be taken as a threat to sovereignty due to states inviting
assistance from the IMF or the World Bank (1995: 111). Held reasons that the key issue is not
whether States have ceded power and authority to institutions of MGG, rather what the
internationalisation of decision-making means for policy-making, its implementation and the
mechanisms of accountability (Held, 1995: 111).
The normative cosmopolitan model is based upon a perceived need to create supra-national
bodies which require popular accountability underpinned by the principle of individual
autonomy (Held, 1996: Ch 9). The concept of cosmopolitan democracy includes both this
desire for enhanced individual autonomy and the reconstruction of governing institutions.
Individual autonomy allows for individuals to act '... self-consciously, to be self-reflecting and
to be self-determining' (Held, 1995: 146). This can be actualised through the provision of
rigbts and the protection they secure for the individual. In order for this to occur a key feature
of autonomy is accountability and transparency to protect against the use of arbitrary political
authority and coercive power (Held, 1996: 300).
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Thus, the principle of autonomy has important implications for accountability, not least
because autonomy means individuals have institutionalised rights. These include the right to
access and participation in those institutions that condition social life and which exercise
political power (Goldblatt, 1997: 142). Thus, transparency is an integral part of this rights-
based agenda for change. Accountability will be enhanced if the rights of the individual are
upheld by governance institutions through increased transparency, information access and
participation. Conversely, it assumes a respect for privacy in all matters other than those which
may harm others (Held, 1996: 300).
Critics of cosmopolitan democracy identif' a number of problems with this approach. It does
not give a convincing account of how global capital can be tamed (McGrew, 1997b: 253;
Jordan, 1996: 85). The very nature of economic globalisation constrains the possibility of a
more accountable form of MGG. It reinforces the traditional global multilateral institutions,
leaving them 'insufficiently regulated and restrained' (Jones, 1997: 48). A key question for
critics of the current neoliberal economic orthodoxy is how, under current conditions of
deregulated interconnectedness, can control over capital be re-established? (Leys, 1996: 56).
By accepting the inevitability of globalisation and the neoliberal economic agenda, the best that
can be expected is more effective management rather than a radical shift in the mode of
governance (Broadhead, 1995: 654).
Also, Held fails to explain why those with power would want to give it up for the principle of
democratic autonomy (Goldblatt, 1997: 149). He appears to believe that reforms are possible
without acknowledging the persistent and many sources of power in social relations. Thus, it
would appear that the cosmopolitan approach gives the justification and the means for
establishing greater accountability at the global level, however it is undone when it ignores
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issues of contemporaly power and authority, and how these structural constraints can be
overcome.
Held contends that cosmopolitan democracy requires the creation of authoritative global
institutions and the replacement of states' coercive powers with a reconstructed international
order. His idea of cosmopolitan democracy does not appear to contain a clearly defined
conception of power, and he gives insufficient weight to the structures and strategies states and
MGG use to maintain power. It would appear, that the rights-based agenda of cosmopolitan
democracy understates the nature of power relations at the global level. For example, where
Held sees disjunctures in the internationalisation of the state, others believe that state authority
is being extended and reasserted in new ways (Hurrell, 1995). Sceptics believe that a
cosmopolitan democracy will remain an unfulfilled ambition because the existing world order
remains one based upon the continuing sovereignty and autonomy of the state (McGrew,
1997b: 255).
Critics argue that cosmopolitan democracy is no more than a normative dream and that there
are limits to how far the globalisation of economic affairs can be made more accountable
(Martin, 1996: 153). In fairness to Held, it is for this reason that accountability needs to be
pursued at the local and national levels, and a balance struck between global and local interests.
However, it has been pointed out that the principle of autonomy may enhance accountability,
but it is not clear if this principle would be widely embraced (Goldblatt, 1997: 149). As
Spegele points out, accountability will not necessarily be enhanced by living in a more global
world (Spegele, 1997: 224). In his critique of Held's work, Goldblatt points out that the ideals
of a cosmopolitan democracy remain constrained by the primary mode of domination, the
sovereign state (1997: 149).
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A further critique of cosmopolitanism is provided by Danilo Zolo (a confessed ethical
relativist) in his work Cosmopolis in which he rejects the universalism of cosmopolitanism.
Zolo raises an issue about the moral content of cosmopolitanism and particularly its universal
rights dimension. This is based upon a scepticism that a cosmopolitan form of governance
could and should transcend national borders. He concludes that the most likely outcome in this
direction would be the reproduction of coercive powers in the form of a 'single planetary
superpower' (1997: 121). Importantly, in his critique of cosmopolitanism, Zolo makes the case
that it is essential to distinguish between problems which are global in scope, and those that are
only solvable by resorting to some type of supranational authority.
Notwithstanding the criticisms made of the cosmopolitan approach it has much to recommend
it, particularly from a normative perspective. Its strengths are that it suggest the possibility of a
democratic form of multilateral global governance that places issues of accountability at the
core of its analysis. Its main limitation is the extent to which the cosmopolitan ideals are
feasible in the existing world order. As a consequence the perspective remains susceptible to
criticisms of being utopian. It is not probing enough in its analysis of authority and power in
the world, and although it holds out the prospect for an accountable form of MOG, it is not
clear how this would be achieved and what problems would be encountered.
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Table 2: Four Perspectives on Multilateral Global Governance
and Accountability




State-centred	 In a traditional state-centred approach 	 State-centred world order results in a
Perspective	 institutions of MGG are dominated by state narrow conception of accountability. Wider
actors. There is an implicit assumption that society remains excluded from the political
the nature of world politics remains much 	 process, with the global agenda presented as
the same despite the processes of 	 distinct from the domestic agenda.
globalisation. It is the nature of power
politics and the international system that act This places constraints upon the notion of
as obstacles to increasing the scope of	 accountability. At the international level
accountability in MGG.	 accountability in MGG is viewed essentially
as an inter-state affair between state
______________ ____________________________________ representatives and bureaucrats.
Neoliberal	 This approach recognises a world governed Transparency is primarily about market
Institutionalism by a plurality of political and non-political 	 efficiency, and not about making the
institutions. It challenges the traditional 	 institutions of MGG more accountable.
state-based notion of governance. To	 .	 .The exclusion of wider society is reinforced
conceive of governance only in terms of by the orthodoxy of the neohberal economic
states ignores the increasing degree of 	 .	 .
agenda. The implications for accountability
complex interdependence that exists at the
are that the separation of the economic fromglobal level and the extent to which 	 .
the political makes it likely that MGG willglobalisation has eroded the power of the
remain largely unaccountable, despite the
state. Institutions of MGG will increase the
rhetoric of transparency.
scope of their activities through institutional
______________ co-operation	 ____________________________________
Radical	 The prospects for a more accountable form The radical approach has an important
Perspective	 of MGG is constrained by the dominant	 contribution to make to the discussion of
capitalist ideological forces in society. The accountability in MGG. However, this
structural transformation of the global 	 perspective remains pessimistic and the
economy is managed by multilateral	 prospects for wider accountability are
economic institutions and the ideology of	 considered poor. This is because from this
globalisation is hegemonic.
	 perspective the structural dominance of
transnational forces make the possibility of
holding institutions of MGG to account a
______________ ____________________________________ distant and unlikely proposition.
Cosmopolitan	 Globalisation has changed the spatial form The strengths of the cosmopolitan approach
Democracy	 of governance so that the traditional state-	 are its normative world view; and the
centred view is being displaced. The peoples recognition of individuals and groups as
of the world should and can play an active 	 necessaiy for democratic accountability. Its
role in their governance. Multiple	 main limitation is the extent to which this Is
disjunctures challenge the traditional state- possible under existing world order the
centred perspective, and have resulted in a governance mechanisms and thus it remains
shift in location and the nature of the
	 susceptible to criticisms of being utopian. It
governance process away from territorially 	 is not probing enough in its analysis of
_______________ bounded, sovereign states.
	
authority and power in the world.
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Conclusion
l'his chapter has set out to explore the relationship between accountability in MGG. Integral to
the discussion have been the processes of globalisation which have led to the
internationalisation of the state and the increased authority of multilateral institutions. From the
perspective of the end of the state debate, the institutions of MGG are presented as an
inevitable part of the globalisation process. Markets and multi-dimensional global forces have
undermined the authority of the state leading to an increase in regulatory power of institutions
of MGG. This raises uneasiness about the way we are governed and how these global
institutions can be held to account. These concerns about the way we are governed under
conditions of globalisation are at the centre of the critique presented by the myth of
globalisation literature. It is claimed that by accepting both the inevitability and consequences
of globalisation it acts to de-politicise the globalisation process and misunderstand the nature of
the process. The ideology of globalisation acts to obfuscate power and authority and undermine
accountability in MGG by shielding governments from criticism, whilst governance at the
global level remains distant and unaccountable. However, despite the issues that both these
perspectives raise for accountability in MGG, neither engage directly with how a more
accountable form of MGQ might be achieved. They fail to outline how more open, transparent
and accountable institutions of MGG can be created, or what problems a more open and
accountable formulation of MGG might have for effective and efficient governance at the
global level.
The four theoretical perspectives present different possibilities for accountability in MGG: the
state-centred and radical perspective are largely pessimistic, whereas the neoliberal-
institutionalist and cosmopolitan approaches present a more optimistic picture. However, none
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of these approaches have been subjected to close scrutiny to see how their prescription for
accountability manifest themselves in empirical cases. The prescriptions offered by these
perspectives fail to acknowledge how public accountability through the release of unbiased
information; public access to information; openness in the governance and public participation
in the policy-making process, can be achieved. The remainder of the thesis looks at these issues
thiough the conceptual lens of transparency and secrecy. As the next two chapters demonstrate,




The objective of public accountability in the institutions of MGG is threatened by the tension
that exists between the practices of openness and secrecy. Traditionally an environment of
openness is taken as the hallmark of publicly accountable political institutions, and secrecy is
seen as its antithesis (Beetham and Boyle, 1995: 62-66). However concealment is often
considered legitimate to enhance the function of governance (Shils, 1956; Bok, 1982). Due to
this ambiguity about the use of secrecy, the guiding questions will be, what are the
circumstances, if any, in which secrecy can be justified? What different interpretations can be
placed upon the use of secrecy, and what are the implications of secrecy for accountability?
The existence of secrecy in institutions and political systems that would normally be considered
accountable is well documented (Franck & Weisband, 1974; Galnoor (ed), 1977; Robertson,
1982: 1-3; Gibb, 1995: 213). Secrecy is ubiquitous and can be found in governance institutions
at local, national, regional and global levels (Teft, 1980: 9). In studies of the social role of
secrecy, the most common approach is to explore the way that secrets impact upon other people
and particularly the consequences for those who have been excluded from the contents of the
secret (Luhrmann, 1989: 161). To understand the implications of this exclusion for
accountability it is necessary to understand the relationship between secrecy and the exercise of
power (for example: Simmel, 1969ed; Shils, 1956; Bok 1982; and Bellman 1984).
52
There are three main sections to this chapter. The first explores the ambiguity of secrecy by
looking at the relationship between secrecy and power; the role of secrecy in the governance
process and concludes by discussing the morality of secrecy. The second section sets out four
types of secrecy which are categorised as institutional, productive, neutral, and functional. The
final section examines the role of secrecy in MGG by looking at the mystification of global
authority; the prospects for the reform of MGG to make it more accountable, and finally the
relationship between secrecy and efficiency in governance processes.
Secrecy and Ambiguity: 'Man's greatest achievement' or a
source of misgovernance?
Specific reference to the study of secrecy is not prevalent in the literature on multilateral global
governance (or for that matter in the social sciences in general). According to Gibb the study of
secrecy has been a peripheral concern for scholars of International Relations (1995: 213).
Notwithstanding this those who have paid particular attention to the phenomenon of secrecy
have identified it as one of the most important of the myriad forms of social acts that exist.
Simmel goes as far as to describe secrecy as 'one of man's greatest achievements' (1969: 330).
The reason why Simmel places such importance upon secrecy is because secrecy offers the
possibility of a 'second world alongside the manifest world' (1969: 330). According to Simmel,
secrecy offers the possibility of Pvo worlds existing simultaneously; one world that is visible
and manifest, and another world that is hidden and concealed.
Because this other, secret, world hides its content from the manifest world it creates the
possibility that the latter can be decisively influenced by what is concealed, thus the secret
world creates the potential for 'an immense enlargement of life' (Simmel, 1969: 330)16. It is
16 The mystical and ubiquitous quality of secrecy is explored by Joseph Conrad in his work Under Western Eyes ([1910] 1985: 99).
lie wites, 'Can you conceive of secret places in Eternity? Impossible. Whereas life is full of thenf.
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this increased scope to act undetected in a wide range of social relations that is the attraction of
secrecy. The primary attribute of secrecy is that it creates space in which activities can occur
that would otherwise prove difficult or impossible, and which can range from the innocuous
pursuit of privacy, to the harmful reinforcement of power. As Feldman points out, secrecy
provides the means to 'accomplish one's goals that would be difficult or impossible to
accomplish otherwise.' (Feldman, 1988: 87). The attraction of secrecy to governance becomes
dearer by considering that without secrecy, sensitive agreements might not be reached;
common interests might be threatened; and the mechanics of the policy process might fail to
function efficiently and effectively (Shils, 1956: 25; Friedrich, 1972: 178). The utility of
secrecy is supported by those who believe that the keeping of secrets is an intrinsic, if flawed,
part of human nature. Any attempt to rid politics of secrecy would be futile, secrecy being a
necessary, integral, functional and ubiquitous part of all social relations (Bok, 1982: 18-l9)'
Because of this secrecy has been described as 'a political act par excellence...' (Feldman,
1988: 87).
Secrecy and Power
Secrets confer a degree of power on the holder and for this reason a secret can be a seductive
and powerful motivating force as a strategy in governance. The use of secrecy in the attainment
and exercise of power has led Cannetti to comment that 'secrecy lies at the very core of power'
(1973: 338). Underpinning most studies of secrecy is the assumption that the intentional use of
17 Another body of literature that rejects a belief in universal transparency and the simple dichotomy, between on one hand secrecy,
myth and superstition, and on the other, openness and publicity, is the post-modern perspective. It is argued that in a post-modern era
it is increasingly difficult to make choices between what is manifest and what is not, and that this ambiguity is a characteristic of the
contemporaly era. Rather than producing a more transparent society, what we have is one that is more chaotic and complex with
meaning increasingly difficult to discern, resulting in a greater confusion and chaos of social relations (Vattimo, 1992: 4). Similarly,
Bauman argues that the 'quest for order' in contemporaly society is a fight between openness and concealment; the modern world is
full of ambivalence and part of this ambivalence is that 'opacity emerges at the other end of the struggle for transparency' (1991: 13).
In this sense openness and secrecy are part of the same process and the struggle for openness only results in greater confusion and
disorder with the truth obscured The coritcmporaly era is considered to be an increasingly complex world, a world where social
processes are mystified and become less transparent, more hidden and less obvious (see: Beck, 1992; Bauman, 1991; Vattinio, 1992)
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secrecy serves to enhance the interests of those holding the secret (Petersen, 1993: 334)'
Thus, it is impossible to explore the tension between secrecy and openness without
investigating the relationship between power and secrecy. As Bok succinctly puts it, 'conflicts
over secrecy...are conflicts over power' (1982: 19).
The legitimate use of secrecy is bound up with our conceptions of the relationship between
authority and governance. In pre-modern times the use of secrecy was understood as an
essential part of authoritative and legitimate governance: 'Indeed part of the very moral
ascendancy and self-esteem of the absolute monarch.. .lay in their consciousness of possessing
arcana imperium [state secretsi from which all others in society were excluded' (Shils, 1956:
23). The use of secrecy was a part of the 'divine right' to rule exercised under the authority of
kings - the principle of arcana imperium. This esoteric rationale for secrecy was legitimised by
the moral imperative that those with absolute power had literally a god-given right to exclude
other lesser beings from the decision-making process (Bok, 1982: 6). The keeping of secrets
symbolised power, acted as an instrument to impose the political will of the ruler and as a
means of protection and self-preservation. Thus the importance of secrecy for ruling was not
lost upon the absolute rulers: 'the very act of hiding knowledge raises the value of what is
hidden, both by lending it awe and by keeping it from public confrontation with potential rivals'
(Luhrmann, 1989: 144).
"The use of secrecy as a source of control and power is well illustrated in Bentham's idea of the panopticon. The panopticon (an
architectural device) is a pison in which the warders can continuously observe prisoners without the prisoners knowledge (or so they
believe). The power of the panopticon is the creation of an a11-transparent' environment (Bozovic 1995: 1). Al the same time the
warders' power is reinforced by them being able to conceal their actions from the prisoners. The prisoners remain visible whilst the
warders are concealed. All the power ofthe inspector 'derives from his invisibility, or more precisely, his invisible omnipresence'
(Bozovic, 1995: 9). This highlights the role that secrecy can play in society when one group is able to conceal themselves, information
or decision-making from another. The secret, concealed group is all powerful and able to resist being challenged whereas the exposed
group are transparent and vulnerable. Foucault has also used the ideas of the panopticon in his discussion of modes of surveillance,
governance and control in contemporary society. See Foucault, 1977.
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With the coming of the Enlightenment and the revolutions that overthrew autocratic rule in the
Western world over the period of 150 years, the myths, superstitions and tradition of the old
order of rulers were gradually replaced by openness, the rule of law and the establishment of
democratic rulers (Brautigam, 1991: 7). The rule of the governors was based upon principles of
accountability and participation, with secrecy viewed as illegitimate except in exceptional
circumstances relating to matters of national security or the stability of the state (see Held,
1996: 70-7 1). Even so, 'one way that ruling elites can gain and hold control is by preventing
citizens from having access to, or from achieving some understanding of, certain types of
information' (Restivo, 1986: 81). As a consequence the continuing use of secrecy remains an
attractive option when in power.
The legitimate use of secrecy is premised upon the authority of institutions. This stems from the
Weberian notion of rational-legal authority which justifies certain acts to ensure the efficient
running of society (Robertson, 1985: 17). According to Gibb an institution unable to protect
itself from external threats may quickly dissolve as it is unable to control those external forces
that may pose a threat to it (1995: 214). Too much transparency can be viewed as a threat to
the authority of the governing institution because it may undermine both the rational and
traditional basis of governance. Therefore secrecy if it secures the authority of the institution
may have a good effect upon society. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that just
because the public are excluded from the decision-making process they will be worse off for it.
The issue of access to information highlights the ambiguity of secrecy. Secrets do not always
convey strength and may undermine the power they are designed to secure. One of the
paradoxes of secrecy is that secrets are extremely difficult to keep. This is because
'information is generated and broadcast so widely it becomes almost impossible for a clique to
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keep it under wraps' (Independent, 10-6-95. See also Shils, 1956: 36 and Galnoor, 1977: 312.).
In an era of enhanced technological communications and ever-present global media,
government secrets are forever being revealed. This it is argued has enhanced the accountable
nature of the relationship between governance institutions and society. Furthermore,
governance institutions themselves recognise that openness can be the basis of their legitimacy
and continuing authority. A society's exposure to revelations of secrecy in governance
institutions can jeopardise that relationship of authority and legitimacy between the governors
and the governed. Misztal reasons that due to the need to be viewed as legitimate the decision-
making process is becoming ever more transparent (1996: 255).
The claim that Western society has become more open and governance processes less concealed
has been contested. Canetti believes that in modern society, '...secrets are the most concentrated
and dangerous that have ever existed...' (1973: 345). Today under conditions of globalisation,
secrets often concern everyone as the world becomes smaller and more interconnected. The
denial of access to information about the governance process means that those excluded are not
only extremely disadvantaged, but they are unable to challenge the legitimacy of authority or
participate fully in the political process' 9 . To be denied access to information is to lack power,
and it is this outcome which fuels the calls for openness. Openness and publicity impose a
powerful curb upon the illegitimate use of deliberate secrecy. The next section explores this
issue further by examining arguments for and against the use of secrecy in the process of
governance.
'9 A similar point is made by Snow (1961) in which he argues that the most important decisions in society are made by a handful of
men, in secret. He documents the case of the Tizard Committee: a group of scientists in Britain whose secret deliberations determined
the choice of Britain's militazy strategy during World War Two. The lack of openness and the degree of secrecy resulted in a number
of significant mistakes occumng. The 'euphoria of secrecy' led to mistakes and self-deception.
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Secrecy and Efficient Governance
One commentator is outwardly contemptuous of too much openness. Simon Jenkins, in an
article entitled 'In Praise of Secrecy', argues that openness in all areas of government would
lead to anarchy and paralysis. Government would be at the mercy of the spontaneous whim of
the people, thus undermining effective policy-making. Jenkins adopts a pragmatic line and
maintains that secrecy is both acceptable and necessary, and should override demands for full
accountability. He writes: 'secrecy and openness are opposite extremes. They are thesis and
antithesis. In a democracy they require a synthesis' (The Times, 2-1 1-94). In the Introduction I
suggested that this synthesis, to use Jenkins' phrase, can only be determined by societal
consensus to establish the legitimate use of secrecy. As yet this consensus remains undeveloped
when exploring the governance mechanisms of institutions of MGG.
Building a consensus needs a number of factors to be taken into consideration not least the
legitimate use of secrecy. For example, open, participatory processes may make governance
less predictable and less efficient (Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1192: 311). At an individual
level the keeping and holding of a secret is often portrayed as a mark of one's good character
and trustworthiness 20 . Those who can keep a secret may be marked out as individuals who are
more worthy of friendship than others 21 . In non-western cultures secrecy can play a positive
part in societal relations. For example, in a study of Pueblo society - a North American Indian
tribe - secrecy is a dynamic process that serves a variety of functions for the essential
maintenance of that society (Brandt, 1980: 125: See also Petersen, 1993 and Piot, 1993). In a
study of West African societies, the secret cabal has been allocated a positive function in the
20 The attraction of secrets to the individual can be found in its 'position ofexception...identity enhancement...of achievement too, of
intimacy' (Nisbet, 1980: 105). Equally, the attraction of secrecy might be in its ability to turn the mundane into something considered
risky.
' Notwithstanding this, an aphorism of Nietzsche with regards to the maintaining of confidentiality of friends' secrets is that 'There
will be few, who when they are in want of matter for conversation, do not reveal the more secret affairs of their friends' (1986ed:
139).
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running of society, 'where the political elites use the secrecy of the society and the
exclusiveness of its temples to discuss sensitive political issues' (Bellman, 1981: 6). This use of
secrecy in different cultures highlights the point made in the Introduction about whether the use
of secrecy has to be socially determined. The point being that the characterisation of secrecy as
negative and mutually exclusive to the norms of society is contradicted by those societies that
have utilised secrecy as a positive force in their social institutions.
Secrecy and (Im)Morality
Those in favour of increased openness postulate that to act secretly is to act immorally, that is
to act in a way that is contrary to a prescribed set of social norms. It is claimed that one way of
conceptualising secrecy is that it is 'a strategy for hiding acts . . .which others hold in moral
disrepute' (Warren and Laslett, 1977: 44). This moralistic view of secrecy is taken by Jeremy
Bentham who believes that not only is transparency necessary for political accountability, it is
morally desirable22 in a progressive, modern society . Bentham believes secrecy to be an
obstacle to effective accountability and argues against the use of secrecy due to the increased
scope that secrecy offers for unaccountable action by public institutions (Bok, 1982: 171).
More recently, Falk has argued that 'secrecy is the mantle that state and market forces throw
over a range of activities which could not easily withstand the impact of moral, political, and
legal scrutiny' (Falk, 1995a: 239). Secrecy is one means by which those in power are able to
conceal or obfuscate the outcomes of certain activities which, if they became more widely
known, would be considered morally reprehensible. To remove this cloak of secrecy, Falk
The American President Woodrow Wilson argued that government if it is pure and correct in its processes it should be absolutely
public in everything that affects it' (Wilson in Friedrich, 1972: 181). In practice Wilson failed to live up to his ovm ideal, taking a
more pragmatic view once in power, and engaged in confidential diplomatic negotiations 1ien required (Gutmann and Thompson,
1996).
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advocates the deepening and widening of democratic openness, underpinned by the principle of
transparency to counter the prevalence of secrecy.
This view of the absolute need for openness is criticised as being a 'primitive psycholog[ical]'
view of secrecy (Friedrich, 1972: 175). Friedrich believes that secrecy is morally desirable in a
democracy as a means of sustaining the necessary elite rule required for securing the national
or common interest (Gibb, 1995: 214). He considers secrecy to be dysfunctional only when it
becomes excessive, as in an authoritarian or police s1ate . To co'nckn cty ou.trigJt, as
Bentham has done, is too extreme a statement of the dysfunctionality of secrecy and
oversimplifies the issues of morality surrounding openness and secrecy (Friedrich, 1972: 181).
There exists information that must be kept secret which questions the idea that politics is more
accountable just because it is more open. For example, the use of secrecy in a secret ballot
would suggest that secrecy is not intrinsically undemocratic (for an elaboration of this point see
Chapter 7).
A Typology of Secrecy
In the discussion above I have focused upon some of the main issues that concern the use of
secrecy in the governance process. I will now move on to distinguish four different types of
secrecy: institutional; productive; neutral; and functional. This tvpology provides a means to
differentiate between the different ways secrecy is applied and used. Separating secrecy out in
this way is not to suggest that different types of secrecy are mutually exclusive or that they do
It should be noted that Friedrich was writing during the period of the Cold \Var and as such his analysis needs to be considered in
this coutext of mutual distrust and paranoia about national security.
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not overlap, but is instead designed to explore further the issue of how to distinguish between
the legitimate and illegitimate use of secrecy.
Institutional Secrecy
The propensity for secrecy in institutions of governance is in part explained by the relationship
between bureaucracy and secrecy. The social theorist Max Weber, believes bureaucracy is an
inevitable consequence of the shift from traditional to modern societies (1978: 983). The
discourse of modernity is based upon reason as the source of progress and knowledge in society
(Best and Kellner, 1991: 2). However, this transformation is not without costs. One
consequence of rationalisation has been an increase in bureaucracy which it is claimed has
'created one of the most profound sources of tension' in open, accountable societies (Giddens,
1987: 180). On one hand a more accountable form of governance has been made possible only
through the mechanisms associated with bureaucratisation. On the other hand, it is suggested
that the bureaucratisation of society has led to the replacement of one form of monolithic
unaccountable rule (the absolute rule of kings) with another (the absolute rule of
bureaucracy)24.
A key feature of bureaucratic institutions is the culture of secrecy that exists within them and
where secrecy has become the norm. Weber explains this phenomenon in terms of the
traditional conception of the relationship between secrecy and power. Secrecy enhances the
power of bureaucrats by the exclusion of others and enhances the interests of a small exclusive
group. For Weber, secrecy in bureaucratic institutions is a universal phenomenon and 'its
power [liesi in its knowledge and experience and in the cloak of secrecy with which it conceals
Max Weber's primary argument against socialism was that even 'if private capitalism was eliminated the state bureaucracy would
nile alone' (Weber in Bottomore, 1985: 26)
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its operations' (Beetham, 1985: 72). Members of a bureaucracy pursue their interests through
the unique access to information and technical expertise of a small elite (Beetham, 1985: 74).
Beetham contends that a 'distinctive source of power lay in knowledge - both technical
expertise and more general knowledge ... such knowledge was of no use unless protected by
secrecy. Secrecy was its essential concomitant' (1985: 74). Openness is only indulged in with
the release of information after the policy has been formulated and is ready for implementation.
Even then the background and process are often concealed. A bureaucracy has a unique power
base due to its internal cohesion which transcends all other political structures whether they be
democratic or authoritarian.
Similarities have been drawn between the way that the bureaucracy of international
organisations behaves and that of national polities (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 16). Cox and
Jacobson suggest that institutional secrecy exists in institutions of multilateral global
governance and that power and authority is maintained by the ability to keep information
concealed (1973: 16). However, a note of caution needs to be struck in that levels of secrecy in
bureaucracies are not universal, they vary from institution to institution, so that one might
expect to see a difference in levels of secrecy between, for example, the IMF and the World
Bank. Furthermore, the function of secrecy in bureaucracy may be about protecting
confidentiality and privacy rather than a political strategy designed to restrict access (Hoggart
in Pitt and Weiss, 1986: 98).
A variant on institutional secrecy is to be found in the work of Zygmunt Bauman (1993). He
challenges the issue of the intentional use of secrecy as intrinsically immoral; Bauman believes
that the role of bureaucracy in the 'social production of behaviour' does not necessarily contain
an innate force for moral corruption. Secrecy is part of the moral indifference generated by the
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rationality of bureaucracy (1996: 264). The key point is that the innate secrecy in
bureaucracies is not deliberately intended to deceive or conceal. Instead Bauman argues that
'the struggle over moral issues never takes place, as the moral aspects of actions are not
immediately obvious' (1993: 24). In other words, the moral character of action is either
concealed or obfuscated by the logic of bureaucratic rationality.
To make his point Bauman uses the example of the bureaucracy in the Nazi Holocaust. These
atrocities were organised, co-ordinated and made possible by bureaucrats sitting at desks. In
contributing significantly to the death of millions of people, they did so without being directly
involved and with limited knowledge of the outcomes of their actions. Bauman uses this
example to explain how bureaucracies driven by the rationalisation process results in the taking
of 'moral sleeping pills' by the bureaucrats themselves. Thus, the secrecy that is inherent in
bureaucracy can be seen neither as immoral nor the overt pursuit of power.
Of course, Bauman is not an apologist for the actions of the Nazis. He is attempting to explain,
by taking the extreme instance of the Nazi Holocaust, that whilst moral blindness can be
furthered by strategies of secrecy they may not be intentionally morally corrupt. This
explanation about the lack of spatial and psychological proximity shaping bureaucrats moral
behaviour, or lack of it, can be extended to the institutional secrecy that exists within
multilateral global governance. Bauman contends that the further an act is away from our
physical and psychological being, the easier it is to can' on without full consideration of the
consequences because it 'renders victims psychologically invisible' (1993: 25). The secretariats
and bureaucrats within MGCi are also necessarily distant from the point where their policies
impact directly and so the argument goes do not appreciate the consequences of their actions
fully.
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Critics of MGG however, would argue that spatial remoteness is precisely why they should be
made more accountable. For example, a recent report by the non-government organisation,
Christian Aid, entitled Who Runs the World?, identified a number of failings in the World
Bank which could be ascribed to the problem of 'psychological invisibility'. This includes the
tendency for the bureaucracy to look inwards to the needs of the organisation rather than to the
people who are directly affected by the organisation's policies. Information is often concealed
and there is a general failure to consult the people most affected by the policies (Madeley,
Sullivan and Woodroffe, 1994: 72-75).
It can be claimed therefore, that the preponderance of secrecy in the bureaucracy of MGG is
something akin to Bauman's moral sleeping pill. These bureaucracies are unable to think
beyond the narrow needs and ideological congruity of the organisation. Bauman is more
optimistic and sees the possibility of greater global responsibility through increased media and
public participation (1990: 184). Critics believe however, that this increased technological
proximity may do nothing to enhance either responsibilit y or accountability within MGG
(Agnew and Corbridge: 1995: 215).
In summary, institutional secrecy is an integral part of modernity and the institutions that
govern a modern society. In the accountability and MGG debate the implications of
institutional secrecy are mixed. From the point of view of Weber, secrecy is inevitable and
compromises accountability. From Bauman's perspective the use of secrecy can be ambiguous
and difficult to judge morally because secrecy occurs as a natural consequence of bureaucratic
rationalisation whilst the consequences of secrecy are compounded by the lack of spatial
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proximity between the bureaucrats responsible for implementing policy and those who are
affected by it.
Productive Secrecy
The use of productive secrecy is varied and widespread in the governance process. Its main
function is to throw a cloak over a particular ideological position by presenting or concealing
information that might challenge the authority of an institution. In contrast to institutional
secrecy, which is about maintaining institutional norms, the role of productive secrecy is to
reinforce a particular ideological viewpoint. The existence of productive secrecy supports the
view that more openness associated with the modern world has not necessarily led to a decrease
m secrecy.
Cesareo believes that there exists a paradox between the continuing levels of secrecy and the
apparent shift towards a more open, information-based society in which information is
supposedly more readily available than ever before. Instead Cesareo argues that 'paradoxically,
secrecy is spreading more and more over the information society' and central to this paradox is
the increasing use of productive secrecy (1992: 90-91). Cesareo, believes it is productive
because its use is designed to produce an outcome determined by the holders of the information,
'and [information released] is intended to be destined to some people in some circumstances for
some purposes only' (1992: 90). Elite groups, such as a bureaucracy can use certain
information to enhance their power base. Productive secrecy is intended to serve the interests of
a particular group or organisation. It is in this sense inherently political and its use underpinned
by an ideological preference.
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According to Cesareo a primary source of productive secrecy is economic institutions
(including multilateral global governance) which actively employ strategies of productive
secrecy as a means to pursue their political ends. The strategies used include: releasing only
information that will benefit their agenda, determining when and how information is released,
and deterring open debate about the validity of information (Cesareo, 1992: 91). The effect of
this is to give the appearance of openness, but in reality productive secrecy acts to privilege
certain information, diverting attention from the further investigation of the actions of the
organisations and the nature and quality of the information released (see also Bok, 1982: 115;
Annis, 1990). The logic of productive secrecy means that it is far more difficult to determine
what is true, accurate and complete and what is not, and secrecy can be enhanced by a
discourse of transparency that does not deliver openness but is part of a process of
misinformation.
To recap, the use of productive secrecy suggests a parado. betceexi increased inforrriatioi nd
increased secrecy. Key to understanding this paradox is the recognition that information is not
neutral and so its release may not increase transparency because its ideological purpose and
content might be hidden. To paraphrase Cox and change the context: information is always for
someone and for some purpose. This means that the production of information can conceal
alternatives by the dominant groups in society
Neutral Secrecy
Bok maintains that a neutral understanding of secrecy is necessary to avoid bias when
exploring the use of strategies of secrecy (1982: 7-8). She asserts that retaining a neutral
definition of secrecy allows us to 'determine what is and is not discreditable by examining
particular practices of secrecy' (Bok, 1982: 9). It has been pointed out that 'secrecy can be an
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integrating and legitimate basis for rendering social and political decisions in society' (Bellman,
1981: 6). Bellman, suggests that the use of secrecy can be negative or positive, consensual or
non-consensual, legitimate or illegitimate (1981: 6). She views secrecy as neither inherently
good or bad; rather it is merely a method to conceal information.
In this context a neutral view of secrecy is one that moves away from the belief that secrecy is,
in the main, used as a method of coercion by governments and elite groups. By taking a broader
look at the social role of secrecy and the conditions under which it prevails, secrecy may be
considered neither illegitimate nor dysfunctional (see Teft, 1980: 3 19-341). As Bok points out,
'while all deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive' (1982: 7). A good
example of a justifiable and neutral secrecy is in the protection of legitimate privacy and
confidentiality.
Thus there is an important distinction to be made between secrecy (intentional concealment)
and privacy ('protection from unwanted access' - Bok, 1982: 10). The right to privacy is
premised upon a set of shared norms about what it is and is not acceptable to keep in the
private domain 25 . The principle of a right to privacy is often defended by the value attached by
liberals to individual freedom and rights. In distinguishing between privacy and secrecy,
'privacy implies the legitimate denial of access, while secrecy in general implies that the denial
of access is illegitimate' (Warren and Laslett, 1977: 45). This justification for the legitimate
use of secrecy underpinned by privacy and confidentiality can be found in both private and
public institutions, including institutions of MGG.
" The extent to which information can be kept private from governments is being increasingly questioned. A recent development has
bcen that of the 'clipper chip' which was originally designed to combat the spread of encryption technology used by ten-orists and
edmnals, but now allows the state to monitor, mobile telephones, fax machines, c-mails and computers. The result is that information
previously considered private can now be kept under surveillance by the state.
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Other commentators are dubious of the absolute rights of individuals and institutions to privacy
and confidentiality because of the potential for private interests to clash with the public interest.
It is argued that private interests (particularly when it is unequal or overwhelming) can have a
detrimental effect upon the public sphere. This is particularly true when the defence of privacy
is used both as a strategy to hide behaviour and to dampen public initiative in investigating
behaviour contrary to the public interest. Cesareo points out the danger of defending secrecy in
the name of privacy when this then gives rise to the transformation of privacy into a 'strateg[y]
of secrecy' (1992: 88). Privacy can conceal information that would be in the public interest.
These strategies compromise a 'citizen's right to be informed, to exchange information, and to
intervene in decision-making processes' (Cesareo, 1992: 88). There is a danger in defending
individual privacy when the legitimate right to privacy is actually a pretext for an illegitimate
form of secrecy. As Bok observes, 'we have learnt that much deceit for private gain
masquerades as being in the public interest (1980: 169).
Warren and Lasslett have suggested a solution to the privacy/secrecy dilemma by making a
distinction between what they term private-life and public-life secrecy. Public-life secrecy
refers to 'secrecy in relation to the institutions of politics [and is] secretive by virtue of [its
public] political role' (1977: 47). The value of public-life secrecy is often credited with
efficient and effective governance and is discussed in more detail below in the section on
functional secrecy. By contrast, private-life secrecy is 'secrecy about one's personal life rather
than secrecy in relation to other's political roles' (1977: 47). To put it another way 'public-life
secrecy is active and directed at the lives of others, while private-life secrecy is passive and
protective of the self' (1980: 30). Private-life secrecy affords some protection against unwanted
intrusion into what could legitimately be considered private.
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To recap, the need for confidentiality and privacy in some circumstances requires that a neutral
definition of secrecy be applied. This gives weight to the argument that secrecy is not
necessarily morally undesirable. What is important is determining the intention behind the use
of secrecy and the context in which it is used. The defence of privacy is just one such example,
whereby concealment can be justified when the intention is to protect the individual or an
institution in a legitimate manner from unwanted external exposure.
Functional Secrecy
In an earlier section I outlined the case for secrecy in effective governance. Shils (1972),
identifies functional secrecy as both a necessary and vital component of the governance
process. Secrecy can be functional when it facilitates actions in governance that would
otherwise be more difficult or impossible to achieve without it. For example, Shils identifies
secrecy's functional role in encouraging a frank exchange of views amongst political actors,
thus increasing the effectiveness of the policy-making process. More controversially, Sbus
claims the need to retain the co-operation of sectors of society who might become alienated by
open discussions and publicity (1956: 25). The official secrets associated with states 'clearly
show that a good deal of secrecy is considered functional, and that its breach is dangerous'
(Friedrich, 1972: 177). The implication here is that functional secrecy in the governance
processes can be a positive good for society and that functional secrecy is usually most
effective when the secrecy is respected by all sides.
The reason functional secrecy can be considered legitimate is that publicity, privacy and
secrecy in democratic systems are normally in equilibrium (Shils, 1956: 23). Thus functional
secrecy becomes acceptable in the governance process because it is balanced by the plural and
open nature of the political system that ensures the accountability of those in power (Shils,
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1956: 23). Publicity even on those matters that are attempted to be dealt with in secret are
vulnerable to the press and interest groups, and once a secret is dispersed amongst the wider
population its power is weakened (Canetti, 1973: 344). Publicity about the affairs of
governance should be enough to hold institutions accountable without direct public access and
participation which may inhibit the governance process. Shils goes as far as to claim that,
'democracy requires the occasional political participation of most of its citizenry some of the
time...it could not function if politics and the state of the social order were always on
everyone's mind ... representative institutions would be inundated by the swirl of plebiscitary
emotions' (1956: 22).
The justification for functional secrecy in public life is taken up by other commentators, such
as Friedrich, who attempts to justify the elitist nature of public-life secrecy. He argues that the
need for secrecy in democratic systems is so strong that moves to make governance
deliberations public would only force decision-making further into the realm of secrecy (1972:
178). Although Friedrich believes that public-life secrecy is not ideal, the consequences of more
openness would result in more secrecy as individuals and institutions acted to protect
themselves from adversarial forces 26 . This paradox between the individual right to know and
the need for secrecy in governance processes is highlighted by Simmel who observes that:
'Every democracy' holds publicity to be an intrinsically desirable situation, on the
fundamental promise that everyone should know the events and circumstances
that concern him, [however] if... there has grown an objective governing
structure which embodies [all] interests, the formal autonomy of this structure
may very well entitle it to function secretly ... [in] the interests of all' (Simmel
1969: 337).
' Shils and Friedrich were writing in America during the secretive and adversarial climate of the Cold War. However, with the end of
the Cold War there is little to suggest things have changed significantly. (See Fors)lhe, 1992).
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Simmel justifies his acceptance of secrecy by claiming that 'it seems as if ... general affairs
become ever-more public, and individual affairs ever-more secret' (Simmel in Nisbet, 1980:
105). He believes that political practice, bureaucracy and commerce have become more open,
whilst the individual has secured a level of anonymity that formerly was only available through
spatial isolations, thus justifying functional secrecy (Nisbet, 1980: 105). Critics of functional
secrecy assert that, rather than being more open, political, bureaucratic and private commercial
affairs are becoming less open. The shift towards the privatisation of public goods, the
increasing use pf science as a mask, the proliferation of arms sales and the mystification of
MGG, is all in conflict with a belief in the increased openness of general affairs (Restivo, 1986;
Aftergood, 1992).
Simmel's acceptance of the use of functional secrecy is also problematic because it does not
confront the problems of purpose, intention and consequences in the use of public-life secrecy.
This point is decisive, because as Bok declares, 'when linked, secrecy and political power are
dangerous in the extreme.. .if this power is exercised in secret, with no accountability to those
whom it affects, the invitation to abuse is great.' (Bok, 1982: 106). By accepting the need for
functional secrecy the possibility of abuse increases and 'only those deceptive practices which
can be openly debated and consented to in advance are just Ulable in a democracy' (1980: 181).
Thus, if secrecy is to be used by structures of governance, judgements about its use and
acceptability can only be arrived at through a democratic process that is inclusive and open
(Bok, 1980: 181; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 95). Ultimately, if procedures or information
are kept secret, it reduces the ability to control those in power and compounds the problem of
who controls the controllers. An uncritical acceptance of functional secrecy shows a tendency
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to ignore asymmetries of power between the governors and governed. In other words, a
functional justification of institutional secrecy may mask the political intent of this type of
secrecy. For example, the use of functional secrecy might lead to hiding decisions that have
been made in error, or hiding the interests of a particular group, class or individual. Functional
secrecy may hide the fact that deliberations are constrained by ideology or may obscure a moral
issue. The complexity of a debate and the question of when and if the issue is raised in public
can be constrained by functional secrecy. Secrecy defended in the name of efficiency may end
up hiding the realities of political power (Bay, 1977: 23).
To summarise, some writers would argue for the positive function of secrecy in the governance
process because it enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of governance (See: Shils, 1956:
25 and Friedrich, 1972: 179). This need for secrecy can be balanced by the general principle of
openness in society through mechanisms like the media. By contrast, others contend that the
acceptance of functional secrecy creates the possibility for the use of secrecy to be extended
into a wide range of governance areas. A functional justification of secrecy may mask
illegitimate behaviour and make it difficult to be challenged (Bok, 1982: 133). Secrecy may be
both necessary and legitimate in certain circumstances. However, the boundaries of secrecy
need to be open to public debate otherwise it risks masking other more sinister or productive
processes of governance.
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Table 3: A Typology of Secrecy
Types of	 Characteristics	 Implications for Accountability
Secrecy_______________________________________ _________________________________________
Institutional Secrecy widespread amongst bureaucratic 	 Institutional secrecy linked to modernity and
institutions. Inevitable part of modernity, 	 bureaucracy. Secrecy is a product of
Secrecy is the norm as it enhances power
	 institutional rationality. Accountability is
and authority and protects institutions from informed by the idea of spatial and
external challenges,	 psychological proximity.
Productive	 Designed to produce an outcome, that 	 Productive secrecy recognises that
favours a particular world view through 	 information is not neutral. Its release may not
biased information. Ideologically driven to
	
increase transparency because its ideological
reinforce a particular world viewpoint 	 purpose may be hidden and thereby obfuscate
which denies and masks alternatives. By	 issues of accountability.
virtue of emanating from an authoritative
_____________ body, information goes unchallenged. 	 _____________________________________
Neutral	 Not bounded by ethical considerations.	 Neutral secrecy used to justiIr the
Secrecy a method of concealment. Avoids 	 concealment of information that is considered
the bias that the use of secrecy often	 private or confidential. Neutral secrecy is not
generates and accepts that secrecy can be	 a barrier to accountability.
both legitimate and illegitimate. Distinction
made between private-life and public-life
_____ secrecy.	 ________________
Functional	 Pragmatic use of secrecy to enhance the 	 Supports the positive function of secrecy in
efficiency and effectiveness of the
	
the governance process because it enhances
governance process. Particularly useful in 	 the efficiency and effectiveness of
sensitive negotiations for maintaining trust. governance. Secrecy is balanced by the
Justified by the benefits of confidentiality to general principle of openness in society.
society and respect for authoritative	 However, a functional justification of secrecy
institutions.	 may mask illegitimate behaviour and ii
unchallenged secrecy becomes more
widespread in the governance process.
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Secrecy and Multilateral Global Governance
Secrecy, Globalisation and the Mystification of Global Governance
The capacity to conceal information has been identified as a key component of structural power
(Warren and Laslett, 1977: 47). For example, the dominant neoliberal economic agenda acts as
a structure; it constrains behaviour and excludes from the mainstream agenda alternative forms
of economic development. It is in this context that the radical perspective (see Chapter 1) can
be applied to examine the function of secrecy in MGG. At the global level, the institutions of
MOO act to reinforce the dominant neoliberal structure by limiting economic choices open to
states. According to Cox the role of MOO as the institutional power base of global capital is a
critical component of maintaining the productive force of capitalist interests (1994: 49).
Secrecy within MOO reinforces the power of the economically dominant groups in society.
Under these conditions the use of secrecy vill compound the difficulty of holding multilateral
institutions to account.
As outlined in Chapter 1, radicals claim that the institutions of MOO strengthen the ideas and
material capabilities of the dominant forces in the world economy. To enhance the authority
and regulatory power of institutions of MOO the use of secrecy acts in two ways. Firstly to
mystify and obscure the role of these institutions in the governance of the global economy.
Secondly to obscure their relations with unofficial non-governmental bodies such as the
Trilateral Commission. Cox refers to this network of governance as a n ébuleuse (1997: 60-
61). The mystification of MGCI occurs when: 'states willy nilly become effectively accountable
to a n bu1euse personified as the global economy [states are theni constrained to mystify this
external accountability in the eyes and ears of their publics through the new vocabulary of
globalisation, interdependence, and competitiveness' (Cox, 1992: 27). It is claimed by Cox that
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an awareness of this process by critical social movements is the motivating force behind the
calls for greater transparency in the pursuit of accountability in MGG.
The mystification of MGG is reinforced by presentation of globalisation as inevitable which
according to Cox leads to the exclusion of alternative perspectives. He believes that the
institutions of MOO have been crucial in constructing a world hegemony based upon a
transnational liberalism (1996: 136-140). The use of productive secrecy helps to achieve one's
material and ideological objectives by hiding information that is detrimental to the aims of the
dominant market ideology. This also makes it more difficult for opposition forces to challenge
the institutions of MOG directly. To merely advocate the reform of MOO in the way that
commentators who come under the neoliberal-institutionalist label have done is insufficient (see
Chapter 1). It is necessary to understand the capacity of secrecy to perpetuate the framework
and structures within which political activity takes place and the limits it places upon change
(Cox, 1995: 32).
From this perspective secrecy within MOO acts to reinforce the myth of globalisation (see
Chapter 1) by marginalising alternative discourses and leaving only one dominant perspective -
the ideology of the market. Through the use of secrecy, MGG are able to defend themselves
against popular criticism and stifle opposition. In this way secrecy enables the institutions to
implement policies for which they remain largely unaccountable. The key role of institutions of
MOO in the spread of global capitalism has been identified by Koc who argues that they
'define and determine the rules of conduct ... in a highly elitist fashion with a group of experts
and negotiators, often in ideological congruity with transnational corporate interests' (1994:
275).
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Thus secrecy acts to conceal the social and political implications of the policies '...to the extent
that secrecy denies social actors information which might reveal that they are exploited or
manipulated by others' (Teft, 1980: 67). It becomes the method of achieving one's goals
without the threat of bringing the dominant set of policy objectives under public scrutiny.
Acting in the interests of global capital, MGG makes it likely that both the conditions and
motivation for secrecy continue. In the case studies these issues will be examined in more depth
to see whether there is any empirical evidence to support the claim that a variety of types
secrecy is utilised by MGG in the pursuit of ideological congruity or denial of alternatives.
Secrecy and the Reform of Multilateral Global Governance
Underpinning concerns about the reform of MGG is a desire amongst some critics to see that
these institutions reform, adopt the principles of good governance and enhance co-operation
amongst members (see Chapters 1 and 3). As already indicated, the institutions of MGG are a
primary location for the existence of institutional secrecy. Commenting upon the World Bank,
Brautigan argues however, that a lack of openness can be due to bureaucratic weaknesses in
procedures or a lack of capacity rather than a 'conscious decision to restrict access' (1991: 22;
1992: 13). From this point of view secrec y is essentially unintentional and merely requires the
reform of MGG and the introduction of policies designed to assist transparency. It is this belief
that has fuelled the discourse of transparency that has become so prevalent in the 1 990s
amongst many commentators (see Report of the Commission on Global Governance, 1995;
Keohane, 1998). Reflecting the liberal-institutionalist view of the world it is suggested that
secrecy can be reduced to a technical problem and that a problem-solving approach can be
introduced to make institutions of MGG more accountable. For example, the World Bank has
introduced an inspection panel to scrutinise complaints made against the Bank and ensure
greater transparency in Bank proceedings (see Chapter 6).
76
Another reason suggested for the perpetuation of institutional secrecy in MOG is the spatial
distance between bureaucracy and the people affected by it. One way of dealing with the
problem of the lack of physical and spatial proximity by the World Bank would be for it to take
responsibility for development projects out of the hands of the bureaucrats and devolve power
to the local level27 . Cesareo argues that issues concerning secrecy have traditionally been
debated 'at the individual and domestic level' (1992; 89). More recently there has been a
tendency for people to attempt, 'exerting from the bottom, an active influence over [global]
institutions' (1992: 89). Secrecy in international organisations conceals problems (including
uneven development, loan conditionality, structural adjustment programmes and environmental
degradation) and this position has led to increased calls for greater transparency in international
organisations (Beck, 1992: 183). As Cesareo observes, secrecy must be attacked and defeated
to support intervention from the bottom in social and decision-making processes' (1992: 90). If
it is to mean anything, accountability requires that debates take place before decisions are made
and not afterwards, in order that policies can be evaluated and opposed. By moving to a form
of substantive transparency and 'opening up the political' it minimises the risks of institutional
secrecy and allows the consent of the governed (Beck 1992: 183).
The problem of spatial proximity would appear to suggest that accountability in governance
based upon anything other than the local level is impossible because we are unable to relate
sympathetically or morally to those beyond our immediate proximity 28 . This idea is contested
by Hoffman who argues that democracy can be 'coherently grasped only as a concept which
resists spatial and temporal constraints.., its emphasis upon popular empowerment is at once
27 Direct action is argued to be becoming more prevalent because the political process has become remote and people feel excluded
from the decision-making process. Two examples of direct action in opposition to World Bank projects are those of the Chipko
activist and Nannanda Dam (see Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 219 and Kothari, 1994).
On a micro level the spatial proximity model appears flawed because secrets are common amongst those i7o know each other and
are in close proximity.
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local, regional, national and global...' (1995: 196). In other words, Hoffman rejects the idea
that institutions can only be accountable at a local level. What really needs to happen is for
MGG to break free of its close association with national and local democracy and embrace a
cosmopolitan conception of democracy (see Chapter 1). One way in which it has been
suggested this can be achieved is by reconstituting the current institutions of MGG into a new
cosmopolitan order (Held, 1992: 46).
Multilateral Global Governance and the Efficacy of Secrecy
Earlier in the chapter, I discussed the role of functional secrecy as a necessary part of effective
governance. The legitimacy of functional secrecy in the governance process is supported by
Luard who believes that MOO is essentially inefficient because there is too much publicity
(1990: 180). This is reinforced by those who believe that 'open, participatory processes may
make governance less predictable and less efficient (Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1992: 311).
The use of functional secrecy would enhance the effectiveness, and hence the good, these
institutions could achieve. Luard makes a distinction between deliberative and decision-making
institutions and labels international bodies as being essentially deliberative in nature with the
political process well publicised. He believes that international organisations are in danger of
becoming too transparent to be effective (1990:180). The implication of Luard's analysis is
that too much openness will lead to global institutions being less effective and undermining
their role in the regulation of the world.
According to Luard, the consequence of global institutions being essentially deliberative is that
the outcome of negotiations is essentially flawed. Participants, aware of the publicity, are
forced to reach an agreement that will be popular with their domestic audience as opposed to
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the good of the global community (1990: 180). This is the justification the G-7 often claims for
its use of secrecy where confidentiality of negotiations acts as a source of increased
effectiveness and efficiency in decision-making (for a longer discussion of this see Chapter 5).
In this way the secrecy that comes with maintaining confidentiality is presented as a benefit to
those who have been excluded.
Arguing for improvement in the effectiveness of international organisations, Luard wants to
place limits upon the extent to which these institutions are open and transparent. The need for
functional secrecy to enhance decision making is reflected by the actions of institutions of
MGG which continue to resist openness at the global level, and which can often exclude
interest groups altogether. For example, in a recent round of trade negotiation by the World
Trade Organisation denial of access to NGOs was justified on grounds of efficiency. It was
observed that, 'allowing the greens in could thwart liberalisation by opening the door to farmers
and all kinds of lobbies opposed to free trade' (Financial Times, 5-1-95). This defence of
functional secrecy and denial of access to non-governmental organisations is premised upon the
belief that these groups would undermine the decision-making process. However, this
pragmatic use of exclusion leaves unchallenged the ideological orthodoxy of global free-trade.
In Chapter 1, I argued from a state-centred perspective that the idea of public accountability in
MGG is constrained by the continuing authority' of the state in the governance process which
leads to the exclusion of non-state actors. The secrecy that continues to exist in institutions of
MGG simply reflects patterns of secrecy that exists as a part of the legitimate right to govern.
Secrecy remains prominent in international organisations because these organisations reflect
national interests at the international level, The continuing existence of secrecy' remains a part
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of what has been described as the 'deep structure of the sovereign state [which is reflected in] a
state-centred and sovereignty centred model of international politics' (Hoffman, 1995: 211).
Whereas political realists would maintain that institutions of MGG are merely extensions of the
national to the global level critics have argued that the right to keep secrets should never be
delegated without guarantees of accountability (Archer, 1992: 78; Cox, 1975: 1). Restivo
believes, '...[theJ secrecy debate has been carried out in a social and political context that
implicitly and explicitly places the national interest, national security, and the interests of elite
professionals above the public interest and the values of participatory democracy' (1986: 80).
A cosmopolitan perspective contests the state-centred perspective not least because institutions
of multilateral global governance exist independently of state actors. Moreover, the claim that
secrecy is in the national interest is less plausible in a world characterised by the globalisation
of political authority through the intemationalisation of the state. It is difficult to make the case
that secrecy is in the national interest, if this self-same secrecy is then reflected at the global
level over global issues which transcends national interests.
Conclusion
Secrecy is a ubiquitous and sometimes necessary part of social relations. To appreciate the
implications of this requires reflection upon the uses and abuses of secrecy. The existence of
secrecy in MGG is not necessaril y a cause for concern in governance institutions and this is
supported by those who advocate the use of functional and neutral secrecy. However secrecy
also allows for the possibility of political processes remaining hidden and unaccountable from
the wider public, reinforcing vested interests and undermining public accountability. Hence the
title of this chapter suggesting the inherent ambiguity that surrounds the use of secrecy. It is
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therefore unsurprising that the issues surrounding the more general use of secrecy are also very
evident and relevant to the discussion of governance at the global level. In analysing the use of
secrecy it is necessary to say something about the type of secrecy being applied. If it is
institutional and productive then it can be seen to undermine public accountability. If ii is
neutral and functional it need not threaten public accountability.
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Chapter Three
The Limits of Transparency
In the debate over the accountability of multilateral global governance (MGG) a discourse of
transparency has emerged as the cause célébre. Underpinning this discourse is the belief that
'transparency is the source of legitimacy and secrecy the source of disaffection' in the
governance process (Gaonker and McCarthy, 1994: 558; Lodge, 1994). Critics of secrecy in
the governance process believe that it compromises both accountability and meaningful
participation, as well as enhancing the interests of particular parties, whilst excluding others
that are more directly affected by the contents of the secret (Bobbio, 1987: 34; Falk, 1995a:
239).
In view of this claim, what, if anything, can the discourse and practice of transparency do to
enhance openness, participation and accountability in institutions of multilateral global
governance? This chapter aims to explore both the possibilities and limits of transparency to
see what impact it might have for accountability in MGG. It is widely recognised that openness
is one of the necessary requirements for accountable governance (Gaonker & McCarthy, 1994:
556; Beetham and Boyle, 1995: 62). Important areas to examine are different types of
transparency, its sources in technological development, democratic and economic theory and
whether it is adequate as a source of accountability in MGG. I argue that the increased use of
transparency requires a greater analytical understanding of this concept to assess its uses and
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abuses. This involves taking into account a number of factors not least the limits, if any, to
transparency in the political process.
Interestingly, the discourse of transparency has found supporters amongst both critics and
advocates of the multilateral global governance. Within this apparent universal approval of
transparency different interpretations and applications have arisen with variations that have
become applied in a number of different ways. Consequently, transparency has become a
manifest but imprecise term with several distinct meanings that need exploring. The guiding
questions are: \Vhat is understood by the idea of transparency? 'What are the limits to
transparency and how do these limits, if at all, have consequences for accountability in MGG?
The chapter begins by exploring the proliferation of the discourse of transparency and
questions whether we can regard the present era as the 'age of transparency'. This discourse is
explored further by looking at the relationship between transparency and good governance. The
second section assesses the work of Noberto Bobbio, who has claimed that, without full and
universal transparency, accountable governance will remain a myth. This is followed by a
discussion of the limits of transparency. The final section introduces a typology of transparency
to distinguish different interpretations. They include: internal transparency, external
transparency, transparency from above and transparency from below.
The Proliferating Discourse of Transparency
The trend towards the production of a discourse of transparency embraces a wider political
framework than just MGG. Mark Brender claims that society has reached the point where
'we're entering an age of transparency' (The Observer, 3 0-6-96). In this article Brender
The tenn has also gained widespread use at the national and local levels of government and within the public and private sectors.
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suggests the 'age of transparency' signifies something qualitatively different from previous
periods in history. This age is characterised as being one where institutions of governance and
authoritative power structures are no longer able to remain hidden and free from public
surveillance. Due to developments in technology, the public has greater access to information
and those in a position of power are placed in a more visible position and thereby forced to
become more accountable for their actions. The age of transparency suggests a trend towards
greater economic and political openness to include plural political processes, increased access
to information, more meaningful participation and the increased accountability of political
institutions (Sandstrom, 1994: 33). The use of secrecy becomes less rational in the governance
process as transparency becomes the norm as governance institutions engage in wilful
disclosure (Florini, 1998: 53).
One consequence has been the emergence of a discourse of transparency operating within a
diverse range of both MGG and non-government organisations. The latter include citizen
groups and individuals concerned with the activities of MGG (see for example, the Christian
Aid campaign entitled 'Who Runs The World?, 1994). These groups believe that there is a
need for greater accountability within multilateral institutions and for decision-making
processes to become more transparent. It has been suggested that one way this objective could
be achieved is through increasing access to information and participation by NGOs in the
policy-making process (Boughten and Lateef, 1995: 5). Increased transparency is justified on
two counts, firstly, those most affected by the policies of MGQ need knowledge of these
policies to be able to challenge and oppose them if necessary. Secondly, that increased
transparency would result in a more effective form of governance through increased
institutional legitimacy.
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An enthusiasm for the discourse of transparency has spread to the institutions of MGG. Even
the IMF (often cited as one of the most secretive of global institutions) has subscribed to the
call for more openness. Official IMF sources have indicated support for the 'desirability of
encouraging more transparency to the public with respect to Fund policies and operations, and
the data on which they are based' (IMF Annual Report, 1995: 39). The declared intention of
more openness within the institutions of MGC is challenged by critics who maintain that there
appears to be a discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality of transparency.
The majority of international organisations, although supporting the discourse of transparency,
have failed to apply the same principles to their institutional practice (Gerster, 1993: 87).
Institutions of MGG have learnt the value of 'talking up' the need for greater transparency, but
it is neither clear what this means in practice or apparent whether accountability has been
enhanced by this process. The relative merits and failings of the discourse of transparency will
now be examined by placing the debate in the context of the idea of 'good governance'.
Good Governance, Accountability and Transparency
The issue of good governance has emerged during the l990s as a central component of the
language and public policy objectives of MGG. Many multilateral institutions believe it is their
responsibility to foster the principles of good governance - accountability, transparency and
participation - amongst aid recipient countries (Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1992: 316). The
background to this new policy agenda has been the end of the Cold War and what some believe
to be the triumph of liberal democracy over competing ideologies (Fukuyama, 1992). The
principles of good governance are also reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the United Nations in 1948. In Article 21 it calls for those that govern to be
acceptable and transparent in their political practices. Article 19 claims the 'ready availability
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of information ... will permit accountability to be practiced ... [andJ markets to function'
(Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1992: 306).
Underpinning the logic of good governance principles is a belief that they serve a dual role:
Firstly, providing the best conditions for markets to operate under. This requires access to
infonnation to enhance efficient and effective operation of the market by producing trust and
confidence (Archer, 1994: 8). Secondly, to enhance the public accountability of governance
institutions that reflects the principles of good governance, 'the good governance approach
suggests that the markets' requirements.. .promote and reinforce equitable and accountable
government' (Archer, 1994: 19). Transparency is portrayed as a positive requirement for good
governance enhancing both economic development and political legitimacy.
However, critics believe that what is required is the application of the principles of good
governance to the multilateral institutions themselves (Gerster, 1994: 94). It is argued that the
emphasis needs to shift to assert the principle of wider public accountability over the expansion
of powerful economic forces and the institutions that facilitate this process (Faik, 1995a: 236-
239). The benefits of transparency and open access to information for global markets are
claimed to be manifest by the neoliberal orthodoxy. At the same time, however, political power
and wealth have become increasingly concealed and characterised as concentrated, exclusive
and global in character (Hurrell and Woods, 1995: 447; Tanzer, 1995: 12).
As a consequence critics of MGCI argue that the process and policy outcomes of these
institutions should be open and transparent (Putzel, 1996: 1). In both the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, critics assert that the levels of accountability,
transparency and participation challenge their adherence to the principles of good governance
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(Gerster, 1993, 87). In part this can be explained due to the IMF and World Bank's version of
good governance being 'an apolitical concept of democracy [with] accountability, transparency,
and competitive efficiency, mere technical correlates of [economicj policy reform' (Ake, 1995:
40). This view is reinforced by Landell-Mills and Serageldin who claim that accountability in
public bodies can be achieved through improved technical management and skills acquisition
(1992: 307). The effect of making accountability and transparency a technical as opposed to
ideological or political problem is that it dilutes the effectiveness of the principles of good
governance as a source of public accountability in MGG.
This means that it is questionable whether the principles of good governance present the
possibility of increased accountability. For example, Richard Falk reasons that there is an
inherent tension between economic globalisation and a more accountable form of MGG due to
the latter promoting the interests of global capital above other groups (1995b: 563). From this
perspective the discourse of transparency becomes co-opted by markets forces and eventually
becomes part of the free-market mantra of 'privatisation, marketisation and globalisation'.
Ultimately this means that the idea of transparency as a source of public accountability loses its
political content. Critics postulate that the primary motivation for the principles of good
governance appear to be for the benefit of markets and elite interests whilst its application in
MGG remains limited (Gerster, 1994: 94; Guhan, 1998: 190).
Others believe that the principles of good governance still hold out the possibility of challenging
the traditional state-centred conception of MGG. This would require institutions which are
accountable beyond the narrow confines of its members. A new governance relationship would
'displac[el the traditional view of separate relations between [institutions of MGG] and the
member state, and between the member state and the public' (Gerster, 1994: 94). This
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conception of governance suggests a wider understanding of the term that stretches beyond the
economic realm to include issues of political governance and MGG.
By extending the principles of good governance from the state level to global institutions the
concept of good governance can be utilised as an analytical device to distinguish between the
way MOG institutions should behave and the way they do behave (Brautigam, 1991: 5). Both
good governance and transparency appear to be intrinsically linked with 'accountability a
fundamental demand in the quest for good governance' and transparency a fundamental for
effective public accountability (Gerster, 1993: 87; Brautigam, 1991).
Transparency and Access to In formation
Access to information is crucial for accountability because for consent of the governed to be
meaningful it needs to be informed (Chapman, 1987: 11; Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1992:
315; Brautigam, 1992: 12). The link between accountability, transparency and access to
information is reflected in The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which includes a
section that makes clear that access to information should be a basic right for all people (Gaer,
1996: 52-53). It is this point that the critics of MCIG have seized upon to make their point
about what they consider to be unnecessary secrecy and restricted access to the governance
process in MGG.
The control of access to information has been recognised as a key component in the production
of unequal social relations with a close relationship between controlling access to information
and power (Wilson, 1984: 17). The function of transparency becomes decisive in countering
excessive power arid increased accountability. Without transparency decision-makers cannot be
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held accountable, without public knowledge their decisions and the information on which they
are based are more difficult to judge.
A good example of an organisation of MGG restricting public access to information is the IMF
which has been accused of using secrecy to shield its decisions from public view (Gerster,
1994: 98). One means, critics argue, to counter this institutional secrecy is to establish a 'right
to access' which would include an element of compulsion in making information available to
interested parties. This would require the World Bank and IMF to make public the conditions
for loans prior to the decisions being made; and interested parties would not be excluded from
the decisions being taken by MGG that may have direct implications for them.
Thus, what is often called the 'Information Age' presents the prospects for a more accountable
form of MGG. It is argued that the rapid development and diffusion of new information
technology diminish the power of states and state institutions (Camilleri and Falk, 1992: 5).
From this perspective technology
 has an emancipatory quality by increasing access to
information and restricting the potential for concealment and empowering non-govenmient
organisations (Hewitt, 1998: 83). The extent however, to which technological advances have
'opened up' the institutions of MGG remain to be seen with some commentators claiming that
the access given to information is tainted by being superficial, selective and biased (Udall,
1994a: 147-8; Cesareo, 1992).
Transparency and Participation
Another dimension to transparency is its scope to enhance participation which is another
important component of accountability. Transparency and access to information facilitate
participation in the political process, which in turn enhances accountability. One of the primary
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criticisms made about MOG is that they have too narrow a conception of participation, usually
restricted to inter-governmental representation and appointed bureaucrats (Beetham and Boyle,
1995: 130).
Critics of limited participation observe that, without active local participation, decisions can be
imposed from above, often to the detriment of those concerned (Gerster, 1994: 99). Those in
favour of increasing participation assert that the exclusion of groups not only risks inefficiency
but also feeds institutional secrecy (see Chapter 2). Allowing increased participation by NGOs
would contribute to the effectiveness of policy dialogue, the programme design and the
consultations that occur between MGG and national governments (Gerster, 1994: 99).
Interestingly some institutions of MGG are encouraging NGO participation in the belief that it
will increase the effectiveness of policies and reinforce their legitimacy (Weiss and Gordenker,
1996; Bradlow and Grossman, 1996: 41). For example, in a range of World Conferences
organised by the United Nations between 1990 and 1996 it was recognised that the conferences
needed to draw on the support of a wide sector of society and that NGO participation was
essential to this process (United Nations, 1997: 8).
However there are risks in increased participation, not least in that certain groups might
dominate the political agenda to their advantage. NGOs might undermine the authority of those
institutions that have been created to take responsibility for policy decisions (Birch, 1993: 86).
A denial of participation and access to information can be justified by the authority of
institutions as representatives of the common good over sectional interests. In MGG
participation is often presented as problematic due to participation being either not practical at
the global level or that the state-centred nature of world politics precludes non-state
participation (Lee, 1995: 146). Compounding this continuing separation of the global sphere
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from the national sphere is the unwillingness of some multilateral institutions to engage directly
with groups other than states (Bradlow and Grossman, 1996: 41). For example, the IMF
contends that it would be inappropriate to have non-members (i.e. any group other than a state
representative) participating in its organisation. Because of this there remains an ingrained
opposition to wider participation amongst many of the multilateral forms of governance (see
Chapter 1).
Within the concept of transparency, however, remains the possibility of a more expansive form
of participation in the decision-making process. Greater participation would reflect an
inclusive, plural and participator)' framework that might accommodate a diversity of interests.
In this way it is believed that institutions of MGG might move beyond the rhetoric of
transparency to a more substantive transparency (Madelev, Sullivan & Woodroffe 1994: 72-
73; Watkins, 1995: 218-219).
Noberto Bobblo and Transparency
Openness and transparency play a key role in the pursuit of legitimacy by governance
institutions. By making explicit their objectives it helps these institutions create an environment
of trust which legitimises their activities and makes policy implementation easier (Misztal,
1996: 245). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, secrecy is also a legitimate part of the
governing process. In view of this an important question is: given practices of secrecy, are
policies of transparency adequate for creating trust between those that govern and those that
are governed? This question has been addressed by Noberto Bobbio who is sceptical about the
validity of the relationship between the governors and the governed based upon trust over
practices of secrecy. Bobbio believes that one of the things desired most in the governance
process should be to make, '... power visible ...' (1995: 36). He claims that only when power is
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visible can it be accountable and participation be made meaningful. We cannot rely on
governing institutions to establish this visibility because, as Bobbio explains in his advocacy of
openness: 'the natural tendency of power - of every form of power - [is] to hide itself; either by
not declaring its intentions in public or by lying about them.. .or by masking (and camouflaging)
itself' (1995: 36). Bobbio argues that the principle of visibility is a revolutionary one because it
challenges the secrecy inherent in power. Transparency enhances accountability and produces
an environment that is opposed to secrecy and exclusion30 . Due to the emphasis Bobbio places
upon transparency, I want to examine his view of openness and transparency to see what it may
contribute to the debate about accountability in MGG.
In The Future of Democracy Bobbio asks the question, "Who controls the controllers?" (1987:
34). He reasons that for governance to be accountable it requires the 'elimination of invisible
power' and the end of the tendency of those in power to hide and conceal information and
obfuscate their political practices 31 . According to Bobbio, hidden power is just one of a number
of other constraints on effective accountability that have become the 'broken promises' of
democracy32 . He argues that openness and accountability are conditional upon one another and
that the trust placed in accountable political systems is 'based upon the conviction that
accountable government could finally bring about both the transparency of power and its public
accountability' (Bobbio, 1987: 33-34). In imposing this basic requirement on political systems,
Bobbio provides a justification for openness and transparency in the democratic process, and a
denunciation of the use of secrecy.
° Bobbio cites three primary forms of "invisible power": "sottogoverno," the government's control of the economy;
"cryptogoverument," the coven paramilitary and intelligence operations of the state; and "all seeing power, the states technological
"Panopticon"... all three work in modern democracies to counter the idea of visible power and control from below (Turits, 1989: 59).
' Bobbio has included three basic prerequisites of democracy: 'participation (or collective and general involvement) ... control from
below (on the basis of the principle that all power not controlled tends to be abused) ... and freedom of dissent'. (Cohen & Arato,
1992: 166).
The others are 'the promise of popular sovereignty'; 'the emergence of a pluralistic society'; 'individual's competence in the face
of ever more complex questions'; 'education for citizenhood'; 'the persistence of oligarchic power'; 'limited democratic space'. (See:
Zolo, 1992: 102.104).
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The problem for Bobbio is that the obfuscation of power is a natural characteristic of all
political systems because 'power does not exist without arcana and because transparency and
complete openness renders [one powerl vulnerable to other, antagonistic, powers' (Zolo, 1992:
42). Contained within this is a belief that secrecy exists as a natural consequence of power and
authority. At first it appears Bobbio suggests that it is inevitable that elite groups will dominate
and that power will be exerted top-down: it is 'politics conceived as a sheer subjective contest
of power per Se' (Anderson, 1992: 107). Bobbio's critique of democracy shows 'how political
realism can be successfully disassociated from its conservative tradition' (Zolo, 1992: 105). He
does this by accepting the nature of realist power politics, whilst also amassing a critique of
representative democracy based upon its 'broken promises'. Thus, Bobbio accepts the premise
of the realist nature of power but does not accept its outcomes which must be challenged.
Bobbio's analysis has something to offer the discussion about accountability in MGG. He
believes that in accountable institutions and political systems publicity... is the rule, secrecy
the exception' (1989: 81). Bobbio draws upon the work of Carl Schmitt 33 who makes clear the
nature of the symbiotic relationship between accountability and visible power: '[accountability]
can only proceed in the public sphere. There is no [accountability] which takes place in
secret...' (Schmitt quoted in Bobbio. 1987: 82). For Bobbio, the possibility of eradicating
invisible power is determined by the degree of 'openness of government, and the "publicity" of
the political system' (Bobbio, 1987: 94). Although visibility on its own will not necessarily
eradicate malpractice, it will undermine the governing bodies' legitimacy and put pressure on
them to change. Although Bobbio identifies what he considers to be the illegitimate use of
secrecy, he fails to differentiate between cases when the decision-making process is open and
transparent and those cases when they are not (see case study evidence). B y universally
" Schmitt is a controversial character due to accusations that his critique of parliamentary democracy in the Weimar republic lent
Uppcfl to the ideas of authontarian rule. (See introduction to Schmitt, 1976)
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rejecting secrecy, Bobbio fails to take into account circumstances where secrecy might be
legitimate.
The problem of invisible power is exacerbated when it is concentrated within over centralised
institutions at the global level where power is concentrated in a few key institutions like the
JMF and the World Bank. To counter the problem of over-centralisation Bobbio advocates a
principle of devolved power, because 'the closer power is physically, the more visible it is.,
(Bobbio, 1987: 82). This idea is reflected by those who view the participation of NGOs in the
policy making process of MGG as essential for improving accountability in public policy
(Ekins, 1992: 67). increased participation would contribute to reducing secrecy and the
difficulties associated with spatial proximity identified in Chapter 2.
Bobbio acknowledges that just because power becomes fragmented or devolved, secrecy will
not cease in its political practices. It is not enough to shift power from the global to the national
or local levels because similar problems will remain. 'What is required is a democratic approach
that can overcome the limitations of elite power at any level. For Bobbio, the prospects for a
transparent and accountable system, be it at the local, national or supranational level, is
dependant upon democratisation of all social life through 'expanding the space of democratic
decision-making and exploiting the potential of pluralism' (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 171).
Bobbio, with his conception of realist power politics, sees the potential for democracy to
fragment the concentration of power in society.
In summary, Bobbio has helped inform the debate about transparency by highlighting the
ubiquitous nature of secrecy, its importance to the governance process and the difficulties of
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overcoming it. However, in advocating a universal from of transparency Bobbio ignores the
limits of transparency and the diverse way in which it has been applied.
The Limits of Transparency
The argument in favour of transparency can be constrained by other considerations and its
limits are best illustrated by an example: Transparency International (TI), is an organisation (in
this case a non-government organisation) established to fight corruption and secrecy and
improve accountability in governments and commercial operations. This organisation might be
expected to fulfil expectations of full and open transparency in its workings and practices.
However, it is more effective in its aims because it has undertaken its negotiations behind
closed doors. Once these have been concluded, the results are released for public
consumption. By limiting access in the early stages of its negotiations TI increased
transparency in the longer term. By placing limits on transparency the NGO enabled 'a wide
range of participants...[to] take action outside of the glare of publicity' (Dias, 1994: 57). This
pragmatic approach illustrates that transparency can be conditional on other factors.
In this example the limits of transparenc y
 and access to information were circumscribed by a
belief that the most beneficial outcome - less corruption - would be derived from confidential
proceedings. Here the rationale behind limiting transparency is one of promoting an
environment of trust and co-operation in which the issue of corruption can be addressed out of
the glare of public attention. Trust is enhanced by limiting the degree of transparency and
access without undermining the legitimacy of the organisation. This view is premised upon the
belief that a policy or negotiations are justly secret if publicity would undermine their intention.
Based in German%; its primary sun is to reduce comiption in goVerniflenlS, international compafli and insmuiions. Coida1
details can be found in Owen. 1996:243. One further point of interest is thai it was founded by foimcr Wodd Bank employees itith
may go some way to explaining its view of irsasparency considering the criticisms made of World Bank secrecy - see Chapter 6.
95
Why should anyone object when the aim of limiting transparency is to produce a beneficial
outcome which would be compromised by publicity and too much access (Gutmann and
Thomson, 1996: 102).
The example raises questions about the possibility of transparency as a means of achieving
substantive change to the governance of the global economic and political system when secrecy
is often considered a valuable part of the decision-making process. This illustrates how a
particular perspective on transparency can place limits upon a more expansive view of it.
Despite the clamour amongst critics and advocates alike for transparency, its use continues to
be surrounded by ambiguities and tensions.
A Typology of Transparency
Because transparency has been presented as a solution to the lack of accountability it requires
that the different types of transparency that exist be elaborated upon and a distinction made
between its different uses. To explore further the limits and possibilities of transparency I will
develop a typology to illuminate different ways in which transparency can be applied in the
debate about accountability in MGG. The discussion so far has highlighted two key points.
Firstly, that accountability requires openness and secondly, that transparency, the means to
increased openness, is circumscribed and limited by other factors.
In the typology I will demonstrate how the meaning of transparency ranges from a narrow
conception (internal and external transparency) to a broad all embracing view (bottom-up
transparency). Transparency can have different meanings, something that has been
acknowledged in the belief that as a concept, it has been 'tailored to specific interests, [and]
practiced to varying degrees...' (United Nations, 1992: 4). This illustrates that the idea and
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application of transparency have not been constant, they have been adapted and changed so that
interpretations of transparency are neither fixed nor mutually exclusive.
The typology highlights that the discourse of transparency is not necessarily neutral, and
depending upon what use is assumed, can form an important component of power relations. By
looking at different types of transparency one can begin to understand how transparency can be
used not only as an emancipatory force in the way Bobbio understands it, but also as a strategy
of power, an ideological device, that whilst promising increased accountability can conceal and
reinforce dominant relations of power.
Internal Transparency
Internal transparency represents a constrained and narrow view of openness. It refers
specifically to internal decision-making and openness within institutions. The aim is to facilitate
decision-making, increasing efficiency and effectiveness by including only a limited number in
that process. It is closely linked to the idea of bureaucratic secrecy and the need to generate
internal cohesion by excluding external pressures. The role of internal transparency is to
challenge the internal secrecy of institutions (Teft, 1980: 327).
In the context of institutional practice this is transparency within institutions and is not intended
to be a part of a wider participatory idea of accountability 35 . Internal transparency, according
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is concerned with
the quality and completeness information available only to decision-makers (OECD, 1983: 10).
Essential for understanding internal transparency is the principle of representation, whereby the
" However, the extent to which an internal form of transparency is open even to the limited degree is disputed. The Secretary General
of the UN Secretariat has complained that co-ordination between the specialist agencies of the UN is problematic. They are unwilling
to share information and policy decisions: . the financial institutions [the World Bank, IMF] have worked at cross purposes with other
UN offices...even as they have pursued common objectives' (Perez de Cuellar, 1995: 151).
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authority of decision-making is entrusted to a small group of representatives or bureaucrats
considered to have specialist knowledge and who are best placed to make decisions. For
example, at the 1995 Conference on Disarmament (see Chapter 7 for more details), internal
transparency played an important role in facilitating the extension of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (Welsh, 1995: 2).
The justification for limiting transparency to this internal form is based upon a traditional
concept of representation and authority that is embodied within representative democracy,
whereby responsibility is delegated and legitimised by the political system. The legitimacy is
sustained by two key assumptions. Firstly, that as elected or appointed representatives they are
legitimately placed to make decisions without further consultation. Secondly, the limits of
internal transparency are justified through the argument that there is information that the public
just does not need to know. This is because it is of no interest, or because it is too complex to
understand, or it is too sensitive for wider distribution and its release would put at risk a greater
good. The practice of internal transparency confers authority upon a small group who are
informed and able to assess the arguments, with representatives acting as 'trustees of the public
interest' (Birch, 1993: 70). As a consequence, critics argue that 'decisions [are] ... made
outside the confines of national politics, in a highly elitist fashion...' (Koc, 1994: 275).
Notwithstanding this, the assumption that internal transparency will dominate the political
process within institutions at the expense of increased access and transparency has been
challenged. A case can be made that because information will ultimately come into the public
domain internal transparency has a limited impact on public accountability. For example, the
World Bank is both the subject and source of various publications and issues a regular series of
policy research papers as well as a quarterly publication, whilst the IMF's activities are
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reported in its publication, IMFSun'ey. This official information is supplemented by
information from non-government organisations, and news agencies and the actions of these
institutions can be checked. For example, during the 1 990s there have been a number of reports
issued by interest groups criticising the activities and policies of MGG (see Friends of the
Earth, 1994; Catholic Institute for International Affairs, 1994a, 1994b).
In summary, internal transparency is narrowly conceived. It represents accountability within
institutions and excludes wider access and participation. Advocates would argue that it
performs an important function within institutions, helping them to operate more effectively and
efficiently. In the pursuit of increased public accountability, its usefulness is limited because it
fails to challenge the secrecy within MGG. Internal transparency presents a possible answer to
the paradox over the existence of a discourse of transparency and the continuation of secrecy.
The two can co-exist when limits are placed upon the extent to which the principle of
transparency is applied.
External Transparency
Aware of the criticism of secrecy made against them, many institutions of MGG have
attempted to counter such charges by increasing access to information. I have called this shift
external transparency '[referring] to the information available to the general public' (OECD,
1983: 10). The move towards external transparency is underpinned by a belief that access to
information is a fundamental requirement to ensure the legitimacy of institutions through
increased accountability.
The credibility of external transparency as a means of enhancing accountability and
representation is based around the debate over the 'right to know' versus the 'right to conceal'.
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The 'right to know' refers to the 'public right to know [in order to prevent] the manipulation of
information, or arbitrariness, and gives substance to the democratic requirement of
accountability' (Robertson, 1982: 12; Hamelink, 1994: 305). The right to withhold or conceal
information is premised upon the right of privacy and the authority of governing institutions
which conveys legitimacy upon them to act in a certain manner.
The dominant rationale for external transparency comes as a response to the criticisms of
governance institutions concealing information. External transparency yields benefits to those
areas of governance that wish to enhance their legitimacy and democratic credibility 36 . In a
recent publication from the European Union the argument in favour of external transparency is
made explicit: 'transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature
and the public's confidence in the administration' (Commission of the European Community,
1993: 93)37, Transparency is thus seen to be an essential part of the process of governance
between the rulers and the ruled enhancing trust in the public over the nature of the
relationship. Following on in this vein, the World Bank has adopted strategies of transparency
to present a more positive image of itself; with increasing external transparency one of its
central reforms (see Nelson, 1995: 34-35 and Chapter 6).
It remains unclear, however, whether 'the right to access' is valued more highly than the
'privilege to conceal' by a wide range of governance institutions. In an attempt to give primacy
to the 'right to access', Restivo asserts, that in the name of greater equality, every person
should be 'entitled to access to the information they need to improve their life-chances ...'
(1986: 81). He believes that our life-chances are compromised by 'ruling elites [who] gain and
"External transparency has been much favoured amongst the institutions of the EU in an attempt to address the democratic deficit
that exists between the institutions and the people. However, this remains an instnimental understanding and does not embrace wider
xincipIes regarding accountability, equality and participation.
However, even by its own admission, external transparency is 'aimed at those members of the public who, because of their
professional or academic activities, follow Community affairs more closely' (SEC (92) 2274: 96).
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hold power ... by preventing citizens from having access to, or from achieving some
understanding of, certain types of information' (1986: 81). Conversely, Robertson reasons that
there have to be limits: 'there can never be, then, a right to know all [my emphasis] that a
citizen might like to know. There can only be a right to know certain specified and carefully
defined types of information...' (1982: 13). The answer for Robertson is one of balancing out
the need for secrecy against the needs of openness in determining what types of information we
have a right to know. Similarly, Bathory and Williams believe that 'the public's need to hear
what is essential to public affairs - whether defined in relation to the decisions and actions of its
political leaders or to public issues - does not extend to everything' (1977: 5). This view
questions whether the principle of accountability can be considered a priori over other values
like confidentiality, efficiency in deliberation and policy-making. In certain circumstances all
information need not, and indeed should not be made public, particularly if the 'good' of
concealment outweighs that of disclosure.
There are important issues surrounding the political function of external transparency which
compromise its ability to deliver increased accountability. External transparency creates an
image of transparency by reinforcing the rhetoric but without necessarily delivering increased
accountability if there is no element of compulsion contained within it. For example, it is
argued that the World Bank's World Development Reports whilst taking the format of
objective analysis may in fact be selective and ideologically biased designed largely for the self-
promotion and justification of a particular institutional position (Wilks, 1998: 1).
In the absence of meaningful 'rights to access', external transparency could be considered as a
largely cosmetic reform. Gills and Rocamora have made a similar point about what they term
'low intensity democracy'. Applied to transparency, the concept 'is in danger of becoming a
101
term of political mystification or obfuscation, serving as a euphemism for sophisticated modern
forms of neo-authoritarianism' (1992: 502). It is important to note that merely increasing
access to infonnation does not necessarily mean it will result in increased accountability. This
is particularly so if increased access to information makes argument unnecessary because the
information compiled by experts and specialists is considered legitimate (Lasch, 1995: 170).
The danger is in conferring legitimacy on information by virtue of its source. What is required
are alternative sources of information so that discrimination between competing claims can
occur. As Bok argues,
'Publicity can involve manipulation, secrecy, at times deception and outright lies;
such publicity can orchestrate and arrange how something is to appear, and how
its problematic aspects are to be concealed.. .It is therefore in no sense opposed to
secrecy and often makes a mockery of publicity in the sense of public discussion
and accountability. Indeed, the motives and actions kept secret or blurred by
avalanches of information or by manipulation are often precisely those that go
against the public interest' (1982: 115).
External transparency interpreted in this way becomes a form of concealment (see Chapter 2
and the section on Productive Secrecy). Lasch considers that access to information alone is not
an adequate means to ensure accountability; rather what is required is inclusive public debate
(1995: 162). External transparency can thus be portrayed as merely a limited form of
disclosure which is too often dependant upon unofficial leaks or reports sponsored by the
institutions in question. Another concern is that the adoption of a minimal level of external
transparency may obscure a more substantive lack of transparency in other areas. Claims that
external transparency is increasing are contested, and the qualit y and scope of the information
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available is argued to be of limited value because it serves particular interests (Cesareo, 1992:
90).
There appears to be a constant tension over the degree of disclosure and the quality of the
information released. On one hand, 'without the right to access there is no means to prevent
government from abusing office or acting against the interests of society' (Robertson, 1982:
13). On the other hand, disclosure might itself bring about a worse outcome because of the way
decisions can be manipulated by that information. Those who advocate unlimited openness
could be accused of being simple moralists advocating a relationship based upon expansive
openness, without considering the wider implications for governance processes.
In summary, the principle of external transparency is one that provides the basis for greater
access to information. This can serve two purposes: firstly enhancing the legitimacy of
governing institutions, and secondl y increasing accountability by providing a response to those
critics of MGG who believe that they are too secretive. As I have indicated, the existence of
external transparency cannot be relied upon to increase accountability. Bok, Restivo and Lasch
have all pointed Out the production and dissemination of information does not necessarily result
in increased accountability . Conversely, there are those political realists who would argue that




The idea of transparency from above (TA) concerns the role of MGG in international
surveillance and policing new rules of accountability and transparency concerning individual
states. Its function is to help ensure the compliance of states in a wide range of multilateral
regulatory agreements. According to the neoliberal-institutionalist perspective (see Chapter 1)
TA requires the collection and dissemination of information by MGG in order to ensure
discipline in the world order (Uvin, 1996: 167 in Weiss and Gordenker). In the aftermath of the
Mexican Peso Crisis (see Chapter 5) the IMF requested greater regulatory powers because it
wanted to enhance its ability to police the global economic system and ensure that information
is available to market actors (Kapur, 1998: 110).
Transparency from above can be enforced in a number of wa ys: by ensuring states maintain
good economic practice to avoid market crisis; by monitoring compliance of norms, rules and
standards of international treaties and regimes such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
and also as a condition of securing loans from the IMF and the World Bank. Transparency in
this context is not concerned with increasing accountability within MGG but refers to the
ability with which MGG can assess compliance with its rules and regulations (Young, 1992:
176. See Chapter 1: neoliberal-institutionalist section).
In the case of market stability, transparency acts to generate harmonisation, with the free-flow
of information assisting market confidence and reducing the capacity of states to act as isolated
national units in an integrated global economy. This international surveillance minimises the
threat to free trade and maximises' the costs of trade protection, because free markets are
' The term 'globalization from above' has been utilised as an analytical concept most fully by Richard Falk (1995a; 1995b). Trans-
national foccs that stand in opposition to power from above have been termed globalization from below'.
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premised on the idea of a 'level playing field', and one way to ensure this is through
transparency and international surveillance (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995: 43). In an era of
globalisation 'policy-makers are confronted more and more with a new discipline - the need to
maintain the confidence of markets, both domestic, and, increasingly, international' (Qureshi,
1996: 31). Advocates of transparency from above argue that it generates confidence in the
markets and that the world economy requires an open and transparent system to achieve this
and the roleof MGG is crucial for shaping compliance towards this shared norm.
Critics, however, believe that the surveillance activities that accompanies top-down
transparency reflects a reconstitution of political authority at the global level without a
corresponding increase in public accountability in these regulatory institutions (Cox, 1996a:
138). This is reinforced by Robinson who asserts 'even the fairest, most open and transparent
process, administered with perfect impartiality, will not generate good outcomes if the rules
are inappropriate' (Robinson, 1995: 375). Here Robinson is referring to the rules of the global
economy that put the needs of global capitalist interests before those of a wider, plural set of
interests. TA acts to reinforce the rules that support global markets and the authority of MGG
whilst limiting the prospects for wider public accountability within MGG by giving precedence
to market forces in the governance process.
This top-down form of transparency is often portrayed in technical terms which reveal little
about its political intent. Critics argue that TA is skewed towards improving economic
transparency and the 'ideology of the market', whilst placing limits upon the importance of
political transparency in multilateral institutions (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 164). The
sovereignty of states is being eroded from above, the spread of international surveillance gives
increased authority
 to the institutions of MGG (Lewis, 1995). This view is reinforced by Cox
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(see Chapter 1) who describes MGG as the 'machinery of surveillance', imposing their rules
and authority upon the global economy (1987: 255). Cox argues that 'the institutions of the
world economy incorporated mechanisms to supervise the application of the system's norms...
(1987: 255). For example, this process can be viewed in the conditions attached to loans
through the IMF and the World Bank. The bias in the discourse of global economic governance
is reflected in the conditionality policies of the Bretton Woods organisations.
This conditionality first requires the accountability of governments to global markets and
secondly, making themselves transparent to global supervisors at the IMF (Gill, 1995: 413). By
contrast, the multilateral institutions themselves remain free from surveillance and the gaze of
the public sphere. This view suggests very much a traditional top down view of power, in
which the institutions of MGG keep surveillance on states, and transparency becomes a part of
these asymmetrical power relations. The vulnerable are trapped if they are constantly visible to
a more authoritative body. The gaze of multilateral institutions acts as a discipline on non-
market friendly policies, and it means there is nowhere to hide from these institutions.
It has been observed extensively that states have traditionally controlled the means of
surveillance and that this continues to be the case (Giddens, 1990; Lyon, 1994; Dandeker,
1990). However, it is not surprising that the internationalisation of state activity has resulted in
the spread of this process to embrace the global sphere of governance. This might be
considered beneficial, stabilising global markets and ensuring compliance with MGG.
Conversely, it transfers greater powers to the global level without any corresponding means of
holding those powers to account. Because institutions of MGG are taking on an increased
surveillance role, there is a powerful argument for making these institutions more transparent in
their operations and hence more accountable.
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in summary, the idea of transparency from above is often justified by an international economic
order founded on the principle of openness (Guitian, 1994: 41). This openness also manifests
itself in international surveillance mechanisms and refers to the way in which institutions of
MGG maintain surveillance and discipline in the global economy. However, the institutions of
MUG are not themselves subject to a similar degree of accountability or external surveillance.
Transparency from above presents itself as a benign form of transparency introduced to
support global markets and risks ignoring other issues such as the public accountability of
MUG that manifest themselves through the internationalisation of the state (see Chapter 1).
Transparency from Below
It has been suggested that at its best the discourse of transparency will remain limited to the
idea of external transparency discussed above (Dore, 1993: 238). The application of the
principle of transparency may remain limited to access to information released by governance
institutions, in order for accountability to be adequate, a more substantive form of transparency
is required, and this I have called transparency from below (TB).
The idea of transparency from below challenges the narrower version described above, and
embraces the possibility of a substantive and wide ranging transparency. The scope of
transparency from below includes increased access to information, increased participation and,
more ambitiously to challenge the existing dominant power structures. In practice the principles
of TB are about extending the limits of accountability beyond the state level to the supra-
national or international level. This brings into question the legitimacy of the current political
processes that separate institutions of MGG from national populations. Transparency from
below questions the traditional boundaries that have separated MUG from domestic society
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(see Chapter 1). It argues for a wider conception of transparency, one that includes openness in
the discussion of substantive issues as well as challenging the processes of globalisation that
are believed to be responsible for the increasing process of social exclusion, inequality and
increasing authority of MGG (see Chapter 1). As a consequence, transparency becomes more
than just a method of increasing openness or call to reform institutions of MGG; it is a political
strategy.
One of the main criticisms levelled at institutions of MGG is that they 'evade any form of
control by public deliberation and opinion, despite the protests of excluded nations and
pressures from diverse social groups' (Archibugi and Held, 1995: 7). Multilateral institutions
are accused of disempowering individuals in the control they have over important areas of our
lives through influencing national policies (Bradlow and Grossman, 1996: 40-1). From the
bottom-up perspective, the reform of institutions fails to take into account differences in the
distribution of power. External transparency may increase the amount of information in the
public sphere, but it does not necessarily mean citizens are more able to hold decision-makers
to account. Similarly, the rhetoric of transparency may well distort the realities of power,
making accountability less likely (Bay, 1977: 23). For example, 'underpinning the state's
control of political space is its privileged access to information' (Camilleri and Falk, 1992:
200). Looking at transparency as a problem-solving device ignores the wider issues of
explaining the underlying structures and social forces that constitute the political process.
Advocates of increased accountability and transparency from below claim that to be effective
the structural conditions that shape modern society need to be challenged and most particularly
the structural forces that support the neoliberal economic orthodoxy (Falk, 1995: 236-240;
Rupert, 1997: 144; Cheru, 1997: 153).
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The idea of TB challenges the state dominated system of MGG and champions a conception of
multilateralism that is based upon an inclusive, participatory global society. The state is just
one of a range of bodies representing people's interests (Wapner, 1995: 335; 0' Brien, 1997:
4). A shift would signal the transformation of MGG to a form of governance that gives more
emphasis to the global with its emphasis on inclusion over multilateralism and exclusion. The
rejection of a state-centred concept of international relations would, it is reasoned, produce 'a
new politics of global responsibility'; one that is inclusive and based upon democratic
principles (Shaw, 1994: 131). As Linklater and MacMillan assert: '... if democratic
accountability has a role within transnational political theory then there is a strong case for
representing international non-governmental agencies and social movements at the highest level
of international decision-making' (1995: 14).
Increasingly there have been calls from interested groups to take on a more integrated role:
during the negotiation for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the
early 1990s environmental groups were calling for "measures to ensure greater public
participation and transparency in the GATT dispute settlement procedure" (Letter to US trade
representatives quoted in Ritchie, 1994: 751). Substantive transparency aims to combat secrecy
and hidden power in the process of MGG b y advocating a more expansive and substantive
form of democracy: one that encourages greater dialogue, equity, participation and social
justice. Lang and Hines believe that the global level of governance is inherently unaccountable
due to its spatial remoteness: 'if decisions about your life and environment...are taken by far-
off people and bodies, it is almost impossible to affect those decisions directly.. .it is easier to
get to a local council or committee meeting, than to one the other side of the world' (1993:
107).
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Advocates of transparency from below believe in the empowerment of local and national
communities to combat social, economic and environmental problems. By contrast the priorities
of MOG appear different. In the economic sphere advocates of greater public control of MGG
argue that because these organisations prioritise the interests of the market before the needs of
the individual, serious economic and social consequences will result (Falk, 1995 a: 181). One
reaction to the process of economic globalisation is a corresponding shift towards a 'localistic
reaction to globalization'. This includes a recognition that there can be, for some, a 'welcome
decentralisation and democratisation of politics' (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995: 218). For
example, in a recent report on aid from the European Union to the Philippines, it was argued
that the traditional top-down approach (with its incumbent conditionality) should be replaced.
What was required was a means of 'taking account of more qualitative issues relating to
cultural diversity, sustainability, equity, gender, participation and the environment' (Santos,
1995: 1). A bottom-up approach favours local participation as a more equitable and efficient
way of distributing aid. Equally, this could be applied to a wide range of issues that are
currently dominated by international organisations.
Transparency from below looks to more substantive participation by NGOs in MGG and is
based upon the belief that accountability requires the opportunity to influence outcomes. For
example, at the recent negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
a lack of openness was identified as seriously hampering the ability of interested NGOs to
participate. Ritchie reasons that the lack of democratic participation occurs as a direct result of
inadequate openness in the political process. This leads to the exclusion of 'individuals and
groups, including some of the most knowledgeable and thoughtful, who criticised the direction
of the NAFTA negotiations' (1994: 749). Where global multilateral organisations are involved,
the tendency appears towards limited participation by concerned citizens and NGOs.
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Camilleri and Falk believe that new social movements committed to resisting the
internationalisation of authority have become a global phenomenon (1992: 206-211). These
new social movements act as the prime checks and balances on MGG. However, these groups
are not without their critics and their belief in a form of international civil society as agents of
accountability need to be viewed with caution. Because critics of globalisation tend to take a
benign view of these social movements it does not mean that they are without power or that
they may not themselves open up new and different inequalities. These groups have unequal
power and political voices and this raises real issues of accountability amongst such groupings
(Hurrell and Woods, 1995: 463).
Notwithstanding these concerns about increased participation at the global level, there is seen
to be the beginnings of a growth of participatory politics at the local level and that local politics
'forms the bedrock of genuine democratisation' (Watkins, 1995: 217). Watkins goes on to
argue that although there is not a universal form of democracy that can be applied to all people
at all times, what is crucial to effective participation is transparent and accountable governors.
Transparency should mean that policies of international organisations are opened up to wider
scrutiny (Watkins, 1995: 219).
To recap, TB asserts the need for a more substantive form of transparency. This more
expansive transparency would extend the possibilities for more accountability in MGG not
least by highlighting the political content of transparency. This position challenges the structure
within which multilateral global governance operates including both the inter-state system and
the global economy. Central to the drive for increased accountability is the capacity of NGOs
to act as critical agents.
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Table 4: A Typology of Transparency
Types of	 Characteristics	 Implications for Accountability
Transparency_________________________________ ________________________________
Internal	 Narrow application. Refers to	 Applies to accountability within
transparency within institutions, 	 institutions, but excludes wider access and
Maintains the primacy of efficiency and	 participation. Advocates would argue that
effective government over wider political 	 it performs an important function helping
participation and accountability,	 effectiveness and efficiency. In the pursuit
of public accountability, its usefulness is
limited.
External	 Most frequently applied form of 	 External transparency provides some
transparency in MGG. Refers to officially access to information. This can enhance
sanctioned release of information into	 the legitimacy of MGG by challenging
public domain. Vulnerable to claims of
	
secrecy. External transparency cannot be
productive secrecy.	 relied upon to increase accountability. The
production and dissemination of
information does not necessarily result in
increased accountability. A right to access
is often balanced against the need for
secrecy.
From Above	 Transparency as a source of regulation in Aims to increase the accountability of
the global order. Surveillance undertaken 	 states to the rules and norms of the
by MGG. Has political implications due to economic system. Institutions of MGG are
the authority it gives to MGG and links	 not subject to the same degree of
with neoliberal economic agenda.	 accountability or surveillance. It presents
itself as a benign form of transparency
introduced to support global markets. It
ignores the political role of MGG.
From Below	 Full political participation by NUOs,	 Extends the possibilities for more
citizens, etc. The discourse of
	 accountability in global governance
transparency is a substantive concept with highlighting the political content of
the potential to produce a more just world transparency. It challenges the structure
order.	 within which multilateral global
governance operates including both the
inter-state system and the global economy.
NGOs play a central role.
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Conclusion
This chapter has higMighted the way in which the discourse of transparency has proliferated
due to developments in new technology, and the dominance of a liberal democratic political and
neoliberal economic agenda on a global scale. It would appear that rather than simply
guaranteeing accountability, the discourse of transparency creates both possibilities and limits
for accountability. In addition to this the discourse of transparency is integral to the
relationship between good governance and accountability. The key issue that it raises is
whether the principles of good governance can be applied to the institutions of MGG. As a
consequence it is legitimate to pose the question whether the current orthodoxy that surrounds
the idea of transparency is merely rhetoric, or does it amount to something more meaningful? If
we agree with Bobbio that power will always attempt to hide itself, then the limits of the
discourse will be made apparent. However, as the typology illustrates, transparency has come
to be understood and applied in a number of different ways. Rather than speak of one
transparency it is more appropriate to think in terms of multiple forms of transparency; and it
is more productive to ask ourselves what form of transparency exists, and what are the
consequences that stem from this for accountability? Understanding transparency in this way
may provide solutions to the paradox between the discourse of transparency and the continuing
prevalence of secrecy in institutions of MGG.
A Summary of Chapters 1-3
The discussion in Chapters 1-3 has concentrated upon exploring the issue of accountability in
institutions of MGCi. Chapter 1 set the context for the discussion by placing the issue of
accountability at the fore by looking at different assessments of globalisation. The end of the
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state thesis gives validity to the argument that globalisation has led to more authoritative and
regulatory institutions at the global level. The myth of globalisation challenges this view and
posits that states are still an integral part of the governance mechanism. Both of these
assessments have implications for accountability in MGG. The latter half of Chapter 1
explored four perspectives on international relations to see what prospects they hold for
accountability in MUG. Each of these interpretations gives a different view of accountability
and the role of transparency. The state-centred position would view wider accountability as a
non-issue. Neoliberal-institutionalism looks to technical reforms to enhance internal and
external transparency. Whereas the cosmopolitan and radical position would advocate
transparency from below as a source of accountability.
In Chapter 2 the focus was on the concept of secrecy and the ambiguity that surrounds its use
in the governance process. Secrecy can be a necessary part of social relations and the
governance process. The existence of secrecy in MUG is therefore not necessarily a cause for
concern. However, whilst secrecy can be justified, its existence allows for the possibility of
political processes remaining hidden and unaccountable as in the institutional and productive
use of secrecy.
In Chapter 3 I examined the idea of transparency, and its potential and limits as a source of
accountability. This chapter highlights the way in which the discourse of transparency has
proliferated in the debates over MGG including what is the relationship between good
governance and accountability. It explores the discourse of transparency, including both the
possibilities and limits the concept presents for accountability. The issue is primarily whether
this discourse is merely rhetoric or amounts to a wider, more public, form of accountability.
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Chapter Four
The IMF and the Mexican Peso Crisis
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has for the last fIfty years been a central pillar for the
governance of the world economy. Its main duty has been to intervene during periods of
financial crisis to prop up unstable domestic economies. In this area the IMF's authority and
influence have become a dominant feature of the modern world. This chapter assesses the
accountability of the IMF policy processes. The particular focus will be upon the part played
by the IMF in the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994/5. The principal questions being: to what extent
were the actions and policies of the IMF open and transparent during the peso crisis?
Challenges to the legitimacy of the IMF's authority have come from a wide variety of 'voices'
who want to see the IMF either abolished, or become a more accountable institution (Bradlow
and Grossman, 1996: 44; Browne, 1994: 63-70; Gerster, 1994). There is growing conviction
amongst these critics that the Fund can no longer act without recourse to a wider set of
interests than those of its dominant members otherwise it will remain an exclusive organisation,
closed to the needs of local conditions (Killick, 1995: 13).
By following a neoliberal agenda based upon free markets and non-intervention the IMF
ignores any social responsibilities vhich is compounded by a lack of public accountability.
Within the IMF, resistance to wider accountability remains strong, justified on grounds of
financial confidentiality, legitimate authority and the interests of its members.
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The chapter is divided into four sections. The first looks at the development of the IMF over
the past fifty years in order to place its current activities in context. The second explores the
internal workings of the IMF and examines the role of secrecy and the discourse of
transparency. The third section looks at the Mexican Peso Crisis and the role of the IMF. The
subsequent section gives an analysis of the peso crisis looking at various factors to answer the
question: to whom is the IMF accountable?
The Background to the Fund
From its inception in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, the International Monetary Fund
has been one of the key institutions in the management and regulation of the global economic
system39 . Its primary duty has been to monitor the economic stability of member states,
intervening when requested to do so with loans to correct short term financial problems
(Williams, 1994: 54). Its job is to promote and facilitate, assisting and giving confidence to
good economic practice between and within states. As Bird observes, 'the Fund ... provide[s] a
linchpin for the centralised management of the international monetary system' (1995: 2).
For the first twenty years after the establishment of the IMF, few questions were raised
concerning the Fund's legitimate position in supporting fragile economies. It was conceived in
order to give assistance and advice in the restructuring of domestic economies in Europe after
the end of World War Two (Williams, 1987: 2). The lack of political controversy in the early
days of the IMF was in part due to the post-war economic boom in the West and in part the
" The IMF came into existence on 27 December 1945. The Board of Governors first met on 8 March 1946. The Executive Board's
first meeting was on 6-5-1946, and it commenced its financial operations on 6 May 1946 (Hooke, 1982).
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institutional weakness of the Fund (Williams, 1994: 57). From the beginning the IMF was
conceived as an organisation dedicated to governing the global economic system.
The significance of the IMF has fluctuated over time. The 1970s was a problematic decade for
the IMF (and the Bretton Woods institutions in general), due to dwindling resources and an
increased part played by the G-7 and private bank finance (Helleiner, 1994: 167). The 1980s
saw a resurgence of IMF activity as the governments of developing countries in need of finance
undertook structural adjustments to their economies as a condition of loan guarantees. The use
of conditionality and the direct surveillance of many developing economies by the JMF
signalled its greater role in the governance process. The dominant thinking within the IMF at
this time was that economic development required the discipline of the market as the basis of
adjustments to domestic economies. These adjustments include deregulation of markets,
opening economies to market competition and reduction in state intervention (see Agnew and
Corbridge, 1995: 195; Woodward, 1993: 4). Due to these policy recommendations the IMF
role as an institution of MGG remains controversial. There are those who see it as apolitically
benign institution facilitating co-operation between its members (Driscoll, 1995), whilst others
characterise the IMF as inherently political (George, 1994: 54-57).
Advocates maintain that the IMF plays a purely technical role, upholding economic stability,
and that it is detached from strategic political decisions. The Fund's traditional authority is
based upon three factors. Firstly, it is an economic and not a political institution; secondly, it
acts on behalf of its members; and thirdly its lending policy gives it the legitimate right to
impose conditions on loans (Driscoll, 1995: 1-3). Conversely, Critics contend that this
politically benign view of the IMF does not reflect reality. After decolonisation the IMF was
portrayed as a tool of neo-imperialist power because of the conditions attached to its structural
117
adjustment programmes (Falk, 1995a: 29; Cheru, 1997: 164). More recently, the IMF has been
represented as playing an important role in the process of economic globalisation and its
governance, reinforcing the liberal economic orthodoxy of economic globalisation (Agnew and
Corbridge, 1995: 164; Gill, 1995: 413; Cox, 1994: 49).
From this critical perspective the IMF is considered to lack legitimacy. It is seen to promote
market forces and act in the interests of the G-7 industrialised states. Because of this the IMF's
function is considered political in both its motives and actions (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995:
164). Critics believe that the political function of the IMF cannot be separated from the more
technical economic aspects of its work, and that the institution is inherently political. This
political dimension to the IMF's role is reinforced by its adherence to neoliberal ideology and
support for market reforms before other considerations such as the social implications that
result from these policies, including increased unemployment and cutting of social welfare
provision (Killick, 1995: 13; Tanzer, 1995: 12-13).
The Organisation of the IMF
When exploring the workings of the IMF, it is useful to say something about its organisational
stnicture. The IMF bureaucracy is based upon a tripartite structure: a Board of Governors, an
Executive Board and Secretariat (otherwise known as the Interim Committee). The Board of
Governors is the top echelon within the IMF, and represents the authority of the member states
with each one appointing a Governor. A Governor is entitled to cast the number of votes
allocated by a system of weighted voting based upon the members' contributions. The Board
meets once a year and the annual report is produced in their name. This report is the definitive
statement of the Fund's policy objectives and review of the past year's projects. The decisions
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made by the Governors are however, necessarily based upon the outcomes of the workings of
the Executive Board and Interim Committee (Ferguson, 1988: 90).
The Board of Governors has in practice delegated primary responsibility for decision-making to
the Executive Board (EB). The EB, led by the Managing Director, plays a crucial part in IMF
policy and have been described as the pivotal decision-making organ of the institution (Hexner,
1964: 76; Ferguson, 1988: 67). The EB is responsible for the day to day running of the Board.
For example, in the event of a crisis, as in Mexico 1994/5 (details below), it was the EB which
was at the centre of the process of consultation and of determining the conditionality of the loan.
There was not time for full consultation with the Board of Governors; the rescue plan was
presented to them by the EB once it had been finalised for agreement. Thus, the role of the
Executive Directors is crucial because they largely determine IMF policy (Bischel, 1994:
141)°.
The final body in the tripartite structure is the Interim Committee (IC) whose duty it is to
advise the Executive Board. Although only able to recommend policy, its guidance is a crucial
component of the IMF decision-making process 4t . For example, in October 1994 the interim
Committee requested that the Executive Board strengthen its surveillance procedures (IMF
Annual Report, 1995: 45). In its report the IC regarded the existing procedures as inadequate
for the systematic harmonisation of national economic policy and recommended that they be
strengthened. Recommendations are often taken up by the EB and become Fund policy. It is
noticeable within this tripartite organisational structure that the IMF operates in a bureaucratic
4° The Exeeutive Board is made up of twenty members, five etected by the members with the largest quotas and fifteen by the other
members between them (Gold, 1979:12).
4° The IC's position was enhanced with the amendments to the Articles of Agreement which came into effect on April 1st 1978 and
its purely advisory role became more influential in the policy process (Hooke, 1982).
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top-down manner, with decisions made at the highest level and then passed down without
consultation with other interested parties.
The IMF and Institutional Secrecy
The existence of institutional secrecy within the IMF has been widely commented upon and
appears to be deeply imbedded within the IMF's culture (Woodroffe, 1994: 4; Friends of the
Earth, 1994: 19; Budhoo, 1994: 13). This type of secrecy in the IMF is justified bythe need for
internal cohesion and the confidential nature of its business in the financial sphere (see Chapter
2). One area in which institutional secrecy manifests itself is in the decision-making process
which is based upon consensus building amongst the ED's. Aware of the in-built bias in the
system of voting, and in order to avoid controversy, an environment of consensus building, as
opposed to vote taking, has developed on policy decisions (Ferguson, 1988: 65; Driscoll, 1995:
9)42 The process of consensual dialogue that has developed amongst the EB means that
decisions are based upon the 'sense of the meetings' (Gold, 1981: 25).
Institutional secrecy is reflected in the dialogue that occurs within the JMF. When the Fund is
about to engage with a member over a loan, dialogue is restricted internally to the Executive
Directors and closely associated members of the IC. Externally, the consultation process is
between the IMF and representatives from the member states. From these discussions a Staff
Report and briefing paper are produced which contain an assessment of a country's
performance, prospects and policies, plus proposals for domestic economic reforms. Even
when these negotiations have been completed, the Staff Report remains confidential. This
42 Officially, decision-making within the IMF is based upon the principle of weighted voting. Advocates of this voting system
maintain that although it does not deliver equality in voting, it does take into account the financial contributions made to the IMF.
Due to the United States' pre-eminenl economic position a veto was a built in, however, because of this the IMF is widely viewed as
an agent of the developed world (Williams, 1994: 67).
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confidentiality is important because it is from this report that potential problems are identified
and corrective policies delivered (Hooke, 1982: 22-23).
Another important IMF document that remains confidential is the Letter of intent. This is
submitted to the IMF by the loan recipient country. Included within it are the details and
conditions that the country intends to undertake for the structural adjustment of its economy
(Hooke, 1982: 21). One of the key criticisms of the IMF is that the information in the Staff
Report and the Letter of Intent are not made public (Gerster, 1994: 48). The input the IMF has
into the Letter of Intent means that the IMF and not the borrowing government becomes
responsible for economic policy (Cooper, 1995: 28).
The institutional secrecy that exists within the IMF and encourages organisational and
functional secrecy (see Chapter 2) is defended on the grounds that it represents information that
is primarily confidential in nature. To release it would threaten the relationship between the
IMF and its members. This is not to say that the IMF has not attempted to address the concerns
that exist about the lack of openness.
The IMF and Transparency
More recently the IMF, under the direction of its Managing Director Michel Camdessus, has
started using the language of increased openness (IMF, Annual Report 1995: 39). On the 22
November 1994, a month prior to the Mexican crisis, a US Treasury Spokesperson, Larry
Summers, made a statement about the JMF. He asked that 'the IMF and member governments
forego traditional secrecy of Fund's programmes to build public support for difficult
adjustments' (Dunne, 1994: 6). Summers suggested that documentation relating to the possible
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consequences of structural adjustments should be made public in order to promote public
confidence in the IMF and build a relationship of trust with wider society.
The IMF, aware of this and other similar criticism has, engaged the discourse of transparenCy.
In part this has been due to the work of Camdessus. In the Fund's 1995 annual report he
comments upon the need for increased openness within the IMF and reforms that have already
been undertaken43 . For example, the IMF has expanded its External Relations Department,
increased the number of publications and made a commitment to make more IMF documents
public (IMF Annual Report, 1995: 39).
The same report states that moves towards transparency must be viewed within the constraints
of maintaining a balance between openness and confidential relations with member states (IMF
Annual Report, 1995: 39). In the light of this statement the effectiveness of these reforms for
greater transparency are ambiguous. Critics reason that the reforms do not go far enough
towards establishing the principle and practice of transparency in governance processes. It is
suggested that what is required is the publication of the conditions of a loan prior to agreement
by the principal parties, so that other interested bodies are not excluded, and there is the
opportunity for public debate (Oxfam, 1995: 44).
The issue of transparency within the IMF is complicated by the different manifestations of
transparency (see Chapter 3) which results in the use of transparency in a number of different
and sometimes contradictory ways. The IMF advocates absolute openness in the economic
sphere, but is content for the political sphere to be bounded by a more limited form of
openness. The dominant discourse in the IMF is that 'international economic governance must
It has been argued that the annual reports are the best source for determining the ideology of the EB and as such 'value judgements
concerning the Fund's ideology may be made on he basis of these documents' (He,ner, 1964: 83).
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be founded inevitably on openness' (Bernstein and Boughton, 1994:41). Transparency in
economic matters is required to impose discipline on national economies and ensure markets
have access to information. According to the principles of good governance (see Chapter 3),
economic openness and political openness go hand in hand. However, there is an apparent
lacuna between the openness advocated in the economic sphere and transparency within the
IMF.
An important role of the IMF is to keep surveillance on national economies and facilitate their
integration into the global economy. This 'top-down' view of openness is one that has been
criticised as being another manifestation of the IMF's powerful position. In the consultation
process, member governments provide the Fund with data for surveillance, enabling the IMF to
cast its gaze across members' economic policies and enforce the market discipline required of
IMF members (see Chapter 3 and the section on top-doi transparency).
Interestingly, the relationship between economic openness and political openness in the IMF
has been confronted in its publication Proposals to Strengthen Surveillance (IMF Survey,
1995: 154). The IMF makes a direct connection between the benefits of openness in the
interests of the global economy and openness within its internal culture. Although the IMF's
primary responsibility is the stability of the global economy, it has been forced by the logic of
market openness to question the basis of its internal secrecy. The IMF has recently published a
document entitled Social Dimensions of the )MF 's Policy Dialogue; stressing the importance
of good governance (see Chapter 3) through accountable institutions and increased
participation as a key aspect of the Fund's policy dialogues when dealing with the issue of
social development (1995: 1). In part this shift towards increased transparency has been forced
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upon the IMF by the discourse of transparency that underpins the principles of good
governance that the institution wants to promote in the global economic sphere.
In the IMF documents the policy recommendations conclude that transparency acts as a check
and balance upon poor political and administrative practices. In addition it enables
participation through dissemination, explanation and the decentralisation of decision-making.
The IMF describes this as a 'stake-holder society' where governance mechanisms are held to
account, and interests within society have a stake in decision-making processes (IMF, 1995: 8).
However, problems occur when we consider the proposition that the IMF, whilst advocating
good governance at the national level, places limits on openness in its governance mechanisms.
In spite of the criticisms of the IMF as a secretive organisation, it appears that the Fund has not
been totally averse to the idea of increased internal openness. In a recent IMF report it was
claimed that 'IMF reports need to be more candid and pointed in analysis and language, and
concerns regarding members' economic policies will need to be addressed more explicitly'
(IMF Survey, 22-5-95: 155). The scope of this new found openness is limited as within the
same report it asserts: 'at the same time, members' needs for confidentiality will continue to be
respected' (IMF Survey, 22-5-95: 155). Similarly, Camdessus, when questioned, in an
interview about a recent IMF document that was said to adopt language 'obscure in the
extreme' and 'very untransparent', replied 'that there is nothing wrong with being a little
imprecise' (IMF Survey, 8-5-96: 134).
The contradictor)' policy of the IMF over transparency becomes even more apparent when
other examples of 'IMF speak' are examined. Camdessus is reported as being in favour of
'encouraging more openness with the public about IMF policies and operations and the data on
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which they are based' (IMF Survey, 14-9-95: 268). The result has been an increase in access to
information on the condition that the relevant member states agree. Similarly, Van Houtven, a
member of the IMF Interim Committee, when asked about transparency, remarked that
openness is a necessity of public institutions (IMF Survey, 14-9-95: 270). However, the
contradictions within the IMF openness policies, soon become apparent as in the same
statement, Van Houtven, defends the confidentiality of relations between the IMF and member
governments (IMF Survey, 14-9-95: 271). Thus, the commitment to transparency becomes
bounded, with limits placed upon it by the IMF's deference to its relationship with member
states.
The dilemma over public accountability and confidentiality is further highlighted by
Camdessus. When asked in an interview about increasing internal transparency and whether a
conflict exists, he replied:
'No, I do not see any conflict. Greater transparency is increasingly recognised by
our members as an obligation that results from the increasing role financial
markets play in their financing. In encouraging transparenc y - and a candid
policy dialogue with us is part of this transparency - we can only help our
members to be judged more accurately by the markets. Any country that is
tempted to be less candid in its policy dialogue with us would be acting against
its own interests, given the existence of the markets. Transparency and openness
in policy dialogue, therefore, must and do go hand in hand' (IMF Survey, 14-8-
1995: 251).
The implication of this statement is that transparency is only required to exist internally
between the IMF and its members, excluding any other interested parties. This raises other
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issues over how the IMF intends to resolve the dilemma over wanting to be seen to be open and
accountable and the secrecy that continues to exist, if indeed it does. The clever manoeuvring
required by this disjuncture is illustrated by the actions of Camdessus who in the statement
above avoids answering the issue of the IMF's internal transparency directly. He highlights the
belief that transparency, rather than being motivated by political factors, is primarily attributed
to the needs of the market to manage its financial 'risk' (See Chapter 1 and Chapter 3).
l'his relationship between transparency and the markets is reinforced by Camdessus's
admission that the priority is for the markets rather than a wider, more inclusive, group to be
able to judge policy. There is the assumption that, because of the needs of the market, political
openness will result and reduce the potential for conflict between states (see Chapter 1 and the
section on the neoliberal-institutionalist perspective). This narrow formulation of transparency
highlights the gap that exists in the use of transparency between the IMF and its critics. This is
a key point because the use of transparenc y within the IMF emphasises certain forms - internal
and top-down transparency - whilst ignoring its critics who want to either enhance external
transparency or move towards bottom-up transparency. The limits of transparency in IMF
operations will now be discussed further, looking at the particular case of the Mexican Peso
Crisis.
Background to The Mexican Peso Crisis
In recent years Mexico has been identified as one of the most successful of the developing
economies emerging in South America. Since the mid-1980s the Mexican government has
undertaken steps to transform the economy from one characterised as being publicly owned,
debt-ridden and inefficient, to one that has become competitive in the global economy,
underpinned by policies of privatisation and low public spending (Ramirez de la 0, 1996: 12).
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It was the apparent success of these policies that encouraged the United Sates to conclude the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) th Canada and Mexico (Ramirez de la 0,
1996: 12).
The reform of the Mexican economy had been underway since 1982, with structural
adjustments policies introduced in an attempt to avoid the characteristic 'boom and bust' of its
economy. The process continued throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s with reforms of
Mexico's financial sector and policies of privatisation. A crucial actor throughout this period,
particularly during periods of economic uncertainly, has been the IMF. It has been suggested
that the IMF had been delegated the role of 'policeman' by the United States government to
keep surveillance on Mexican economic policy (Smith, 1996: 3).
The IMF's involvement intensified throughout the 1980s due to a fear of the effects of the
Mexican government defaulting on loan repayments on the confidence of the global market.
The IMF came under pressure to act and so became involved in buttressing-up the international
linancial system by underwriting Mexico's interest payments. This became known as the
'Brady Plan'. Critics of the plan believed that, rather than solving Mexico's debt problem,
what had happened was that Mexico's economic problems had merely been transferred from
private commercial banks to the public institution of the IMF (Shepherd, 1994: 310). For
many, this failure of the Mexican economy, like the peso crisis to follow, raised questions
about the neoliberal model advocated by the IMF. An important point to note is that in this
transfer of money from one type of organisation - private banks and commerce - to a public
institution the IMF was effectively taking greater responsibility for the economic development
of Mexico. The IMF gives those economies that are experiencing difficulties a 'seal of
The degree of responsibility that the IMF has taken throughout the developing world is reflected in the IMF lending $7Obn to 93
developing countries in the period between 1980 and 1990 (Woodward, 1993).
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approval' - a guarantee in effect that something is being done to address the problems. The
intention being to reassure investors and attract further external investment from private
sources.
Cho argues that the structural adjustment undertaken by Mexico had little effect upon
developing its economy during the I 980s (1995: 78). To maintain confidence in its economy,
Mexico was forced to pay high interest rates on its debt leading to greater levels of poverty.
Despite this, the success of the Brady Plan has been described as 'incontrovertible'. Primarily
this was due to a debt restructuring programme led by the IMF, and by 1995 Mexico had
become the thirteenth largest economy in the world (Treviño, 1996: 95). Its 'star pupil' rating
had led to an increased confidence in the Mexican economy and further integration of the
Mexican economy was sought through NAFTA45
The Peso Crisis
Due to Mexico's star economic billing, the financial crisis, when it came, took the IMF and the
rest of the world by surprise. On the 20 December 1994 the value of the peso collapsed and the
currency had to be devalued. This collapse followed the failure of the Mexican government to
anticipate the reaction of the markets to its economic policies and in initially dismissing the
possibility of any devaluation. As markets withdrew their support for the Mexican economy,
the government did not have the resources to intervene during the crisis and the peso lost fifty
per cent of its value (Weintraub, 1995: 108). The significance of this situation was reflected in
the claim that this represented the 'first financial crisis of the twenty-first century' (IMF
Survey, 20-3-95: 85).
The NAFTA agreement presented Mexico with a means to accelerate economic growth by making it more attractive to external
investment froni the USA (See ..eyton.Bro, 1994: 352).
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The role of the IMF during this crisis was crucial for the stability of the regional and global
economy. By restoring confidence in Mexico's economy, the IMF hoped to settle South
America more generally and stabilise global markets. Failure to do so would be detrimental to
the whole region, precipitating what has become known as the 'tequila effect'(Carrizosa,
Leipziger and Shah, 1996: 25). The fear was that had the peso crisis not been tackled
effectively there would be serious economic repercussions throughout the region (IMF
Survey, 20-2-95, 54). The 'tequila effect' is a good example of the interconnected nature of
national economies, and was the reason for the IMF's 'unprecedented' response to the crisis. In
the words of Camdessus the IMF was acting to avert a 'worldwide catastrophe' (IMF, Survey,
1995: 54).
Responding to the crisis the IMF provided a stand-by loan of unprecedented size, with the IMF
making the biggest single loan it had ever given to a member country: a sum to the value $17.8
billion47 or 12,070.2 million SDR's (Special Drawing Rights 48 ). This agreement by the IMF of
a loan within hours caused tension amongst some of the Governors of the IMF, primarily
between those of the USA and European Countries (Coyle, 1995: 24)). The speed with which
the IMF bureaucracy moved was achieved without recourse to official IMF procedures and
effectively excluded any other groups than the IMF Executive Board from the decision-making
process (Tanzer, 1995: 11). In doing so the Fund appeared to disregard its own Articles,
shoring up a national economy suffering finance capital outflows, something that the IMF had
previously been at pains to avoid (Snowden, 1996: 1-2).
4' In Argentina, for example, the situation in Mexico was blamed for tnggeiing a crisis of confidence in the banking system, with
capital flowing out of Latin America (CalTizosa, Leipziger, Shah, 1996:23-24).
' The final loan to the Mexican government totalled $50 billion dollars which s the aggregate contributions of US Government,
IMF and the Bank of International Settlement (Trevino, 1996).
4' SDRs were introduced to replace the fixed gold value of the dollar by the second amendment of the Articles (See. Gold, 1981:25).
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The role of the United States government was key in influencing the IMF Board. The US
government did not want its new trading partner to undermine the recent NAFTA agreement.
Domestic pressures meant that the US administration was unable to mount an adequate rescue
package (Economist, 4-2-1995: 14: 85). As a consequence the IMF was persuaded to
intervene. It did so without the full support of all its members; Germany was particularly
reluctant. It has been suggested by Strange that 'while the secretariat of the IMF may have
been happy to expand its role as a nascent world central bank, the IMF's Executive Directors
who are appointed by national governments were unlikely to agree' (1996: 196). During the
Mexico crisis the US government, rather than portraying it as a national crisis for Mexico,
presented the situation as a threat to global economic security and particularly the United
States economic security.
The blame for the collapse of the peso was initially contested. One argument is that it was
caused by foreign investors panicking and removing their money due to the threat of the
Mexican economy going into recession (Roett, 1996: 44). Since then the blame has shifted with
the IMF citing Mexico's governing elites as responsible for the crisis (Roett, 1996: 44;
Davison, 22-8-95; Weintraub, 1995: 230). Others have blamed the situation upon the
structural deficiencies of the IMF model market driven approach (Cvpher, 1996: 452). This
confusion was compounded by two contrasting views that appeared in consecutive editions of
the Economist. On 28 January 1995 the IMF was accused of incompetence and of limited
utility. By 4 February 1995 the same publication was of the opinion that the IMF had redeemed
itself by being a more effective unit of economic governance than the United States.
What this would appear to indicate is that responsibility for the crisis was not all on one side
(Strange, 1998: 96).
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What ever the explanation for the crisis, the Mexican government had to give into the market
and the IMF had to organise swift and effective intervention. To a large degree this was
motivated by a belief that the peso crisis might lead to developing countries, like Mexico,
reverting to protectionism and retreating from the process of economic globalisation. The IMF
believed its role was crucial to ensuring that the project of market reforms did not go off the
rails (IMF Survey, 17-4-95).
The Role of the IMF
This section examines the available information to assess the IMF's direct involvement in the
peso crisis. After the initial crisis had stabilised with the Mexican government allowing the
peso to float and raising short term interest rates, assistance was requested from the IMF on 6
January 1995. With this request for assistance, on 9 January 1995 the IMF and Mexico entered
into formal negotiations over the conditions of the loan. First, a standby loan for the short term
c>'. 0 Xt edAu terru	 B'y early February although the details
of the loan had been arranged, what was not clear was the substance of the discussions that
occurred in this three week period. The conditions of the loan were discussed between the IMF
'Mission' and the representatives of the Mexican government. The outcome of this dialogue
was the drawing up a Letter of Intent setting out the loan terms. It is in drawing up the
conditions contained within the Letter that the IMF was able to exert its influence and authority
imposing the conditions under which a stand-by loan was granted.
In the context of the discussion above about the IMF and transparency, it is interesting that on
2 February 1995, Camdessus held a press briefing in which he described the steps the IMF had
taken to avert another crisis and maintain confidence in the peso (IMF Survey, 20-2-95: 53).
Included were some general comments about the adjustment programme as well as comments
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about its overall size. It has been suggested that this display of transparency was to enhance
market confidence rather than greater access to IMF policy-making processes. This
interpretation can be assumed because of the lack of transparency which characterised the
dialogue between the IMF and the Mexico government. Apart from the limited transparency
offered by the press conference, the conditions and details of the loan were at worse kept
concealed, and at best not fully open (Fidler, 6-4-95)
It has been reported that the degree of adjustment expected of the Mexican economy was
played down by the IMF. The IMF maintained that the Mexican economy remained essentially
sound and that the crisis was a temporary blip. This explanation appears to clash with the
realties of the adjustments expected (RamIrez de Ia 0, 1996: 25). It has been argued that
because the Mexican government was expected to put its domestic economy in order whilst
servicing its foreign debt, there was an 'unfair distribution of the burden of the adjustment
between the domestic economy and foreign investors, as well as among socioeconomic groups'
(RamIrez de Ia 0, 1996: 25). Attempting to conceal this fact, strengthens the claims for the
increased accountability of the IMF.
During the peso crisis some secret information came into the public domain. This was not
through explicit disclosure by the IMF or Mexican government but from information leaked to
the press and from other sources (Heredia, 1996). The conditions of the loan included: a)
Mexico must have a 0.5 per cent surplus in public finance in 1995 b) Mexico must limit
increases in credit c) Mexico must increase its net internal assets. This leaking of information
might reinforce the idea that secrets are difficult to keep (see Chapter 2). In reality it does not
amount to much more than limited access to basic information. Critics of the IMF during the
On application to the IMF for further information regarding the content of the Letter of Intent and Staff papers swiounding the
Mexico crisis, I was informed by the External Relation Department that the information was not for public consumption.
132
peso crisis argue that the lack of transparency meant that the Fund could not be held
accountable for those policies that contributed to the economic and social problems in Mexico
(Heredia, 1996: 2).
Given the circumstances it could be argued that it did not matter that the content of the
negotiations between the IMF and the Mexican government were not released into the public
domain. It is clear from the IMF's general policy statements what conditions would have been
required for the external loan negotiations, namely, that Mexico must move more quickly
towards neoliberal macroeconomic policies. But the detail is significant because the IMF had a
set of pre-conceived assumptions about economic development which were reinforced through
its policy recommendations. Without an open discussion of these assumptions the policy
recommendations of the IMF could not be challenged. Furthermore, in keeping details of the
loan secret the IMF contravenes the principle that whilst confidential negotiations may be
justified there should be no secrecy surrounding the terms of the settlement.
The exclusion of social groups from the IMF's policy-making process meant that traditional
groups from Mexican society were excluded from the debate over structural reforms, in this
case despite the social ramifications of the peso crisis for the majority of the population. This
can be explained in part by the IMF playing down the consequences of structural adjustment.
The reality for many was very harsh, with rising unemployment and reductions in welfare
spending. it is claimed that the economic hardship was the catalyst for the formation of the
Zapatista rebel movement based in the state of Chiapas (Lustig, 1996: 158). To add weight to
this it is reported that the standard of living for workers in Mexico is lower than it was fifteen
years ago and out of a population of 90 million a half are living below the poverty line (Doyle,
5-3-95).
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Following the agreement between the Mexican government and the IMF, it was reported that
the Mexican President would 'announce his plan last week without first seeking the traditional
agreement of business and labour ... [when pressed] ... officials admitted why not: they would
have refused' (Economist, 18-3-96: 65). This decision is particularly salient if one considers
that the political process in Mexico has been characterised as one of 'bargaining, negotiations
and compromise' (Lindau, 1996: 320). It is noteworthy then that before the IMF had become
directly involved, the Mexican government had traditionally entered into dialogue with other
groups, and reached agreement upon economic policy based upon wider participation
(Economist, 24-12-96). This previous use of dialogue amongst interested groups can in part be
attributed to past governments authoritarian tendencies and their ability to control trade-union
leaders and industrialists.
Recent moves within Mexico to make the political system more democratic have meant that the
government has reduced its degree of control and readiness to resort to violent repression5°
Before the peso crisis, the financial markets, private capital sources and the IMF had been
demanding democratisation, decentralisation, transparency and accountability in Mexico. The
result of this lessening of overtly authoritarian tendencies by the Mexican authorities, might
help explain, in part the continuing use of secrecy between the IMF and the Mexican
government (see Chapter 2). Secrecy is a useful tool for decision-makers because it does away
with the need for more explicit forms of authoritarian control. One implication is that the
secrecy between the IMF and the Mexican Government is a direct result of the calls from the
IMF for the democratisation of Mexico's political system.
This is not toy that Mexico Is still not an authoritarian state prone to acts of repression; this appeara particularly true in view of
the failure of the Zeddillos administrations to reduce the security forces use of torture (see Lindau, 1996: 307).
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Since the crisis it has been reported that private sources of finance have demanded a return to a
more authoritarian style of leadership, including high levels of secrecy in political activity
(Doyle, 5-3-95). The implication being that a more authoritarian government is required in
Mexico rather than a more democratic one (Doyle, 5-3-95). This illustrates two points: firstly,
the power of market forces and the IMF to intervene in the governance process; secondly, that
transparency can be applied selectively depending upon the circumstances, and in fact can be
overridden in the name of effective economic governance.
The IMF - Accountable to Whom?
The Mexican Peso Crisis raises a number of salient issues about the IMF accountability. These
issues will be explored more fully in the sections below on the IMF and confidentiality, access
to information, institutional secrecy and productive secrecy. Each of these subject areas can
inform the discussion about accountability in MGG and the extent to which the discourse of
transparency is applied in the IMF.
The IMF and Confidentiality
The IMF is a bank, and like most banks it prides itself ott its confidentiality and discretion. An
IMF financial package normally takes the form of an agreement between the IMF, the debtor
country and the institutions of private finance. Thus, a desire to maintain the sovereignty of its
member states as well as the confidentiality of private investors are two reasons why IMF
packages have traditionally been shrouded in secrecy. The traditional norm of confidentiality
allows the IMF to claim the discourse of transparency without jeopardising its relationship with
member states. The IMF is also likely to limit access to the information released by
governments in order to avert the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy that a poor financial
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performance might precipitate (Kapur, 1998: 110). Furthermore the IMF like other banks
favours a culture of confidentiality based upon the interests of investors. With the proliferation
of private investment in economic development there is increasing concern over whose interests
are given primacy in loan conditions: public or private interests (Martin, 1996: 146-147). It has
been pointed out however, that the maintenance of this norm of confidentiality leads to the
concealment of much information that might otherwise be considered trivial at best or false at
worse (Bok, 1982: 117).
This traditional confidentiality versus the desire for more transparency, presents the IMF with
something of a dilemma over whether to make known its views or to keep them confidential.
For example, if the IMF goes public it could worsen the situation, as markets and investors
respond adversely to the changes proposed by the IMF as a condition of the loan. Dobson
asserts that 'confidentiality is necessary in exchange rate matters' in order that
macroeconomics and structural policies are not undermined (1 995a: 231). Alternatively, IMF
recommendations made in secret can be ignored more easily b y recipient states (Weintraub,
1996: 235).
During the Mexico crisis, the 'rationale for the large rescue effort was that a Mexican default
would have adverse repercussions throughout the international financial structure' (Weintraub,
1996: 230). Without the rescue package it has been suggested that the result would have been
'armageddon in emerging markets'. This hyperbole and the threat of financial meltdown
provided for some a justification for the secrecy surrounding the rescue package (see section on
neutral and functional secrecy in Chapter 2). The IMF considers this justification sufficient for
the concealment of information because in keeping certain information concealed, it acted in a
responsible manner, safeguarding the region's financial stability. The release of information
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might have had a negative impact on the markets and place the Mexican economy at greater
risk. Also, confidentiality increases the likelihood of increased private investments and
furthermore without confidentiality the Mexican government would not have released sensitive
information to the Fund.
This deference to market stability, over increased institutional openness, gives support to the
proposition that a shift in authority has occurred from states to markets (see Chapter 1). The
JMF was concerned primarily with bailing out those investors rather than any long-term effort
to correct the problems in the Mexican economy (Ramirez de Ia 0, 1996: 28). One of the
IMF's Executive Directors was reported as making the following statement about the dangers
of too much transparency: 'People want more transparency, but it could be dangerous for the
government. For example, the government must cut the budget and advance quickly before the
situation deteriorates further. Political parties, unions, etc. could retard the process...' (quoted
in Bischel, 1994: 160). What the Director appears to be saying is that too much accountability,
in the form of openness and the participation of a plurality of groups, poses a threat to the
stability of the market.
Not directly concerning the peso crisis but of illustrative value, was the decision of the Swiss
government to release the IMF Staff Report relating to its Article IV consultation with the
Fund and the IMF's reaction. Members of the Executive Board were very critical, with
comments ranging from the Swiss being very brave to their action being dangerous (Bischel,
1994: 159). It is brave in the sense that the release of certain information compromises the
relationship between the Fund and its members. The danger exists because too much openness
produces a negative effect for the decision-making process. It is suggested by the executive
members that release of information should only occur after a period of two or three years
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(Bischel, 1994: 160). Implicit within this statement is a continuation of a high degree of secrecy
as a necessary part of the functioning of the IMF and its relations with members.
In summary, confidentiality in the practices of the IMF is more usually justified by the benefits
to society, respect for its relationship with members and other financial institutions and the
maintenance of trust. This justification of confidentiality becomes more problematic if it is used
to exclude wider society from the decisions-making process, when it acts as a shield to protect
the IMF from criticism and when the principle of confidentiality is applied to cover a wide
range of dubious practices.
The IMF and Access to In formation
A justification for the right of concealment of information in the relations between the IMF and
its member states is often legitimised by the principal of state sovereignty. This assumes that
all members as sovereign states are ultimately responsible and not the IMF. This is highlighted
in the following: 'I will never publicly say to a country that it must devalue. I do not have the
support from my membership or, in particular, from the 179 members of finance of the world,
to do that' (Camdessus in IMF Survey, 20-2-95). This 'catch-all' justification helps the IMF to
avoid giving access to information. For many cosmopolitan thinkers (see Chapter 1) this
apparent deference to sovereignty acts as an obstruction to more inclusive public accountability
by reinforcing a state-centred perspective. Therefore, a primary justification by the IMF for
restricting access to information is based upon members deciding what information should be
released.
In interviews with members of the IMF Executive Board Bischel solicited the following
illuminating confession with regard to the institutions view of releasing the detailed information
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that makes up the consultation documents: 'After a sufficient period (two to three years), when
the programme has been implemented, it ought to be released. Much of the Article IV
consultation becomes public through policies that are implemented or through a budget that
comes through parliament' (Bischel, 1994: 160). This admission reveals two important aspects
of the IMF interpretation of transparency. Firstly, that the public is only fit to see information
several years after decisions have been made. Secondly, that transparency exists through the
implementation of policies. Of course in both instances, it is too late to challenge the legitimacy
of the policy.
The IMF makes much of the confidential relationship between itself and its members; in
retaining this position, it fuels the continuation of strategies of secrecy jn the domestic political
arena. Notwithstanding the desire for openness by the IMF, it is not clear if the information put
Out 'is not highly selective and at times less than illuminating' (Economic and Political Weekly,
30-1-93: 140). A case in point concerning the Mexico crisis is that of the obfuscated financial
package to the Mexican government where only selected information about the IMF rescue
package was released and that was challenged as being inaccurate and concealing a hidden-
agenda (Fidler, 1995).
A major priority for the IMF is meeting its responsibility to ensure a stable economic order.
One means of achieving this is the monitoring of national economies. In order to build trust
whereby national governments open their records to the IMF, the institution protects the
confidential nature of the records and the formal discussions. A problem with this process is
that of selective transparency. Much of the Fund's business is undertaken in private and so it is
nearly impossible for the agenda of these meetings to be influenced by external forces.
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In part, an explanation for the reticence of the IMF to release information can be constructed
around its reluctance to see itself as fulfilling more than a functional need, rather than one
where it has real political power. The IMF justifies its lack of consultation with groups other
than governments by the principle that to intervene between a government and its people would
be a political act. By emphasising its technical surveillance role over any overtly political
agenda, the IMF shifts responsibility away from itself and onto the national government.
The IMF and Institutional Secrecy
The Mexican crisis supports the idea that institutional secrecy within the IMF remains strong
and that the transmission of the rhetoric of transparency to something more substantive is
weak. The lack of substantive or external transparency from the IMF over the Mexico crisis
needs to be put into the context of the earlier stated aims of the IMF with regard to
transparency. The IMF is caught in a difficult position concerning the concept of openness;
openness presents the possibility of increased legitimacy, while secrecy remains an institutional
characteristic.
Although there appears to be a cloak of concealment pervading the IMF, the organisation has
not shied away from encouraging the principle of transparency in its rhetoric. Indeed, the IMF
has embraced the principle of transparency as being of great value. It has been made clear that
this was not to be at the expense of other principles, like confidentiality. Thus there appears to
be an on-going tension over whether transparency will manifest itself in the IMF and its
operations.
Because the IMF expects greater openness from its members to avoid events like the peso
crisis, it should therefore, reciprocate by itself being more transparent in its operations (Elliott,
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11-5-98). Without reforms to reduce secrecy Elliott believes that the IMF will find it difficult
to reject the arguments that the IMF is best suited to defending the interests of global capital
rather than protecting those most directly effected by its policies. The legitimacy of the
institutions is brought into question because without adequate levels of transparency and
accountability, trust in the institution is low. Cooper believes that more openness will lead to
greater criticism; the outcome of this will be enhanced IMF legitimacy as well as improved
analysis of situations by the IMF (1995: 28).
The Role of Productive Secrecy
In Chapter 2, I described how productive secrecy acted to reinforce a particular ideological
view whilst excluding other interpretations of events. In this case productive secrecy acts to
protect the IMF's structural adjustment programme from criticism and being undermined by a
lack of public support. It has been suggested that the failure of the IMF's surveillance and
policy recommendations contributed towards the peso crisis (Martone, 1996: 53). By utilising
strategies of productive secrecy to help gloss over failures, it helps protect the traditional IMF
model of economic development even when those policies might be making matters worse in
fragile economies.
The rhetoric of transparency that exists within the IMF can be explained as a 'smoke screen'
which in reality hides productive secrecy. Productive secrecy can work to reinforce a particular
position whilst denying alternative approaches. For example, Camdessus has stated that a
major risk is: 'the possibility of the more rapid marginalisation of countries that fail to integrate
themselves into the globalised economy, and associated with this, a growing divergence
between the regression of living standards in those countries and rapid progress in others' (IMF
Survey, 20-3-96). Integration into global markets underpinned by the neoliberal orthodoxy
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supports the idea that there is no alternative and that in economic policy-making at least states
are unable to counter market forces. This reflects the IMF's normative role; to promote and
foster those polices known as 'liberal internationalist' (Pauly, 1994: 204). What this amounts
to is a set of dominant beliefs and values that put market based solutions to economic issues
before all others and to the exclusion of other views.
The effect of this is to give the appearance of openness with strategies of productive secrecy
acting to privilege certain information, whilst diverting attention away from closer inspection of
the nature and quality of the information released (see Bok, 1982: 115). The logic of productive
secrecy means that it is far more difficult to determine what is true, accurate and complete and
w'hat is not. The iàeoogica congruity of the 1MFs neoliberal agenda is enhanced by the
rhetoric of transparency because the appearance of openness allows the institutions to claim
legitimacy for their policies without being subject to full public accountability.
On one hand the rescue bid succeeded in its stated aims and the Mexican economy is now more
stable with evidence of a trade surplus. The latter has been achieved largely by the falling value
of real wages helping Mexican companies to be more competitive in the global market
(Weintraub, 1996: 230). On the other unemployment has risen dramatically with an additional
0.5 million unemployed in 1995 compared with 1994, the effect of which is increased social
degradation and economic hardship with the Mexican people suffering most (Weintraub, 1996:
231; Strange, 1998: 98). This despite the IMF's claim that the Mexican rescue package




The discourse of transparency within the IMF is bounded by contradictory statements. As
indicated above, the IMF makes much of its legitimate right to conceal information due to the
confidential nature of its relationship with its members, their rights as sovereign states and the
fragile nature of market confidence. There are however those within the IMF that claim it is a
more open and accountable institution than it has been in the past due to its policies on
transparency. From the evidence of the Mexican Peso Crisis this transparency is at best
ambiguous, and at worst the means for the IMF to obfuscate its actions from direct criticism
and pubIc accountability.
This ambiguity over the discourse of transparency and continuing prevalence of secrecy is only
part of the story. Within the IMF secrecy emerged in many different forms, most notably
institutional secrecy, which critics maintain transformed itself into productive secrecy. This is
mamfested by the presentat.on of the peso crisis as due to g(obal forces, beyond the control of
states. Whereas many critics blamed IMF policies in restructuring the Mexican economy as at
the root of the problem. The Mexican Peso case suggests that the IMF is responsible for a high
degree of inCituCional and productive secrecy. This highlights the limits of the discourse of
transparency as a means for holding the IMF to account. As a consequence, critics question the
legitimacy of the IMF which in turn undermines the institution's authority. At the moment the
JMF relies upon the rationale of effective governance, and its influential position in
underpinning financial rescue packages, to avoid the need for increasing its legitimacy. To
increase accountability would require a significant increase in transparency. This would need to
include enhancing the quality and quantity of the information released by the IMF, public
participation by interested parties, and the establishment of a publicly accountable evaluation
unit to monitor the fund's activities (Halifax Initiative, 1995: 40).
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Chapter Five
The Group of Seven and the Halifax Summit
The Group of Seven (G-7) 5 ' is a collective of the seven most economically powerful states in
the world. Its aim is to act as a forum for the management of global economic and political
matters. According to Lewis the (1-7 offers the capacity for effective multilateral governance
that other institutions cannot offer due to its membership being limited to the most powerful
states (1991: 25). The authoritative role of the G-7 is reflected in the knowledge that 'the
understandings reached by the G-7 are followed through in wider international organisations
and give impetus to their work' (Bayne and Putnam, [995: 3. In this way the G-7 plays an
important role in shaping both the global agenda and the implementation of policy by other
institutions of MGG. As a consequence of this authoritative position the issue of accountability
is a critical concern for many
 critics of the G-7 (Woodroffe, 1995: 8; FaIk, 1995: 1).
A discourse of transparency is implicit within the rhetoric of the G-7 and is reflected in the G-
7's 'common values' of co-operation between states underpinned by democratic principles
(Lewis, 1991: 26). As with other institutions of MGG, at the core of the 0-7 are the principles
of good governance (see Chapter 3). The principles of accountability, transparency and
participation have been voiced in G-7 communiqués 52 and underpin a normative preference for
the governance of the political and economic spheres. This apparently positive view of
The seven are: USA, Canada, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy. Since 1995 Russia has begun to play a role in political
discussions. However, the G .7 to date have resisted demands by Russia for full membership.
32 A higher quality of life for all people is the goal of sustainable development. Democracy, human rights, transparent and
accountable governance, investment in people and environmental protection are the foundations of sustainable development' (G7
Communiqué, 1996: 1).
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openness adopted by the G-7 is contested by critics who accuse it of being a secretive and
exclusive body. From this perspective the primary aim of the G-7 is to shape a world order that
reflects the interests of its members rather than a wider set of concerns (Archibugi and Held,
1995: 4; Budhoo, 1994: 13: 15; Chomsky, 1994: 178-79).
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first introduces the origins of the G-7 and the
development of the summit process. The second section concentrates upon three different views
of the G-7. The third looks at the Halifax Summit to see what this particular case can tell us
about the nature of G-7 governance. The final section is an analysis of the Halifax Summit and
explores the different dimensions of transparency and secrecy to see if the summit process
facilitate or inhibit increased accountability.
The Origins and Development of G-7 Summitry
The origin of the G-7 summitry stems directly from the global financial crisis of the 1970s and
the failure of the Bretton Woods system to deal effectively with it 53 . The economic turmoil at
this time was characterised by the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the oil
crisis and global economic recession (Putnam and Bayne, 1984: 7: 11-14). There was also a
growing realisation amongst the leaders of the industrialised states that they could not insulate
themselves from the vagaries of the world economy and the expansion of global financial
markets (Helleiner, 1994: 163). Due to the relative economic decline of the USA and the
increasing economic power of Europe and Japan, it was believed that the USA could no longer
be expected to be solely responsible for the management of the global economy (Putnam and
Bayne, 1984: 7-8). By combining their collective influence the members of the G-7 hoped to be
able to regulate these burgeoning global financial markets. The G-7 would address capital
Forafulleraccount ofthecrisissee: Armstrong, GIand Harrison, 1991: 221-231.
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controls and take action to prevent world economic slumps through the co-ordination and re-
alignment of national exchange rates (Webb, 1994: 183-4). The broad aims of the G-7 have
been characterised as the three C's: 'convergence, co-operation and co-ordination' (Dobson,
1991b: 3). The G-7 summits have been described as: 'the main place at which the most
powerful states of the industrial world could discuss and co-ordinate their broad interests and
policies. The G-7 and the summits became the governing board of what might be termed the
global concert' (Smyser, 1996: 329).
From its inception, a central concern amongst the G-7 participants was to avoid the general
trend they perceived towards the bureaucratisation of international organisations. There was a
growing belief amongst the leaders of the industrial world that the institutions of MGG had
been made ineffective by the increasing power of developing states. Some believed that the
expansion of members had contributed towards these institutions becoming stagnant and
lacking in leadership (Putnam and Bayne, 1984: 8). This reflects the argument deployed in
Chapter 2 regarding the efficacy of functional secrecy made by commentators such as Luard
who argued for less publicity and more effective decision-making in MGG.
From the beginning it was envisaged that the G-7 would be a small informal group which
would meet privately. The idea for a gathering of political leaders of the industrialised world
was the brainchild of Chancellor Schmitt of Germany and President d'Estaing of France. They
envisaged the G-7 as a 'direct, unscripted, unbureaucratic exchange between a few heads of
governments' (Bayne, 1995: 494). This exclusivity was reflected in the group initial meeting
place, the White House Library. It was hoped that the limited membership of the G-7 would
make it a more effective decision-making forum than other forms of MOG.
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The scope of the 0-7, over time, has evolved from a forum primarily limited to finance
ministers to one where heads of state meet to discuss wider political, social and economic
issues (Smyser, 1996: 328). This extension of its authority has been reflected in the closer
attention paid to G-7 summits, which are now high profile media events. An indication of the
G-l's changing scope has been voiced in a suggestion that 'the G-7 summit has assumed a
function that the founders of the United Nations (UN) had originally envisaged as the role of
the UN Security Council' (Smeyser, 1996: 329). This view of the G-7 as more important than
the Security Council is supported by the fact that the G-7 includes both Japan and Germany:
'the G-7 is the institution that [can] make the most important security as well as economic
decisions' (Smeyser, 1996: 329).
Competing Interpretations of the G-7
The G-7 is unique amongst the multilateral forums of economic global governance, and it has
been described as both ' ... an institution and an anti-institution ...' (Bayne, 1995: 494). Unlike
other mechanisms of multilateral global governance the 0-7 has no secretariat, no headquarters
and no official rules or procedures (Bayne and Putnam, 1995: 2). As one commentator has
observed the quasi-governance role of the 0-7 is reflected in its quasi-institutional
manifestation (Merlini, 1994: 5). These anomalies present difficulties in establishing the exact
institutional nature of the G-7; this is further compounded by a wide range of formal and
informal practices (Baker, 1996: 3). It is perhaps not surprising then that a number of different
interpretations of what the G-7 is, and should be, have developed. It is to these that I turn next
to see how they contribute to the issue of accountability and the 0-7.
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Personalisation Versus the Institutionafism of the G-7
Key to the 0-7's institutional framework are its annual summits, which have become the
principal forum for policy formulation and dispersal. As already noted, the summits place
emphasis on informal discussions between heads of governments as a means to enhance co-
operation. The most comprehensive survey of summitry has been undertaken by Robert
Putnam and Anthony Bayne in their work 'Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in
the Seven Power Summits'. The authors attempt to explain through the application of game
theory why the G-7 has emerged and persisted over time. They seek to explain how co-
operation can be achieved by rational actors, why participants behave in a certain manner and
how this behaviour can be reconciled with the objectives of the 0-7. The limited membership of
the G-7 acts to encourage greater frankness of participants, safe in the knowledge that their
dialogue will remain confidential. In addition, this closeness makes it more difficult for
participants to 'free-ride' and so encourages participants to adopt a strategy based upon co-
trat(Baket, !99&. 17.
As already indicated above, for some, the advantage of the G-7 summit is its personal nature. It
is a forum that allows for '... frank, compact, spontaneous ... exclusive, anti-bureaucratic
[dialogue]...' (Bayne and Putnam, 1995: 2). Participation is limited to a very small group,
normally only heads of government with a single adviser whilst on occasions this may expand
to include a foreign or finance minister. Preparation for the summits is traditionally imuted to a
small group of participant government bureaucrats (officially known as sherpas) and
governmental ministers. The critical point is that the success and effectiveness of the G-7 is
said to depend upon limited participation. The defining feature of a 0-7 summit is that: '... it
'4 This term was adopted in reference to summits and the well known ability of Nepalese sherpas to navigate the mountains of the
Himalayas under difficult circumstances.
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should be small, select, and personal. It should be limited to countries that carried weight and
influence. It should bring together those directly responsible for policy' (Putnam and Bayne,
1984: 17). It is believed by those that advocate this format for the G-7 that this type of
relationship is essential for the effective and efficient management of the global economy
(Smyser, 1996: 331).
This personal dimension to the G-7 makes it more flexible in its operations than other forms of
MGG and it is argued that any further formal institutionalisation of the G-7 processes would
be detrimental to this. Critics have reasoned that due to the limited number of participants at
the G-7 it is unrepresentative of 80 percent of the world population (Falk, 1995: 170). To those
however, who favour maintaining the personal aspect of the G-7 view this limited membership
as an advantage. So whilst critics argue that the G-7 requires opening up, supporters of the
current system contend that its very existence depends upon its exclusiveness. This point is
important because 'by definition the G-7 is a very exclusive club [whilstl ... the impact of its
decisions [arel inclusive.' (Parry, 1994: 1 l)
" An indication of the 0-7 exclusivity is reflected in the narrow list of key participants at the 1995 Halifax Summit, who were as
follows:
Heads of State:
U.S. President Bill Clinton
Japanese Prime Minister Tomftchi Murayama
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Italian Prime Minister L.amberto Dini
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien
UK Prime Minister John Major
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac
Russian President Boris Yeltsin (included for the political discussions only]
Foreign Ministers:
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andre OueUet
UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hued
French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette
Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrey Kozyrev
Finance Ministers:
U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin
Japanese Finance Minister Masayoshi Takemura
German Finance Minister Theo Waigel
Italian Finance Minister Augusto Santozzi
Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Kenneth Clarke
French Economy Minister Alain Madelin
Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Georgiyevich Panskov
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Conversely, others see this personalisation of governance and informality as a weakness. They
believe that the G-7 would be better placed to assert its authority if it had an institutionalised
bureaucracy that would enable it to follow through decisions made at summits. From this
perspective the perceived benefits of informality and personal contact are portrayed as
weaknesses. For example, the limited number of meetings and the lack of a permanent
headquarters means the G-7 lacks mechanisms of accountability (for example, there is no
institutional memory apart from the communiqué). It is claimed that without such means of
accountability the G-7 lacks the legitimacy to deal effectively with global issues and is
constrained by domestic political pressures (Bergsten, 1995: 16).
Sensitive to the criticism of being a closed group the G-7 over the period of its existence has
graàua'ñy begun to change from the original conception of small informal meetings, to include a
wider range of participants. For example, since the Halifax Summit in 1995 steps have been
steps taken to include the representatives of other multilateral institutions (the IMF and World
Bank) in the summit dialogue. However, Critics still maintain that this is very much a restricted
group, and worse still the nature of the participants continues to reflect and reinforce a narrow
set of views and interests (Muzaffer, 1994: 20-23).
In summary, there is a split between the European tradition, characterised by 'cosy chats'
between world leaders, and the United States' view of the G-7 as a more results-orientated
Sherpas:
U.S., Daniel K. Tarullo
Japan, Mauki Hayashi
Gemany, Jurgen Stark
Italy, Ambassador Sergio Vento
Canada, Gordon Smith
United Kingdom, Alex Allan
France, Jean-David Levine
Russia, -
(The Bureau of National Affairs, 1995: 10)
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organisation, with a stronger institutional framework (Putnam and Bayne, 1984: 25). In the
context of the main themes of this thesis this distinction also raises issue for transparency and
G-7 accountability. The personal approach is considered a more effective means of governance
by members of the G-7, it is high in internal transparency but depends upon self-regulation as
to what is and is not released into the public domain. Critics believe it lacks the mechanisms for
accountability and public scrutiny that could be generated by an institution with a more formal
structure.
The G-7, Global Leadership and Functional Secrecy
The members of the G-7 act as a global concert discussing matters relating to the entire world
and take upon themselves the responsibility that this entails. However, it has been pointed out
that the nature of this responsibility is 'difficult to establish because responsibility may be
defined in different contexts?' (Shaw, 1996: 10). In the context of the G-7 the primary purpose
of a summit is to display global leadership and authority in the management of the world's
economic and political affairs. It is this desire for effective governance that provides the
justification for G-7 summits remaining as exclusive small meetings of world leaders.
Advocates of the current G-7 format believe that a central value of a summit is its format of
confidential conversations. From its beginnings these have been central to the summit,
President Giscard d'Estaing made it clear: that they should be '... a matter of conversation
between a very few people and almost on a private level' (quoted in Bayne and Putnam, 1995b:
1). From this perspective it would appear that the needs of global leadership are incompatible
with greater levels of transparency and accountability.
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This is reinforced by those that argue that the G-7 can be most effective by remaining a closed
institution. Some critics believe the G-7 has become too public. For example, Smyser has
described the meetings of G-7 finance ministers as 'their nadir of futility' (1996: 334) due to
their inability to reach a decision on the management of the global economy. To become more
effective Smyser reasons that the G-7 needs to keep to its original format of the original
Library Group' [where] the summiteers can talk quietly and informally far from the glare of
publicity' (1996: 338). Thus, implicitly he argues for more secrecy and less transparency in
order for the G-7 to remain an efficient decision-making body. This is reinforced by Wendy
Dobson who observes that 'as participants in the Group of Seven have found, informality and
frankness are the most valued aspects of the process, yet these attributes tend to decline as the
size of the group increases' (1995a: 232). Thus there appears to be positive aspects to
excluding wider participation in the decision-making process. Similarly, the benefit of
maintaining limited membership of the G-7 is that as a smaller unit it is more effective in
dealing with the management of economic globalisation (Bayne, 1995: 494).
This desire for concealment by the 0-7, in its operations, raises a pertinent question: how much
secrecy can be justified? On one hand the 0-7 proclaims the benefits of greater openness; the
1995 Halifax Summit (see below) agreed to reform the institutions of MOO into more open and
accountable institutions. On the other there exists a presumption for functional secrecy to
easure the most effective workings of the G-7. What remains to be seen is whether this
functional secrecy acts to mask other political and ideological motives.
The G-7 and the Internationalisation of the State
The issue of accountability in MOO is closely connected to what has been described as the
internationalisation of the state (see Introduction and Chapter 1). It has been suggested by some
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commentators that a shift has occurred in the location of political authority from the national to
the global. This reconfiguration of authority has resulted in a convergence of economic and
social policy around a neoliberal-economic agenda. Described as 'disciplinary neoliberalism', it
is disciplinary in the sense that those countries that do not follow the remedies and actions
advocated by the neoliberal model are punished. Advocates of this model believe that the G-7
plays an important role in reinforcing the authority of markets and a set of narrow neoliberal
policy objectives (Cheru and Gills, 1997: 154).
According to Gill, disciplinary neoliberalism has come about due to 'a phenomenon which
partly involves a range of political and institutional responses to the internationalisation of
economic activity' (1990: 4). The G-7 plays a key role acting as a conduit between the formal
and informal, its primary role to manage the global world order, described by Gill as the 'new
constitutionalism'. This is 'the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism,
and if possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development' (1995:
412). Gill believes that the G-7 Summit at Halifax illustrated the manner by which the G-7
creates the conditions to achieve this: 'G-7 leaders opted to strcngthen surveillance mechanisms
under the aegis of the IMF, World Bank and BIS [Bank of International Settlementi, after the
failure of the existing methods of surveillance was revealed by the Mexican financial crisis of
1994-5' (1995: 413). By reinforcing the authority and regulatory power of institutions of MGG
it makes it difficult for dissenting voices to be heard.
By contrast, from a neoliberal-institutionalist position the effectiveness of the G-7 is played
down as a forum for MGG. For example, the result of the Louvre Accord in 1987 was that the
G-7 was unable to 'impose order on the international monetary system' (Gallaroti, 1997: 385).
The G-7 is presented as the mere aggregate of seven individual voices without a coherent
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strategy. This undermines the policy effectiveness of the G-7 and 'economic co-operation
among the G-7 has had a history of ineffectiveness because it has remained open to and
encouraged domestic and foreign policies that are inconsistent with the intentions and spirit of
substantive economic policy co-ordination' (Gallaroti. 1996: 400). From this perspective the
markets are the key issue and the accountability of the G-7 is a marginal concern.
The G-7's ability to act as disciplinary mechanism is also disputed by Merlini who portrays the
G-7 as a benign organisation: 'its role is not one of government, but one of distributing tasks
and indicating rules in moments of crisis ... '(1994: 25). Thus to write about the G-7 as a key
component of global hegemonic forces as Gill and Cox might be an overstatement of its
authority and utility. This is especially so if we consider, as many do, that the G-7 summits are
at best a limited form of co-operation between the most powerful states in the world. As
Silvestri points out: 'As a system of global government, the G-7 is particularly lacking because
it does not have a universal membership, its highest decision-making body meets only once a
year, and, most importantly, it has no mechanism for implementing the policies it sets out'
(1994: 28). However, to deny the G-7 a central job in multilateral global governance is to
ignore the "G-7 paradox"; whilst the G-7 may have limited power, its demise could easily lead
to mayhem in the global economy (Garavoglia and Padoan, 1994: 56).
Others prefer to see the G-7 as a kind of global directorate involved in the informal co-
ordination of global affairs (Held and McGrew, 1993: 272). For example Held observes that
what was remarkable about the 1987 financial crisis was the speed with which the G-7
countries reacted to the crisis and arranged a collective response (1995: 129, n4). A global type
of governance transcended a fragmented national response, and public policy-making took on a
global complexion, with the 0-7 co-ordinating other MGG (1995: 259). This view is reinforced
154
by Agnew and Corbridge who argue that it is only through the institutionalisation of the G-7
that states are able to regulate the global economy (1995: 195). At the G-7 in Naples in 1994
participants widely acknowledged that financial markets had become more powerful. This
however, was not perceived as a negative development, and commentators have noted that the
economic crises in Mexico 1994/5 merely needed to be managed by more effective economic
institutions of global governance (Hutton, 11-7-94).
In the post-Cold War era the G-7 is positioned to work out the rules of a new world order,
hence the notion of a G-7 directorate (Lewis, 1991: 25). In this role the 0-7 has taken
responsibility for the governance of the global economy and in this important sense has come to
represent the intemationalisation of po]itical authority. Thus, the power of the 0-7 is in setting
and co-ordinating the economic agenda, which is then reflected throughout the world. The 0-7
has gained in influence by strengthening the surveillance mechanisms of the IMF and the World
Bank, and second, by subordinating other international organisations to a global order shaped
in a hierarchical relationship with the 0-7 at the top (Silvestri, 1994: 29).
Thus there are a number of different interpretations of the G-7 and its role in MGG none of
which are conclusive. All raise issues for the role of accountability in the G-7's operations.
Whether the G-7 represents the internationalisation of disciplinary authority in the sense that
Gill understands it or whether it is more benign but still acts as a global directorate the actions
and polices of the G-7 remain a focal part of MGCI. However, the three perspectives fail to
assess the issue of accountability in any depth, the role of secrecy and the nature of
transparency. It is with this in mind that I now look at the 0-7 Summit in Halifax 1995 to see
what light empirical detail can throw upon the issue of G-7 accountability.
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The 1995 G-7 Halifax Summit
Background to the Summit
The 1995 summit in Halifax, Canada, was portrayed at the time as being of great significance
because it was to be the first in the cycle of summits that would take the G-7 into the new
millennium. It was described as occurring at a 'critical global juncture', in which the G-7
would need to begin to confront the changing reality of the post-Cold War era. This view of
the Halifax Summit was reinforced by the host country who presented the summit as taking
place at an important historical moment occurring as it did: '50 years after the founding of the
United Nations and the establishment of the principal post-war Bretton Woods financial
institutions and only five years from the coming challenges of the 21st century' (Canadian
Government Report, 1995: xiii).
Much of this could be dismissed as end of millennium hyperbole. However, the Halifax
Summit does appear significant for a number of reasons, not least the recognition of increasing
significance of globalisation and the recommendations made for the reform of the Bretton
Woods institutions. Taking place from the 15 to 17 June 1995 it has been dubbed the
'Chevrolet Summit' - a car renowned for its cheap and reliable nature. This 'value for money'
mentality was something that the organisers of the Halifax Summit aspired to re-create after
years of increasing costs and perceived inefficiency at G-7 summits (I-Iirsh, 26-6-95). It was an
attempt to get back to the Summit's original raison d'être, and small-scale, informal talks.
After years of growth, both in terms of its political and economic ambition, and as a public
spectacle, the summits were becoming more of an opportunity for politicians to impress their
domestic audience rather than an opportunity to implement global policy. The Halifax Summit
was an attempt to halt or reverse this trend.
3' The flrstthree cycles were 1975-19S1; 1982-1988; 1989-1995
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In part, the choice of Halifax was ideal for the purposes of 'down-sizing'. It is remote from the
usual centres of population where G-7 summits have tended to take place. The choice of venue
has been interpreted in other ways: for example, the relative remoteness of Halifax compared
with other 0-7 summit locations was a powerful reminder of the G-7's original purpose,
namely '... to secretly manipulate the global economy...' (I-Iirsh, 26-6-95). Thus, the choice of
Halifax was a move towards making the G-7 a less public but more effective event. Holding
the summit there would allow the proceedings to remain relatively closed and in a more easily
manipulated environment.
The Halifax Summit and NGO Access
A wide range of NGOs have increasingly attempted to influence events surrounding G-7
summits. The aim of these organisations has been to force the 0-7 to take account of a wider
range of policy issues as well as trying to encourage the G-7 to adopt a more inclusive form of
decision-making. According to Guttry (1994: 68) there are five mechanisms in the structuring
of a summit; the two that are most relevant to access by NGOs are the preparatory stage and
the summit proper. The preparatory phase is when the initial preparation of issues and
documentation for discussion at the summit is undertaken. The actual summit itself is where
the participants meet and a final communiqué produced which records and reveals the outcome
of the summit.
The preparatory phase of the summit process is for many the critical element of the decision-
making process, whereas the summit itself is largely a public photo-opportunity for the heads
of state. Traditionally during the preparatory stage the role of the sherpas is central in setting
the agenda and in shaping the contents of the final communiqué. During this period individual
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countries have the opportunity to give access to information and include wider participation by
non-governmental groups. For example, in 1995, Canada, the host country, engaged with a
degree of openness with NGOs that had not been seen before in the preparatory stage of a G-7
summit (Round, J 995b). For the first time, and unlike other participating governments, the
Canadian Government allowed NGOs access (with inclusion in the Parliamentary Standing
Committee) which, in collaboration with the other members of the 0-7, was to determine the
agenda for the summit. Despite the NGOs being invited to participate in this preliminary phase,
there were strict limits on the extent of this. Once NGOs views had been solicited by the
Committee, the actual formulation and wording of the communiqué was not an inclusive or
public process (Round, 1997b). Thus participation and openness did not extend to the final
communiqué itself, there were no drafts for the NGOs to comment upon; information flowed
one way, from the NGOs to the sherpas, and the NGOs were not aware of what influence, if
any, they had upon the final communiqué and agenda (Round, 1997b).
Just before the Halifax Summit the draft final communiqué was leaked, much to the
embarrassment of the Canadian Government 57 . Those who leaked the report saw it as an
opportunity to embarrass the G-7 by revealing what it would not contain before the summit had
started. The leaking of the conmluniqué also challenged the general secrecy that surrounded it.
Once the contents were Out in the open it offered the possibility for the communiqué to be
challenged. It would enable the NGOs to challenge and lobby the participants as well as try to
get public opinion on their side through the media.
From the perspective of the Canadian government and other G-7 members the leak was
perceived as undermining the governance process. It was suggested that leaking the
" The draft communiqué was released by the Canadian New Democratic Party.
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communiqué was irresponsible and, although it was only a draft, it highlight differences
between the participants. Ultimately it could make the resolution of these differences more
difficult (Financial Times, 8-6-95). This condemnation of the leak reflects the view that the G-7
functions better as a governance institution when its deliberations are kept private and free
from the public's gaze.
This incident highlights the ambiguity that informs any analysis of transparency. It is presumed
by some (see Bobbio Chapter 3) that openness is in the public interest. However, greater
transparency may lead to a worse outcome than would have occurred if all the information in
the communiqué had been kept concealed until the summit was completed. Because of the leak,
it was observed, 'The G-7 leaders will go to Halifax aware that journalists and analysts will be
able to draw up lists of supposed winners and losers based upon a comparison of the leaked
document and the final text' (Norman, 8-6-95). Whilst critics of the G-7 could argued that this
might encourage participants to address these issues more directly and effectively, conversely it
might mean that they become more reticent and defensive as a response to greater openness.
The NGOs attending the Halifax Summit drew attention to their desire for greater participation
by staging a parallel event variously entitled the P-i , Peoples Summit and The Other
Economic Summit (TOES)58 . This alternative shadow event had been organised by a coalition
of NGOs to act as a voice for those excluded from the 0-7 summit process and '...to tell the G-
7 leaders what we think the 0-7 agenda ought to be' (Broadbent quoted in Summit News,
1995a: 3). To be able to do this more effectively what is required is 'openness, transparency
and access' (Summit News, 1 995b: 4). One NGO representative from the Canadian Coalition
' The P7 is made up of a wide range of concerned social and economic groups.
159
For Global Economic Development reported, however, that 'very little is transparent - we talk
to bureaucrats and hope our concerns are heard' (Round, I 997a).
There is no formal processes or lines of communication between the NGOs and the officials of
the G-7. An example of the gulf between governments and NGOs is reflected in the observation
of Round, who commented: 'the closest we got was waving at Bill Clinton as he drove past'
(lO-9-97b). It is reported by Parkin (1996) that as a result of this exclusion the political
strategy of the NGOs is changing. Some NGO actors go as far as to claim that involvement in
the summit proper is no longer a priority. Higher up the agenda is a desire to get their message
over to a wider public audience (1996: 5). It is claimed by Round that the G-7 summits, as a
focus for NGO opposition, are now becoming irrelevant. This is compounded by the realisation
that there is no institutional means of ensuring G-7 accountability. The NGOs reason that
because there is no institutionalised system of checks upon what has been achieved by the G-7
from one summit to the next, there can be no measure of progress, or effective accountability
(Round, 1997b). Therefore, at the summits the main concern of the P7 is to create a hostile
presence and thereby increase the pressure upon the summit participants to reach an
accommodation (Falk, 1997a: 23). As it stands there is no real access, no participation by
NGOs and it therefore undermines the idea of accountability through openness in governance
and public participation in the policy-making process.
The Halifax Summit and the Discourse of Transparency
The Reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions
The Halifax Summit concluded by agreeing a wide range of initiatives one of which was an
agreement to look at reforming the institutions of MGG to make these institutions more
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transparent and accountable. The political will for the reforms stemmed from the end of the
Cold War and the increasing importance of economic globalisation. As Bayne (1995: 500)
reports, there was a growing belief amongst the participants that the G-7 could improve its
legitimacy, and its influence, if it acted with openness internally and with regard to the views of
others. By adopting a more inclusive and open approach it is argued that the G-7 could become
a more effective mechanism of global governance. Therefore, the attempts to reform the
institutions of MGG needs to be examined to see what it can tell us about the rhetoric of
accountability and the discourse of transparency adopted by the G-7 at Halifax.
The moves towards the reform of MGG started in the year before Halifax, at the Naples
summit and many believed that the Halifax Summit would be the next step towards the creation
of a new post-Cold War economic and political order (Hutton, 19-6-95). There was a
consensus emerging amongst the leaders of the G-7 that the world has changed and that the
institutions for its governance need to be reformed to reflect this changing world. The Halifax
Summit was to be the event where the muddling towards a new global order was replaced with
a set of coherent institutional reforms (Putnam, 1994: 91).
This desire for reform was reflected in the official communiqué from the Halifax Summit with
a reference to multilateral institutions becoming more accountable and more transparent
(Norman, 8-6-95). The need to reform the IMF and the World Bank was also reflected in the
preparatory report of the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee for the Halifax
Summit. It was suggested that the top priority on the 0-7 agenda was to 'redefine the essential
future role of the Bretton Woods institutions and, consistent with that, making them as efficient
and democratically accountable as possible' (1995: xiii). This report suggests that, at least
amongst some participants, the idea of public accountability would be given serious attention.
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Critics had argued that because the 0-7 defines the policies of the World Bank and IMF, the
charge is that the 0-7 is responsible for: '... conducting World Bank and IMF negotiations and
other activities in a covert manner, relying on secrecy to preclude criticism and opposition, a
set of practices that are anti-democratic in their essence and contrary to the spirit of
transparency' (People's Tribunal 1994: 135).
A key aim outlined in the G-7 communiqué was for the reform of MOO for the good of the
world as a whole (0-7 Communique, 1995a: 2). One aspect of this 'for the common good'
approach was the strengthening of the IMF's surveillance role particularly after the Peso Crisis
of 1994 (see Chapter 4). Transparency and surveillance in the IMF is related here to top-down
transparency (see Chapter 3) and reinforces the case that the G-7 is responsible for organising
a new constitutionalism. Another was the reform of the World Bank through 'emphasising
participatory development by collaboration with non-governmental organisations and the
public' (G7 Information Centre, 28-5-97). Here the case for greater transparency from below is
being made and suggests the possibility for the enhanced accountability of the G-7.
Thus we can see in the 0-7's proposals for the reform of MOO at Halifax, the issue of
transparency was dealt with in two senses; political and economic. In the political sense, it was
suggested that the IMF and World Bank needed to be made both more accountable and
transparent. In the economic sense, the G-7 communiqué emphasised the prevention of
economic crisis through improved surveillance. There is explicit acceptance by the -i in its
communiqué that the release of information was a critical component of transparency with the
need for 'fuller disclosure of... information to market participants' (Communiqué, 1995: 3).
One conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the increased transparency the G-7 desired
was motivated by market considerations and not increased public accountability.
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It is claimed that one means to increasing transparency that does not involve risking sensitive
aspects of MGG is that whereas 'the dialogue may be private ... if the overall framework
within which it is taking place is open then analysts may see the warning signals for
themselves' (Corrigan in Report, 1995: 22). By contrast, critics of MGG believe that more
public accountability is required, rather than less, and that there is crucial information that
needs to be made available to the public. From the evidence of the Halifax Summit and the
general exclusion of NGOs it would appear that a bottom-up transparency still remains a
peripheral concern for the G-7.
In Chapter 3 I discussed how transparency cannot be understood as universally applicable and
that it is open to interpretation. For example, there is a distinction that is made between
transparency as it applies to the World Bank as opposed to the IMF. The G-7 communiqué
stressed that the World Bank required 'reforms that assure transparency and public
accountability' (Communique, para 26, p5). Whereas, for the IMF, it states: 'wherever
feasible, the Fund should be more open and transparent in its assessment and policy advice'
(Background doc, para 4, p6). In the G-7 summit report, whilst encouraging participatory
development, it is made clear that participation, where it exists, refers to the relationship
between governments and their people. It does not refer to the 0-7 as a collective forum of
MOO that requires wider access in its own right. The apparent desire for greater
accountability, transparency and participation, is contested by critics who argue that practice
within MOO undermines this possibility.
In addition to this, Helleiner (1995:76) writes that whilst the 0-7 is to undertake a review of the
Bretton Woods institutions, this review is limited to so small a group of states that it will lack
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legitimacy. To be seen as a genuine reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, in the best
interests of all, wider participation is required, rather than being restricted to a narrow group.
This is reinforced in the following observation:
'One of the most striking contradictions of the structural transformations
associated with so-called globalization is the extent to which its linkages are
coniined to one-third of the planet's population and the nations of the OECD and
G-7 member countries. This is the extent to which globalization is a North-
North, not a North-South Dialogue' (Ferguson, 1992: 73).
This North-North dialogue is a feature of the 0-7 and where decisions can be viewed as
reflecting the interests of the members rather than the interests of the planet as a whole 59 . The
point has been made that the reform of international institutions requires the assent of countries
and peoples not represented by the limited G-7 countries. Productive secrecy plays an
important role legitimising the actions of the 0-7 and excluding alternative perspectives from
the political agenda. Critics believe that a more representative selection of countries should
attend the 0-7 summits. In addition, others would like to see increased representation to include
NOOs and other groupings in order to increase legitimacy.
Due to the argument for greater transparency at the Halifax Summit it would not be
unreasonable to have expected the next summit in Lille 1996 to be more open. However, the
new openness simply amounted to the inclusion in the summit process of the heads of other
international organisations. This increased participation comprised of the heads of the IMF, the
World Bank, the World Trade Organisation who were there to provide advice on issues
affecting developing countries. As has been observed, 'In Lyon, all the international civil
' Enlargement of the 0.7 to become more inclusive revolves primarily around the inclusion of Russia; there are no moves within the
0.7 to open the process up to NOOs or even the representatives of developing countries.
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servants have been invited, essentially to represent the views of the rest of the world'
(Brwnmer, 28-6-96). The irony in Brummer's observation is obvious throwing light as it does
on the limited form of transparency contained within the Halifax reforms of MOO. Thus, this
manifestation of the discourse of transparency is limited and does little to enhance public
accountability.
The Summit Communiqué and Productive Secrecy
The official output from the G-7 Halifax Summit amounted to a ten and a half page
communiqué and a fifteen page background document on the reform of MGG. The
communiqué is important because it is the only publicly issued document recording the
outcome of the summit and represents the G-7's clearest commitment to external transparency.
It can be claimed by advocates of the summit process that it is right that the unfinished drafts
of the communiqué and bargaining position in negotiations are kept secret because the final
statements are made public. This rationale supports the view advocated by those who support
the rationality of functional secrecy (see Chapter 2). Full transparency at an earlier stage might
undermine the choices available, the policy-making process and force participants to adopt
view point that appeals to their domestic constituents (Bok, 1982: 175-80).
The vagueness of the G-7 Halifax communiqué and other official releases can be interpreted in
a number of ways, including an attempt by the G-7 to hide its intentions; or avoid commitment,
and a wider global responsibility. This is reinforced by critics who claim that calls for
transparency in the communiqué are merely bland statements of phoney normative aspirations
(Sheridan, 19-6-95). The Summit communiqué can be criticised for being too general and
unspecific in the implementation of its commitments and therefore undermines the notion of this
type of transparency leading to more accountability. As an illustration of the actual level of
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transparency in the G-7, it has been observed that it is rare for the G-7 to publicly register its
views upon any economic matter. For example, on the issue of currency value, it has been
reported that over the last twelve years the G-7 has only commented in its institutional voice on
three occasions (Brummer, 11-2-97). The implication of this is that the G-7 is reluctant to
comment publicly upon an economic issue which might have significant consequences for a
range of actors.
Another characteristic of the 0-7 Halifax communiqué is its complexity, 'these documents
reflect a nominal agenda, which in many cases does not correspond to the matters actually
discussed ... [whilst many] ... consider these documents wordy, vague and difficult to
understand' (Garavoglia and Padoan, 1994: 55). From the perspective of productive secrecy
this complexity and lack of clarity might perform two functions: first to reinforce a particular
ideological view; second to protect the G-7 from criticism about its lack of substantive reforms
of MGG. An examination of the official communiqué offers the opportunity to see if this type
of productive secrecy is being utilised by the G-7.
A wide range of commentators have observed that the overall message emanating from Halifax
is that countries must keep to the neoliberal orthodoxy characterised by tight economic
management and the continuing expansion of global markets. The communiqué itself asserts
that all countries will have to keep their houses in order, and in this case order refers to the
neoliberal orthodoxy (Hutton, 19-6-95). It is because of the consequences of following the
policy formulation laid out by the G-7, with its far reaching social and political implications,
that critics have pressed for increased accountability through greater openness and
participation.
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At the Halifax Summit the communiqué finished with a declaration that a commitment to
neoliberal globalisation remains the most economically beneficial, and that the primary aim of
the (3-7 is to facilitate the working of the market and the key economic players (Communiqué,
1995: 2). Despite accusations of vagueness, one thing that the communiqué appears to make
clear is the assumption that globalisation will be positive for all countries and merely requires
that countries take the right 'medicine'. It accommodates the universal view amongst 0-7
participants that globalisation is inevitable and that following the policies of the market will
result in the common good.
Critics argue that the openness of the communiqué in terms of its policy recommendations for
free trade and IMF support of structural adjustments programmes can be challenged because it
fails to include' ... open discussions and deliberations about the pitfalls of standard neo-
classical international trade recipes.' (WIDE, 1996: 3). What this does is to give some support
to the internationalisation of authority as discussed above. The suggestion is that information
released by the 0-7 has the aim of reinforcing a particular ideological position and stifling open
debate about the wider implications of an unregulated global capitalism.
In the communiqué section entitled 'Meeting the Challenges of the 21sf Century', the explicit
assumption is that globalisation is driven by market forces and technological change. The
implication is that global forces are beyond the control of national governments (see Chapter
1). One interpretation of this is that the communiqué represents a type of productive secrecy:
the 0-7 is responsible for the development of economic globalisation, however, it cannot be
responsible for its sometimes negative consequences. The communiqué fulfils a critical role in
the continuation of this market belief by reaffirming the no change policy, implicitly denying
the possibility of alternatives. The G-7 is able to avoid its responsibilities, as well as obfuscate
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the issue of accountability. The communiqué is at best a very limited form of transparency, and
a flimsy source of accountability, which could in future lead to more questions being asked
about the legitimacy of the G-7.
The G- 7 and Visibility (The Role of the Media)
In Chapter 2 the argument was put forward that the potential for functional secrecy to conceal
a misuse of power is counter balanced by a free press (See Shils, 1956; Friednch, 1972). The
function of the media has been to report on the actions of those in power and provide a counter-
balance. In so doing the media play a vital political role in opening up the political process and
making it more accountable by disseminating the product of the G-7's external transparency.
From this perspective the media acts as a neutral arbiter acting in the public interest. Freedom
of expression ensures that the media acts as an indirect form of accountability on the governing
group. A counter perspective argues, however, that a primary function of the press is to
support the interests of the dominant class, with the media reflecting those interests through the
control of the news agenda. (Curran and Seaton, 1985: 22 1-227). Information generated in this
way conforms to the established social order and is ideologically driven. Others take a more
ideologically neutral position, but retain a cynical view of the purpose and role of the media at
the G-7 summits. In a scathing attack on the worth of the media at G-7 summits, Hirsh
describes them thus:
'each spring 2,000 reporters descend on some lucky city, the drone of briefings
fills the air for three days and the leaders pose stiffly for group photos and
discuss every manner of issue - from Bosnia to biodiversity - usually in too little
detail to matter (1995: 35).
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The presence of the media at the Halifax Summit means that on one level the events are very
visible and Baker makes the point that of all the 0-7 processes the summits remain the most
publicised (1996: 10). In part this can be explained by the need of the G-7 to maintain a high
public profile, without which its legitimacy as an effective form of economic governance is
more vulnerable to challenge.
The summits are the public face of the 0-7 and it is the role of the media to report upon the
different aspects of them. In this respect the media has been challenged for its seeming
unwillingness to criticise the 0-7. Critics at Halifax (see Summit News #002) believed that the
media always followed the official agenda, reinforcing the effects of productive secrecy.
Generally it can be said that the media is more concerned with the relationship between
participants and their domestic audiences rather than the wider global issues that are the
purpose of the G-7 summits (Round, 1 997b). This view is reinforced by Shaw who observes
that governments know that responses to global issues can make a difference to national
politics (1996: 10). As a consequence the non-governmental groups who are present at the
summits cannot rely on the mainstream media to either convey their messages to the public or
to report on anything other than the official line.
The high media profile the G-7 summits attract appears to be at odds with the actual degree of
transparency which is produced. One explanation for this is provided in Summit News #001: in
a reported discussion between a journalist and a member of the P-i, the point was made that
the media is largely dependant upon the official releases of those in authority because the
meetings are all held behind closed doors (1 995b: 2). The result is that there can be no
independent reporting of the discussions and what actually takes place. As a result the media
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resort to photo opportunities and regurgitating the official press releases and much of what is
reported is clouded by the spin from the press officers representing the G-7 participants.
There is a counter perspective to this view and, the amount of transparency generated by the
media has led to some governments calling for further restrictions on media intrusion of
summits and the need for increased privacy. It is reported in 1992 that the British government
wanted to reduce the degree of publicity surrounding summits as a means of gaining freedom
from media attention, thus they argued enabling summits to be more effective (Hodges, 1994:
24). We can see therefore, that the issue of concealment and revelation is played Out in the role
of the media in the summit process and that it is far from obvious as to whether or not the
media acts as a counter balance to the secret talks that characterise the 0-7 summits.
Conclusion
The 0-7 wants to keep its discussion concealed in order to enhance effective governance.
However critics of the institutions of MOG believe that it is the responsibility of the 0-7 to set
in place 'an open and participatory' review of the World Bank and the IMF which would first
need to be applied to itself (Woodroffe, 1995: 2). To act as a directorate, regulating the
institutions of MGG, the G-7 needs to act to remove the excessive secrecy surrounding itself
and the other institutions of MGG, as well as integrating public participation into its decision-
making process (Halifax Initiative, 1996: 5).
From the evidence presented here it would appear that the 0-7 has engaged most closely with
the discourse of internal and external transparency. The justification for limiting transparency
to its internal form was to promote dialogue amongst participants. However, this is ultimately
too restrictive to enhance public accountability or the trust that exists between the governors
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and the governed (Coote, 1998: 126). The 0-7 summit process remains a largely exclusive
round of meetings with limited accountability, transparency and participation, justified by the
need for functional secrecy. Other examples of the limits of transparency were the official
Halifax Communiqué, the role of the media and the limited participation of NGOs. These
failures demonstrate the inadequacies of the G-7 in conforming to the principles of good
governance and enhanced institutional accountability.
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Chapter Six
The World Bank and the Arun-3 Dam Project
The purpose of the World Bank is to provide funds for economic development. In this role it
has become the largest single lender of public financial aid to the Third World. The defacto
authority of the Bank gives it a 'unique moral, political and economic role' (Please, 1984: 1).
Like the IMF (see Chapter 4), the World Bank faces criticism over its affairs, and the issue of
the Bank's accountability has become a central concern for many people (Caufield, 1996;
Horta, 1997). Areas of concern include the degree of secrecy and apparent lack of transparency
that surrounds World Bank projects. To explore these issues and the consequences for the
Bank's accountability this chapter will focus on one of the Bank's most controversial projects
of recent times, the Arun-3 Dam Project in Nepal.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines the background to the World
Bank, its role in the development process. The second explores the way in which the discourse
of transparency has been applied and interpreted within the World Bank and the extent to
which secrecy prevails. The third sets the context by introducing details of the Arun-3 Dam
Project. The final section takes this material and applies it to the issue of the World Bank,
accountability and Arun-3.
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The World Bank and its Raison D'être
Commonly known by its generic name, the World Bank, the institution consists of four
organisations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the
Economic Development Institution (ED!), the International Development Association (IDA)
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Collectively these institutions are known as
the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) or the World Bank. Of the four institutions the
ED! and IFC have the most independence, as they are run as semi-autonomous agencies. The
IBRD the IDA are usually considered together as they share the same president and staff
(Wilson, 1991: xi). For the purposes of this chapter the generic term, the World Bank will be
used, except where otherwise specified.
Like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank was conceived in 1944 at Bretton
Woods to support post-war reconstruction in Europe which it undertook under the terms of the
Marshall Plan. Once this reconstruction was completed the Bank shifted its attention towards
Third World development (George and Sabelli, 1994: 2). It is in this capacity that the Bank has
proved most controversial (Culpeper, 1996: 60). A wide range of critics have cited the World
Bank as being the root cause of many of the developing world's problems (see for example,
Watkins, 1995: 10; Christian Aid, 1994: 20; Friends of the Earth 1994). These critics maintain
that World Bank policies are responsible for ecological degradation, social destabilisation and
economic dependency (Kothari, 1994: 40). In an investigation into the World Bank, Caufield
concluded that the premise that the Bank exists to help the poor is just an illusion (1996: 330-
338). Conversely, the Bank's advocates see it as playing an integral part in development
projects amongst many underdeveloped and developing states (Sandstrom, 1994: 30). What is
incontrovertible is that without the help of the Bank the necessary funding for economic
development and poverty relief would not be forthcoming.
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In its role as the world's largest development agency the World Bank provides loans for
development projec&°. These projects have traditionally been large scale, including dams for
the production of hydro-electric power, and road building projects. According to the World
Bank, these types of projects contribute to the economic development of the country in question
by developing its infra-structure for economic growth (Friends of the Earth, 1994: 3). The
primary objectives of the World Bank were reiterated on its 50th anniversary in its official
publication Finance and Development; in this report the Bank stated that its principal aims
continued to be helping to reduce poverty and increasing living standards in the developing
world (Sandstrom, 1994: 30-1).
One of the World Bank's strengths is in countering the lack of coherent policy in the developed
world towards the developing world. In contrast to individual states, the World Bank is in a
good position to translate its world view into real policy outcomes (Sabelli and George, 1994:
2). Primarily this is because it is unconstrained by domestic political pressures. The Bank's
world view is shaped by a neoliberal development model which has at its core: 'the belief that
the reform of economic and political institutions, together with the liberalizatIon of macro-
economic policy, are the pre-conditions for market-driven economic grovth' (Henderson, 1998:
359). Critics of these policy objectives described the Bank's function pejoratively as an agent
of 'disciplinary neoliberalism' (see Chapters 1 and 3; Gill, 1995: 406, 1992: 272). They claim
that the Bank imposes its world view upon aid recipient countries to their detriment and that
dissenting voices are excluded from the debate. However, Nelson believes that this view of the
Bank is too restrictive and that it should be viewed more as an institution that is 'subject to
external pressure and is neither monolithic nor static internally' (1996: 5).
In 1994 the Bank had finds of5148 billion dollars, financing about 1900 projects throughout the world (Hocta, 1997: 132).
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The Bank's loans have conditions attached to them with the most well known being the generic
policy package associated with structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). These conditions
are primarily economic and act to privilege economic austerity over 'pump-priming', and place
restrictions upon national policies. Linked to these economic reforms are political
conditionalities. These lead to the adoption of policies at the national level which are seen as
the source of much increased poverty and economic hardship (Caufield, 1996: 338). The Bank
counters this by maintaining that its duty is essentially a technical one, and resists any
suggestion of a political role (Williams, 1994: 110). Gillies explains that the Bank has a
narrow version of governance which focuses on the technical criteria for economic
development. This excludes the wider consideration of most civil and political rights (1996:
115). However, claims of the Bank's political neutrality are contested not least because 'it is
hard to think of anything more political than deciding how money is spent' (Gillies, 1996: 105).
Despite protests from the Bank over its political neutrality and essentially technical role in
development projects, the political role of the World Bank is well demonstrated in its conditions
for lending.
The World Bank and the Discourse of Transparency
The principles of good governance have come to the fore in World Bank policy
recommendations as a condition placed upon countries wishing to secure aid. The World Bank
made the concept central to its development policies in the 1 990s 6' In a publication, entitled
Governance, the World Bank asserts that 'good governance is epitomised by predictability,
open and enlightened policy-making (that is transparent processes) ... and a strong civil society
The use of governance in World Bank parlance was first utilised in 1989 in the report 'Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth'.
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participating in public affairs' (1994a: iv). The World Bank's report on governance makes
clear the connection between transparency and accountability by making the claim that
'transparency and information pervade good governance and reinforce accountability'( I 994a:
29).
Conversely, poor governance is defined by the World Bank as governance which lacks
accountability and has non-transparent decision-making procedures (World Bank, 1992: 9).
The report goes on to claim that 'secrecy and non-transparent decision-making provide an
opportunity for private gain or for political arrangements against the public interests' (1994:
31). Are these principles of good governance reflected within the Bank? Gillies reports that
'...the Bank is virtually immune from any form of accountability to the intended beneficiaries
of its activities' (1996: 118). The result of this, according to Gillies, is that the legitimacy of
the Bank is challenged. To be legitimate the Bank needs to be open and accountable through
the release of information, access to documentation and openness in the governance process.
In the next three sub-sections I explore different assessments of the relationship between
different types of transparehcy and accountability within the World Bank.
Internal Accountability
Procedurally, the decision-making mechanisms within the Bank are similar to those of the IMF,
with decisions made by consensus rather than voting. Consensus is favoured by developing
states because if decisions are to be decided by straight voting, the G-7 countries with their in-
built majority share holding in the Bank have the power to make all the decisions. For example,
the Nepalese government only has two-tenths of one per cent of the voting power, whereas the
United States has sixteen per cent (Perkinson, 1994: 68). As a consequence the representatives
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of many developing countries see their interests being best served by decision-making based
upon dialogue and consensus rather than formal voting procedures.
Interestingly in those situations where a vote is taken, the outcome is often concealed because
discussions can continue more frankly if they are not open to public scrutiny (Colchester, 1989:
10). This limited form of internal transparency produces a dilemma; viewed as positive feature
it is a lubricant in the political process of sensitive negotiations. Alternatively, the secrecy that
is implicit in internal transparency undermines the legitimacy of the Bank by excluding a larger
group of interested participants. In recognition of this, some governments and NGOs have
pushed for policy reforms on information disclosure (Horta, 1997: 132).
It is claimed that to portray accountability merely in narrow internal and procedural terms
misses the wider point about the scope of accountability (Udall, 1994a: 145). The Bank's
accountability is flawed according to those who want to see a more expansive and inclusive
form of accountability. This is because '...the Bank is not held accountable for its actions,
except to a board of executive directors...' (George and Sabelli, 1994: 152). The problem is
compounded because the Directors views are then shaped by the dominant states. In a series of
interviews, Bischel reports genuine concern amongst some of the Directors from the developing
world, that the Bank is primarily a tool of the rich western industrialised states (1994: 146).
Moves to make the Bank more accountable through increased access to information and
participation by non-state actors has been resisted internally. The Bank maintains an orthodox
position on the issue of accountability justified on the basis that the relationship is primarily
between member states and the Bank: 'the World Bank.. .is a multilateral organisation,
accountable only to its member governments - and that if its projects have problems they are
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primarily the responsibility of the borrower governments' (Fox, 1996: 1). This view is
reinforced by Bischel who on interviewing an Executive Director of the Bank was told, 'the
Bank cannot intervene between a government and its citizens, otherwise it would become a
political actor. Bank interaction must be with the governments that then represent the people'
(Bischel, 1994: 150).
Notwithstanding the predominance of the orthodox view, there still exists ambiguity within the
Bank over issues of transparency and concealment. For example, Bischel found when
interviewing World Bank Executive Directors one respondent argued that 'we disagree with
making the Bank accountable to anyone other than the government, but we support more
participation by affected parties...' (quoted in Bischel, 1994: 150).
External Accountability and Access to In formation
Another source of accountability comes through the external transparency of official Bank
publications. The World Bank and donor governments are accountable through the release of
its monthly operational summaries which give details of the Bank's activities. These
publications include a wide range of technical and policy papers and environmental impact
assessments. Critics, however, view these measures of limited value, with the monthly
operational summaries giving little detail, rather simply outlining the projects in purely
technical terms (Udall, 1994a: 147-8). Similarly, policy papers are of limited value in
increasing accountability because these papers are only released into the public domain after
the details of the project have been completed and therefore restricting wider debate. Finally,
although NGOs see environmental impact assessments, as a move in the right direction for
increased accountability they believe they have limited utility for accountability, not least
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because the World Bank bureaucracy remains secretive and unaccountable (Friends of the
Earth, 1994: 8). In summary, critics argue that the publication of Bank reports does not, in
itself, guarantee greater accountability.
The issue of external openness is related to gaming access to World Bank information. A lack
of information represents a powerful obstacle to accountability (see Chapter 3). To create an
effective form of accountability in the Bank an essential ingredient is access to information
(Horta, 1997: 132). To accuse the Bank of denying access to information might be premature
due to the reforms that have been undertaken. In part these reforms came about due to external
criticism and an internal World Bank report. The Wapenhans Report (1992) highlighted that
the Bank had failed to monitor effectively the implementation of its projects. The Bank was
accused of ignoring the social and environmental problems of particular cases as long as
projects were fulfilling wider development criteria. The report concluded that, to challenge this
'approval culture' the Bank would have to become more transparent, participatory and
inclusive of those people directly affected by the projects (Horta, 1997: 132-133).
As a response to the Wapenhans Report the Bank, in 1994, took a number of steps towards
improving its policy on access to information. These moves included a new policy on the
disclosure of information and the opening of public information centres as a response to the
criticism of high levels of institutional secrecy within the Bank. In his foreword to the World
Bank publication The World Bank Policy on Disclosure ofInformation the President, Lewis
Preston, reasons that access to information is essential for the Bank to gain wide support for its
projects. In addition, access to information enhances the quality of Bank projects, fulfilling the
wider aims of the Bank which are to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development
(World Bank, 1994c). Because of this, the Bank in its information policy statement 'recognises
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and endorses the fundamental importance of accountability and transparency...' (World Bank,
1994c: 2). Thus a clear link is made between the aims of the Bank and the need for openness
and accountability. The final policy statement asserts that from this position it follows that
there is a presumption in favour of disclosure recognised by the World Bank policy of opening
Public Information Centres (World Bank, I 994c: 3)62 Furthermore, a move towards disclosure
has been the creation of what has been termed the public information document (PID). As
Udall points out PIDs have been created to satisfy those critics of the World Bank who accuse
it of secrecy. PIDs are a part of the Bank's new information policy - a policy that has expanded
the categories of documents that will be made available to the public.
In August 1993 the Bank's Executive approved and included in its annual report a section
entitled Public Access to Bank Information Expands (1 994b: 3). As already indicated, this
document reiterates the shift within the World Bank towards a policy of disclosure in the
absence of a compelling reason not to do so (Gerster, 1993: 99). Included in this new policy of
disclosure was information that had hitherto been kept concealed, and included project
information documents, Staff Appraisal Reports, environmental assessments and legal
opinions.
Prior to this new policy the World Bank had often been accused of secrecy in its activities.
Critics of the Bank maintain that there is a direct link between the failure to grant access to
information, and the principles of public participation and accountability. Writing in 1989
Colchester claims that:
'2 These Public Information Centres are located in Washington, London, Paris and Tokyo. Field offices hold information relevant to
that particular country. A useful guide to these centres is published by the Bank Information Centre, Washington Email:
bicusa@igc.apc.org.
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'In most cases.. .documents are not even available to borrower governments or
World Bank Executive Directors; they may be restricted to a small number of
staff within the Bank. Moreover, there are no formal procedures by which the
public can apply to access to the Bank's internal papers nor any formal review or
appeal process to which outsiders can turn if Bank management denies them
access' (1989: 9)
From another perspective the Bank has been forced to change its policy on access to
information due to what has been termed the 'information revolution' (Annis, 1990: 73). The
argument is that information is now becoming more accessible due to new technology and the
reducing cost of the hardware63 . The information revolution has resulted in the spread of
information on a global basis: 'The proliferation of information and communications hardware,
thougl1 it certainly reaches the rich first, is beginning to penetrate the isolation of poverty.
Literate, media-connected, information hungry people are driving social change from below'
(Annis, 1990: 73). This view is supported by those who believe that new technologies are
facilitating openness and access to information (see Chapter 3).
Annis describes the World Bank as a 'knowledge based institution' (1990: 74). The Bank's
main transfers are not in money but information about policy recommendations for economic
growth (Annis, 1990: 74). As a result the Bank has become knowledge based and that 'the
contemporary World Bank embodies the high technology of the information age' (Annis, 1990:
75). Annis is not blind to the limitations of this information age within the Bank and calls for
an 'Informational Glasnost within the Bank' and an explicit policy on information openness to
offset the secrecy within the Bank. More critical of the World Bank information policy is Giles
Mohan who claims that the information provided by the Bank is a form of political power. The
'3 This increasing equality associated with the infomation age is challenged by others. For example, see Hosseinzadeh and Yesilda,
19X9.
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power of MGG is enhanced through the subtle means of the 'creation and dissemination of
knowledge ... knowledge is used to create consensus for more concrete policy intervention'
(1994: 526)
Before the reforms of 1993, most of the Bank documentation was restricted. Following the
reforms access to information varies according to which country applicants live in (Cahn,
1993: 166). Citizens of the United States are able to gain access once a document relating to a
project has the approval of everyone in the Bank and its progression is afait accompli. Even
this limited access is denied to the citizens of developing countries who have no access to
information regarding projects within their countries. The charge made against the World Bank
is that during the planning and decision-making process of project design, the World Bank has
remained hidden behind a veil of secrecy (Udall, 1994a: 145). Despite this, and particularly
since the Bank's withdrawal from the Narmarda Dam Project, there have been moves to
increase public access to Bank information. The question that has been posed by Udall is
whether this means greater public accountability, or is it just a public relations exercise
(1994a: 145).
Information supplied to the Bank by governments of aid recipient countries is not made public.
The primary justification for this by the Bank is that, 'there is a need to preserve the integrity
of the deliberative process and to facilitate and safeguard the free and candid exchange of ideas
between the Bank and its members.' (World Bank, 1994c: 13). For the same reason, access to
the Bank's internal decision-making processes are restricted, including internal documents and
memoranda. The Bank restricts information on its financial affairs and to ensure the privacy of
its staff. Finally, in a catch-all clause the Bank may not release information because the:
'external release of some information may be on an ad hoc basis when, because of its content,
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wording, or timing disclosure would be detrimental to the interests of the Bank, a member
country, or Bank staff'(World Bank, 1994c: 14).
It is understandable that the Bank should want to protect the private affairs of its employees,
however, there appears to be a disjuncture between the Bank's policy of openness and its
catch-all restrictions. The World Bank has kept information secret due to the Bank's attitude
towards certain issues, such as, the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples
(Colchester, 1989: 10). There has been a suggestion that the World Bank has begun to look to
more sophisticated methods in the search for increased legitimacy, and it is possible that its
policy of information access through the discourse of transparency is one of these strategies.
In a scathing attack, worth quoting at length, two critics of the Bank pour scorn on the Bank's
infonnation policy, particularly the lack of openness in its projects and the access to
information policy:
'The Bank is not transparent. It justifies its opacity by the need to protect the
confidentiality of its relationship with borrowing members who are themselves
then enjoined by the Bank to be, precisely, transparent. Since many governments
are unwilling to allow their own people, much less outsiders. to learn what Bank
projects may have in store for them, the Bank's refusal to divulge such
information places it at the same level of poor governance as those governments
it criticises for their lack of transparency. Its confidentiality defence is not just
hypocritical but absurd.' (George and Sabelli, 1994: 152)
The Bank's disclosure policy is designed to enhance the legitimacy of its projects. By adopting
these policies it appears that the Bank, more than other institutions of MOG, is prepared to
It baa been suggested that one method employed by the World Bank is in establishing pailnerships with NOOs to reduce the
possibility of opposition to their policies (Kothari, 1994).
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engage with the discourse of transparency is a substantive way. What remains to be seen
however, is whether the disclosure policy is sufficient to produce more accountable World
Bank.
Privatisation, Secrecy and the World Bank
The increase in private funding for World Bank projects reflects the ciectine. tn kc e.di
on multilateral development. As a result private sector money is being presented as the only
viable alternative (Guardian, 13-9-96). Thus investment from the markets is being presented by
the World Bank as the way forward for development projects. This shift in World Bank policy
raises some interesting issues about the use and justification of secrecy and whether institutions
such as the World Bank can be open and transparent.
Privatisation or the use of private capital for development projects means that the
confidentiality of investors needs to be protected according to the logic of what Bauman
identifies as commercial instrumental rationality (1995: 262)65. One justification for restricting
access to information is to protect the confidentiality of private investors. Whereas
accountability is about public decision-making, capitalism is about private decision-making
(Laxer, 1995: 296). The shift to private financing has increased the significance of this sector
for financing development projects. Critics claim that: 'pnvatisation has done more than
disadvantage poorer peoples and communities. It removes democratic accountability of service
providers from the people who use and depend upon them. It not only constricts what can be
decided: it shifts who decides' (Martin, 1996: 153). Policies of pnvatisation have resulted in
' Bauman argues that any other motives other than the interests of business are secondaiy and that they are dinissed o the
grounds that they do not make business sense, the only sense that business may recognise' (1995: 262).
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power becoming concentrated at the global level between the MDBs and private finance in the
form of transnational companies: 'At the heart of the campaign to reform the World Bank and
other multilateral development banks (MDBs) is an attempt by citizens groups, NGOs and
local communities to force the MDBs to become more publicly accountable and transparent in
their operations' (Udall, 1994a: 145).
Privatisation has resulted in the World Bank funding private companies to undertake projects,
thus developing the relationship between the Bank and private companies. It is reported that the
Bank is undertaking internal reforms to make it more 'private sector friendly' (Hildyard, 1996:
177). One area of concern arising from this shift to private finance is those many Multilateral
Development Banks (MDBs) other than the IBRD have weaker information and disclosure
policies. As we have seen, some documents have become more readily available in the IBRD.
This, however, is tempered in other MDBs such as the IFC (Hildyard, 1996: 178). The
potential for more secrecy stems the IFC concern for confidentiality. As a consequence what
might be considered proper business confidentiality becomes an excuse for a more wide
ranging type of exclusion and lack of accountability.
Transparency, Participation and Non-Government Organisations
It is a widely held belief that the active political participation of society is a critical ingredient
of full accountability and that this is a core aspiration of the principles underpinning
transparency from below (see Chapter 3). Without participation and the means to participate
fully, those in power are able to exclude opposition forces and make decisions with impunity:
'The involvement in public decision-making on the part of organisations and
social movements that directly represents the broadest possible range of interests
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in the civil society, helps ensure that decisions are relevant and have broad based
support. Such organisational involvement, along with the freedom and exercise
of individual expression, forms the backbone of democratic society' (Hellinger
and Hellinger, 1994: 121)
This is not to say that the importance of participation to making the World Bank more
accountable has not been recognised by the institution. The desire to encourage more
participation has emerged due to the World Bank aligning itself to ideas of sustainable
development as a means of reducing the debt of developing countries. The notion of sustainable
development is underpinned by a belief that if projects have the support of local people they
will prove to be more successful. This policy has encouraged the Bank to promote the role of
NGOs in the development process. By doing so it has increased the degree of direct
participation of those affected by the development projects: 'Participation means more than
sharing in the benefits of development. It means an active, sustained and consequential role
in determining how these benefits are generated' (Hellinger and Hellinger, 1994: 118).
One of the Bank's Directors, Sven Sandstrom, has written that there is a global trend towards
participation and political openness (1994: 33). Another Director takes a more pragmatic line
and reasons that projects have more chance of success when a full range of actors are involved
because of the investment that local people will have made (Adams and McCracken, 1994: 36).
It has been claimed that participation is about stakeholding, an inclusive process that gives
primary importance to the poor who are most likely to lack power and information (Adams and
McCracken, 1994: 36)
' The idea of a 'stakeholder society' is contested. However, within it is the idea of a restructuring of the global economy to reflect
community needs. See Jones, RB 1997.
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It is claimed that NGOs and new social movements have become one of the prime checks upon
international organisations (Camilleri and Falk, 1992: 217; Uvin, 1996: 165-65). Often
comprising of a loose coalition of institutions of civil society these NGOs include various
environmental and social groups, charities, development bodies, church and consumer
organisations. Indeed, Gerster describes NGOs as the 'agents of accountability' although the
degree to which they themselves are accountable and representative agents is open to debate
(1993: 8889)67. Although the World Bank has taken steps to include NGOs in its decision-
making processes, the quality and extent of this participation is much debated. For example, in
an open letter to the World Bank a coalition of arganisations and individuals concerned about
the World Bank's policies in India accused the Bank of only including the NGOs once the
project has been planned and decisions taken (Kotan et al, 1996).
The Bank favours those NGOs which are funded by the World Bank itself and restricts
consultation to these - some would argue co-opted NGOs - and in doing so excludes the people
directly affected by the project (Kotari et al, 19-10-96). Nelson has observed that the Bank has
adapted calls for increased participation by adopting the language of participation to align itself
closer with the wishes of NGOs (1996: 4). Others believe that this closer involvement of the
NGOs with the World Bank leads to the possibility that they become co-opted to the Bank's
view of development which stresses conditionality and structural reforms over other issues.
Strategies of co-option raise the real risk of opponents to the World Bank becoming more
malleable after years of fighting the World Bank (Kothari, 1994: 52). Participation appears
constrained by the nature of the relationship between the Bank and NGOs.
"Executive Direct ols of the World Bank have questioned the accountability of NGOs. It is not clear who they are accountable to,
and it could be argued that their influence is based upon might of resources as oppose to their being representative of wide sectional
interests (Bischel, 1994).
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It might be assumed that greater participation by NGOs would increase levels of openness, and
that institutional secrecy would be pushed to the margins of the governance relationship. The
interaction between secrecy and participation is of particular importance when considering the
detrimental effect for public participation when secrecy exists. Not least because it excludes
those who are most affected by the decisions made. However, it is noteworthy that although the
NGOs criticise the World Banks secretive practices, they are likely (if invited) to engage in
closed-door meetings with the Bank. The confidentiality this lends the discussions means that
the NGOs can make their points to the World Bank without the threat of embarrassing a
member state. Thus, NGOs have become involved in some policy dialogue, and although this
does not amount to complete openness it is significant because the 'principal vehicle for
participation at local levels are peoples organisations and those institutions that represent or
support the poor and their interests' (Hellinger and Hellinger, 1994: 125).
The Wor!d Bank and the Arun-3 Dam Project
The importance of the Arun-3 Project for the World Bank is that it had become a measure of
the Bank's credibility and ability to undertake large infra-structure projects. The Arun Dam
can be viewed as a 'classic' World Bank project involving investment from the Bank and the
private sector in what have been described as 'megaprojects'. The Arun-3 Dam followed on
from the earlier example of the Namarda Dam in India, and it has been described by Udall as
'... a test case in World Bank accountability' (1994b: 82). Furthermore, it has been observed
that there are many lessons that 'can be drawn from the political dynamics between
international donors and recipient societies from this single project in Nepal' (Gyawali, 1997:
185).
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The rationality underpinning the project follows the Bank's orthodox position on economic
development. The Bank believed that the dam would provide the people of Nepal with cheap
energy from a plentiful natural source. The Arun-3 Project was being presented as an initiative
which would help to fundamentally transform the economy of Nepal. It would be part of the
on-going process of economic re-structuring that Nepal had undertaken, under the guidance of
the World Bank68 . The size of the project is illustrated in the following quote:
'The World Bank is currently considering spending US$140 million on what
would be Nepal's largest ever hydroelectric dam. The 200 megawatt dam and its
122 km access road would cost US$764 million, the equivalent of Nepal's entire
annual public expenditure budget, and would threaten the biologically rich and
culturally diverse Arun mountain valley. The valley contains one of the last
pristine forests in the Himalayas and is inhabited by 450,000 people from ten
indigenous groups' (Friends of the Earth, 1994: 6).
Initially it was the Nepalese government who approached the World Bank for help in funding
the Arun-3 Dam Project. As noted by Gyawali, 'in 1987, the Government of Nepal requested
the World Bank to become an active role and "lead donor agency" in mobilising resources for
Arun-3' (1997: 188). Due to the request, the World Bank took responsibility for the project.
This served two functions: to ensure the success of the project, as well as to act as an agent on
behalf of Nepal's government in seeking funding for the project from both public and private
sources.
61 The World Bank insisted that a number of macroeconomic reforms take place before the funds to build the Arun-3 could be
released. These included satisfactory prowess in implementing SAPs, tax reforms, adoption of the Bank's budget forecast and reform
of the administration (Gyawali, 1997: 198).
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Because of this active and close involvement, the World Bank had an extra incentive in making
the project work to maintain its credibility. This occurred at a time when sections within
national governments were beginning to question the Bank's continuing relevance. This may
explain why the World Bank was so reluctant to cancel the project, moreover, why many
aspects of the project were initially obfuscated to protect its interests. Feasibility studies were
undertaken by the World Bank. A growing band of critics believed these studies missed the
point about the environmental costs posed by the Dam being built (Gyawali, 1997: 19O).
The World Bank, Accountability and Arun-3
Opposition to Arun-3
Opposition to the Arun-3 Dam was organised around a coalition of NGOs. In a letter sent by
the Alliance for Energy, a Nepalese NGO, to the Executive Directors of the World Bank, dated
6 July 1994, they set out their concerns over public participation and access to information.
Firstly, that there had been inadequate public participation in the evolution of the Arun-3
Project. The government of Nepal portrayed the project as having undergone public scrutiny, in
an open and transparent manner. Yet the reality for many opposition groups was of a project
presented as a fail accompli. Any consultation that had taken place had been at the instigation
of NGOs rather than the government of Nepal or the World Bank (Alliance for Energy, 1994).
Secondly, important documents were withheld by the government of Nepal, despite the World
Bank's policy based upon a presumption in favour of disclosure. Primarily this was justified by
the prior authorisation of borrowing governments as a precondition for the release to the public
of the most essential documents (Korta, 1997: 134). The release of documents came only after
Environmental threats that 'could lead to severe erosion, stream disroptions, floods, landslides, and a loss of biodiversity. The
access road could result in an influx of migrants posing a threat to both the forests and the local culture' (Friends of the Earth, 1994:
6).
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legal action by the NGOs. Even then, many critical documents like the Memorandums of
Understanding between the government of Nepal and the World Bank, were concealed from
public scrutiny (Alliance for Energy, 1994). Finally, there was the failure of the World Bank
itself to release information prior to the limited public consultation that took place. The Bank's
information policy requires that information be released. This was not done in the Arun-3 case,
for example, the green colour coded, Staff Appraisal Report was not made available prior to
project approval and not in Nepal at all (Alliance for Energy, 1994).
Critics of Arun-3 believe that the World Bank favoured the views of local and international
elites rather than the indigenous population or local economies (Perkinson, 1994: 68). This
view is reinforced by environmental NGOs who opposed the building of Arun-3: 'The plan has
been strongly criticised by citizens groups in Nepal, Europe and North America who are calling
for an immediate moratorium on funding. They argue that the whole of Nepal's power needs
could be met with small, localised hydropower and solar power schemes, but the World Bank
has admitted that it has not even considered this option' (Friends of the Earth, 1994: 6).
On 24 October 1994, the Arun Concerned Group (ACG) made a complaint to the Bank's
Inspection Panel on the grounds that the Bank had failed to implement its policies and
procedures including information disclosure (Udall, 1994b: 84). The complaint, registered as
Inspection Panel request RQ94/1 70 , was based upon the non-compliance by the International
Development Association (IDA) with its rules and regulations, including the non-disclosure of
information on its economic analysis, its environmental assessment, and its involuntary
resettlement of indigenous people. Thus the role of the Inspection Panel in Arun-3 was in
7°On 2 February 1995 the Board of Executive Directoes agreed to an investigation based upon the Inspection Panel recommendation
on the following points:'.., whether IDA's policies and procedures have been observed with respect to environmental assessment,
indigenous peopies and involuntary resetilement, in terms of(I) the consistency of the determination of the road alignment with
Operational Directive [OD] 4.01 (Environmental Assessment); (2) the consistency of the treatment of indigenous peoples, if any, with
OD 4.20 (Indigenous Peoples), and (3) the consistency of arrangements for compensating seriously affected families for land acquired
by Governments with OD 4.30 (Involuntary Resettlement)' (World Bank, 1995a).
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investigating the claim that the project violated the Bank's environmental assessment and
resettlement policies.
After receiving the complaint, on 2 May 1995 the Bank's directors authorised an investigation
by the Inspection Panel It was the first request received by the Bank to use the panel to
investigate one of its projects 71 . The panel's operating procedures set out that the initial work
plan for the investigation will be publicly available. However, the panel does not have to set out
an agenda or initial work plan for its investigation nor make all its findings or information
public. The Inspection Panel completed its investigation and submitted its report to the
Executive Directors on 21 June 1995. The resolution establishing the panel required that the
findings be made public within two weeks of consideration by the Executive Panel.
A press release from the World Bank details the application from several citizens of Nepal who
were directly affected by the Arun Project. On 4 November 1994 the Bank's Inspection Panel
under the chairmanship of Ernst-Gunther Broder recommended that an investigation into the
claims of the citizens was justified although this did not pre-judge the merits of the claim
(World Bank, 1994a).
As already noted, before the Arun-3 Project came to public notice, the World Bank had
introduced a new and expanded information policy. It is worth considering therefore whether
this new information policy was significant in the Arun-3 case. The Inspection Panel found that
the allegation of non disclosure of information by the Bank was unfounded. The Panels
Copies of the Notice of Registration are available from the Bank's information centre or through the World Bank's information
Gopher.
72 The initial work plan includes: (1) research of Bank documentation and files as well as information made available by the
prospective project co-financiers and the assessment of any solicited or unsolicited information from other sources; (2) meetings with
the Requesters. affected people in the Arun Valley. Bank staff, co-financiers, officials of the government of Nepal, and representatives
of NGOs; (3) interviews with groups of affected people in the Arun valley, particularly with regard to their involuntary resettlement
and loss of land (4) visit to project sites in the Arun valley, to review environmental assessments; and, (5) hiring of limited consultant
services from experts in Nepal on the questions of indigenous people and environmental assessment (World Bank, RQ 94/1).
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findings published on 11 April 1995, gave the reason as '...the disclosure policy was evolving
so rapidly during the later phases of project preparation that full compliance was difficult'
(World Bank, 1995b). The Bank was unable to fulfil its commitments to greater transparency
because its policy was so new and as yet unestablished the implication being that this would
change in the future.
In August 1995 after considerable pressure from opposition groups and a report from the
Bank's Inspection Panel the World Bank withdrew from the Arun-3 Project. Whether this was
due to increased transparency or some other factor needs to be explored further. It was reported
that one of the reasons given by the World Bank was public pressure. Another reason cited by
Gopal Sovakoti of the Arun Concerned Group (AGC) was that, 'So unwilling was the Bank to
release the Panel's report which strongly criticised it for not following its procedures, that
cancelling Arun was preferable' (Quoted in Bell, 16-8-95).
The Panel had just completed a full inspection when the World Bank's President Wolfensohn
announced in August 1995 that the Bank would no longer support Arun-3. Wolfensohn cited
the work of the Inspection Panel as one of the primary reasons for this decision (Hunter,
1996a: 74). It should be noted that the decision not to support the project was not taken lightly:
the project was seven years in the design stage, and a significant amount of resources had
already been devoted to it both in financial and human resource terms. The cancellation of the
Arun-3 at this late stage was an expensive failure for the Bank, estimates put the costs at $25
million. To some extent the failure and thus wasted money can be attributed to the lack of
openness by the Bank and the government of Nepal in the initial stages of the project (see
Gyawali, 1997: 202 1h6).
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The cancellation of Arun-3 was seen by many as a victor)' for the coalition of local, national
and international NGOs that opposed Bank projects on social, environmental and economic
grounds (Fox, 1996: 1-2). There was a growing consensus against this type of project from
members within the G-7. The NGOs had managed to gain the support of the US Executive
Director of the Bank and influential governments, creating internal dissent within the Bank
(Fox, 1996: 2). The final piece of the jigsaw was the acceptance by the Inspection Panel of the
Arun-3 as its first case. There was no guarantee that this would mean success for those
opposed to the building of the dam and, 'in spite of this convergence of internal and external
criticism, the Bank's management remained committed to the project, distorting the Inspection
Panel 's findings and moving the project towards Board approval. No project presented to the
World Bank's Board has ever been voted down' (Fox, 1996: 3)
Initially the omens did not bode well for those opposing the project, but in the end a range of
factors came together to force the cancellation of the project. This included pressure from
NGOs, and the fact that the dam's cancellation would have a low-cost politically for the new
World Bank President (Wolfensohn) who had not tied his credibility to the project. The project
was also under threat because of reluctance b y donor countries to finance a project that had
generated significant opposition in their domestic spheres of influence, particularly in Germany
and Japan (Fox, 1996: 2).
The Role of the Inspection Panel
As noted above the Inspection Panel was made fully operational in 1994 and its first task was
to investigate the complaints about Arun-3 by providing an independent assessment of this
' Despite this, the cancellation was very unpopular with the Government of Nepal who vowed to fight to have the funding for Arun
III restored (Gywali, 1997).
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project74 . Its significance lies in the ability of complainants to directly register their grievances
with the World Bank. This development represents a potential shift in the governance
relationship between the Bank and social movements. Private citizens now had the mechanism
available to complain directly to an institution of multilateral global governance without first
having to go through their government (Hunter, 1 994b: 8). In part the establishment of the
Inspection Panel makes a case for the cosmopolitan ideals whereby the separate relations
between institutions of MGG, member states and private individuals is being challenged. It also
challenged the assumption made by the radical perspective that the institutions of MGG cannot
be made more accountable in the prevailing world order (see Chapter 1).
The Inspection Panel was presented by the Bank as an important development in Bank
accountability and a check upon the Bank's activities. It achieved this by acting as an
intermediary between the Bank and other non-state parties. It has been observed that the
Inspection Panel is: '...the first forum in which private actors can hold international
organisations directly accountable for the consequences of its failure to follow its rules and
procedures' (Bradlow, 1994: 554). It will allow those who can demonstrate that the Bank has
failed to implement its development policies to hold the Bank to account for its conduct.
Accountability should be enhanced through the increased public debate generated by the
findings of the Inspection panel which are to be made public (Bradlow, 1994: 579)75
As a means of monitoring the Bank, the Inspection Panel helps ensure that the Bank fulfilled its
responsibility in its project appraisal. If a World Bank project falls short of expectations then
' It was on 22 September 1993 that the Bank's Executive Directors decided to establish the independent Inspection Panel under
IBRD resolution 93-6 (Bradlow, 1994: 553). The procedures are as follo: an investigation by the Panel must be requested by a
group of people adversely affected by a particular Bank project. Afler the Bank's Executive Directors have considered a request for
inspection, the Bank will make publicly available the request for scnitiny, plus the panel's recommendations on the request, and the
Executive Directors' decision on wiether to proceed. The Bank will also make publicly arailable the panel's report on its investigation
and the management's response to it. In addition the Panel's annual report to the Executive Board will be published by the Bank.
(World Bank 1994b: 74)
" Fcc a review of the Panel's procedures, membership cnteria and powers see Bradlow, 1994.
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the reasons must be made transparent (Bischel, 1994: 156). In part this increased clarity is
generated by the reporting of the panel's findings into the public sphere. Through this increased
transparency, the Bank becomes more accountable because the onus is upon the Bank to justif'
or defend itself against negative comment (Bradlow, 1994: 579). If the Panels findings are
made public it will mean that, '...there will be a public record of the panels work that can be
used to hold the Bank's directors and staff accountable for their actions in response to the
panel' (Bradlow, 1994: 578).
The independent Inspection Panel has been described by one leading NGO and critic of the
World Bank as '...represent[ing] the most credible innovation introduced by the Bank to
promote public accountability' (Friends of the Earth, 1996). Thus, it would appear that the
Bank does take its responsibilities seriously and that accountability through greater
transparency is made possible by the external regulation and surveillance of the Inspection
Panel.
The benefits of the Inspection Panel were not viewed as only being one way. The Bank benefits
because the Panel provides the Bank officials with 'timely, independent and objective
information about the actual and potential effects of its operations' (Bradlow, 1994: 556). The
outcome of this is that the Bank is able to follow more successfully its raison d'être, because:
'... by increasing the transparency of Bank operations and the accountability of the Bank's
staff the Panel should improve the Bank's ability to alleviate poverty and promote sustainable
development' (Bradlow, 1994: 556). Considering this and the apparent benefits to
complainants, the creation of the Inspection Panel appears to have universal benefits and
credibility. In its most positive light the Inspection Panel is an independent panel designed to
arbitrate between both the World Bank and NGOs, and the World Bank and individuals. This
196
independence gives the Panel the potential to open up the Bank's decision-making and planning
of projects through its access to Bank information and its independently published reports
which are made public (Udall, 1994a: 150). The Inspection Panel can be clearly seen as a
mechanism to make the World Bank more accountable.
The public accountability of the World Bank remains a concern for NGOs because, despite the
apparent success of the Inspection Panel, many critics remain unhappy with its workings and
its relationship with the Bank's Board of Directors. For example, they argue that the remit of
the Panel is too limited and that it excludes the MIGA and 1FC 76 from its sphere of activity.
The Bank continually challenges the rights of claimants to take a complaint to the Board and
thereby deterring would be complainants, particularly if they have limited resources. The
Inspection Panel only operates in reaction to a complaint, it is not pro-active in its role of
monitoring the Bank. What NGOs want is: 'an open and transparent process, [and] that the
views of NGOs, community groups and other independent experts be solicited and fully taken
into account, that the mandate of the panel be clarified and strengthened, and that the Panel's
independence be guaranteed' (Friends of the Earth, 1996).
Some critics argue, however, that the Inspection Panel is not the credible agent of transparency
and accountability that it was at first believed to be. One reason suggested for this is that
because of the negative finding of the original Inspection Panel (known as the Morse
Commission), the Executive Directors commissioned a Panel which is less independent and less
open than it might at first appear. In the Arun-3 case the role of the Inspection Panel met with a
mixed response from NGOs. In an Oxfam report (1996) it was argued that economic factors
6 The potential for secrecy in the MIGA and IFC is considerable as their funding comes directl y from the private sector. For this
reason it has been suggested by the World Bank that there needs to be two Inspection Panels, one for private sector claims and one
for public sector. The concern is that business confidentiality will overnde the public right to know.
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rather than public opposition that was the deciding factor in the Bank withdrawing from the
Arun-3 Dam Project.
There were other concerns about the terms of reference and independence of the Inspection
Panel For example, although Wolfensohn, the Bank's President, responded to the concerns of
the protest movements, he failed to publish the findings of the Inspection Panel's report.
Confidential copies of the Panel's report reached the public through unofficial channels (Horta,
1997: 145). The Panel can only make recommendations to the Executive Directors and it is
they who will decide if an investigation will be undertaken or not, and it is only then that
documentation on the complaint and the recommendations will be made public (Korta, 1997:
144).
It is suggested that cancelling Arun-3 before a full inspection could be undertaken amounted to
a damage limitation exercise and an embarrassing U-turn by the Bank in what was to have
been one of its most prestigious projects. By cancelling the project Wolfensohn was able to up-
hold the Inspection Panel's initial findings without the need for a full investigation (Horta,
1997: 145). The Inspection Panel might give the appearance of the Bank becoming more
responsive to the concerns of outside groups, however, this responsiveness does not amount to
full public accountability. As the Arun-3 Project shows, the Bank can respond to protests
without necessarily explaining why or giving access to more information, or in other words
being more transparent and accountable.
The World Bank and Productive Secrecy
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter there are those who believe that the World Bank
operates in a purely technical manner, a politically benign institution with nothing to hide.
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Therefore, it could be argued that the concealment of information is the result of poor
institutional practices and procedures rather than a political act (Daly, 1994: 109-1 10).
Conversely others have claimed that something far more sophisticated is happening and that
productive secrecy has helped to turn the Bank in the words of Caufield into the 'Masters of
Illusion' (1996). What this amounts to is the Bank obfuscating the real terms arid purposes and
conditions of lending to enrich private banking, create open markets and promote the interests
of the G-7 (Pettifor, 1998: 54). The Arun-3 Project appears to be no different and had elements
of productive secrecy in its development up to and including its cancellation. The Bank was
preoccupied with instigating a project that fitted its p re-determined development plan of mega
infra-structure projects coupled with internal economic reform and disregarded the negative
social and environmental impact upon the indigenous peoples.
Thus, productive secrecy manifested itself within the World Bank by concealing some aspects
of the Arun-3 project whilst revealing those which are most beneficial to its world view. Critics
of the World Bank argue that SAPs and projects like Arun-3 have hidden costs which the Bank
keeps concealed because it prioritises economic factors over others (Madely, Sullivan and
Woodroffe, 1994: 20). Information is available through the Bank that supports the dam
building project, whereas critical information is suppressed or is not even on the agenda as it
directly conflicts with the Bank's norms.
Conclusion
The cancellation of the Arun Dam Project was seen by many as a great victory, particularly for
those opposed to the project and, more generally, a victory for greater accountability in the
World Bank. The general shift towards increased openness within the Bank can be viewed as a
significant step towards greater accountability, participation, and good governance. Whilst this
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episode does not necessarily mean that there will be increased accountability over future Bank
projects, the creation of the Inspection Panel can be viewed as a positive step towards greater
accountability. The fact that institutional secrecy has been successfully challenged needs to be
tempered against the possibility of continuing productive secrecy; a lack of NGO participation;
and the privatisation of investment in project development.
Although it appears that the World Bank's view of transparency remains ambiguous, there is
evidence to suggest that the Bank not only speaks the discourse of transparency, it practices it
as well in the form of meaningful external transparency and the beginnings of transparency
from below. Whilst the Bank's new information policy, with a presumption towards disclosure,
and the Inspection Panel will not necessarily guarantee accountability, they appear to be steps
in the right direction. Critics however, would claim that the Arun-3 case was a one-off situation
bought about by a desire by the Bank's new President to assert his authority over the
institution, as well as a desire to give the appearance of the Bank as responsive to criticism.
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Chapter Seven
The Conference on Disarmament and the 1995
Non-Proliferation Review and Extension Treaty
The end of the Cold War, has not stopped the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
this remains one of the biggest obstacles to global peace and security (Williams, 1992: 225-6).
The realisation by states of the need to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons has led to
decision-making on security issues becoming increasingly internationalised in forums such as
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) (l-Iowlett, 1997: 340). Compliance and co-operation
require the application of the principle of transparency in an attempt to build confidence and
remove the traditional secrecy that surrounds national security issues and, nuclear weapons in
particular. Transparency has been described as the key to compliance, enhancing legitimacy
and generating trust (Chayes and Cha'es, 1994: 66). As I outlined in the Introduction, this is a
narrow view of transparency, and one which limits itself to explaining successful co-operation
between states (see Mitchell, 1998: 109). My interest remains primarily the way in which the
discourse of transparency can be applied more widely to enhance accountability within
institutions of MGG.
The positive role of transparency for accountability in MGG raises a dilemma for those
institutions in the security sphere. Traditionally the secrecy that surrounds arms control
negotiations has been considered beneficial for resolving differences between participants away
from the gaze of the public. As a consequence it is legitimate to ask to what extent is it
desirable for the political processes to become more transparent if this endangers the
disarmament process. Most would agree that the overriding concern of institutions such as the
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CD is to make the world a safer place. The question then is how can this be best achieved? For
some this would mean that it is the outcome and not the process through which the final
agreement is reached that is most important. From this point of view as long as a new treaty is
agreed, the means by which it is arrived at are a secondary concern. Secrecy can play a positive
function, lubricating the negotiations towards the desired outcome (Gibb, 1995: 214). For
others it is important that the process is open and transparent so that the outcome is not only
legitimate but that it also imposes greater accountability upon the participants. To achieve this
transparency must be more than a technical matter of verification; rather a political aim
encouraging greater access and participation by a wide range of interested paties.
More generally, the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons have been identified as
raising critical issues of accountability in the post-1945 world. The nuclear age has been
charactensed by secrecy, and the build-up of nuclear weapons has been observed to be both
secretive and unaccountable (Shaw, 1997: 33; Bloomfield, 1997). Critics, however, have begun
to challenge this apparent symbiotic relationship between secrecy and nuclear issues by argurng
that the subject is too important to be decided behind closed doors, solely by the representatives
of states and technical, bureaucratic elites (Walker, 1988: 125; Beck, 1997: 78).
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explores the way that secrecy has
been justified in the nuclear security sphere and the case for more openness. I then consider the
origins and development of multilateral global governance in the security domain and the
function of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The third section specifically explores the
1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, considering both the
conference proceedings and the preparatory stages. The final section gives an analysis of the
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CD and the signing of the NPT, looking at the political process and the role of secrecy in the
political process.
States, Security and Accountability
Traditionally multilateral disarmament negotiations have been undertaken in private by state
representatives. In this context the use of functional secrecy is justified because it creates
efficient and effective governance in the shared interests of the international community. By
excluding other non state actors it reflects a state-centred conception of world politics,
reinforcing the principle of absolute sovereignty, and defence of the national interest. It has
been noted that 'since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) the division of the world into clearly
delineated jurisdictions has been widely regarded as the organising principle of politics'
(Camilleri and Falk, 1992: 141). For example, the absolute sovereignty of states is recognised
within the NPT, in Article IV which confirms that 'nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties ...' (UN DPII1654, March 1995). This
statement reinforces the sovereignty of states and the rights of states only, to participate in the
negotiation process of MGG.
This state-centred view of the world has however become increasingly challenged, due to the
forces of globalisation and a more critical perspective on security looks towards states being
part of the problem rather than the solution (Devetak, 1996: 167). Luard believes that security
has been transformed by the internationalisation of the issue and that to make a more stable and
secure society requires greater co-operation between states and not competition (1990: 33).
Luard's approach reflects the neoliberal-institutionalist approach (see Chapter 1) and
participation remains limited to states: transparency is ostensibly an issue between states alone.
Luard acknowledges the limitations of this when he writes: 'discussions of security at present
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are undertaken by national decision-makers.. .they are there to represent their state, or at best
a group of states.. .there is no representation of non-state actors.. .still less of the mass of
humankind as a whole' (1990: 43). An alternative to the state-centred perspective has
developed that suggests that what is required is the enhanced accountability and transparency
of multilateral institutions to stop the subordination of people to military need (Beck, 1997:
78). This would help avoid the situation where negotiating security treaties is dominated by a
few powerful states, excluding weaker states and NGOs (Alley, 1995: 5-6: 36-7).
Although the primacy of the state in security matters persists, the undermining of de facto
sovereignty has been going on for some time, increasing the tension between state interests and
the interests of global societies. In 1977 Keohane and Nyc argued that a system of complex
interdependence has come into existence, characterised by multiple channels of connections
between societies, and an absence of hierarchy amongst issues. This has led to two key
developments: the absolute autonomy of states has been questioned and security issues can now
no longer be conveniently separated from domestic ones. The domestication of security issues
has meant that NGOs have begun to be more visible and vocal on the global security stage,
demanding greater participation in, and access to, the arena in which decision are taken.
Luard has written about the end of national security because he believes that in a globalised
world no state can claim to provide security for the population within its territorial boundaries
(1990: 18). Reflecting this belief, Soligen asserts that there has been too much attention given
to inter-state negotiations when discussing issues of non-proliferation and that more attention
should be paid to subnational and transnational actors (1995: 206). Underpinning this view is
the belief that the security sphere should include a wide range of actors that have traditionally
been excluded to create a new for of multilateralism that provide mechanism for citizen
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participation (1995: 215). Cosmopolitan critics of the state-centred world order reason that
'democratic security policies aim to remodel sovereignty rationally - democratize it - by
nurturing more democratic and more effective world security institutions' (Johansen, 1991:
227).
Nuclear Weapons: the case for secrecy and transparency
As indicated above the use of secrecy in nuclear security is widely accepted as the norm. In no
other area of governance does the utility of secrecy appear so readily accepted. It has been
suggested by Canetti that the whole nuclear era can be characterised by secrecy and that we
find the realm of nuclear weapons secrets are at their most concentrated (1 973ed: 345). This
observation is born out by Stephen Afiergood who, when undertaking an investigation into
secrecy in the United States government commented: 'No one disagrees that certain types of
information such as the design of weapons of mass destruction must be protected from
disclosure' (1992: 81). Thus, secrecy in the nuclear realm is often presented as both inevitable
and necessary.
A positive view of secrecy is reflected by participants involved in sensitive negotiations like the
NPT on the basis that it is both beneficial and rational to have discussions underpinned by
secret diplomacy (Aftergood, 1992: 87; McGrew, 1997b: 255). Another motive for rejecting
transparency is made by Bok who claims 'publicity tempts negotiators to "play to the
galleries"...at the expense of the public good ... and when public exposure is selectively
magnified by the media, biased public responses can damage negotiations long before they have
been completed.' (1985: 725). In arms control negotiations because there is an atmosphere
devoid of trust, agreement could only be made when all parties feel secure in the negotiation
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process. Under these circumstances a legitimate claim for secrecy in the political process as the
most responsible course of action can be made.
However, secrecy can also breed an environment of mistrust and suspicion that may lead to a
more destabilised world in which nuclear weapons proliferate more widely. This is reflected in
the security dilemma: 'the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state
B which therefore takes steps to increase its security leading in its turn to increased insecurity
in state A and so on' (Baylis and Rengger, 1992: 9). Secrecy fuels mistrust and competition
between states which in turn makes the security dilemma more acute. As Bok argues (1982:
192) the more secrecy individual states exercise in military matters the more reason others have
to reciprocate in kind. The rationale for military secrecy is self-preservation and is reflected in
the pure power politics that characterises the state-centred perspective on international relations
(see Chapter 1).
Some commentators have attempted to move beyond this view that the security dilemma is
necessarily a constituent part of world politics by looking beyond state-centred conceptions of
security to one which embraces a more accountable form of security which encompasses a wide
range of participants and meaningful accountability (Walker, 1988: 125-26). On a
philosophical level it encapsulates ideas labelled as 'cosmopolitan morality', which means that
'humanity has rights and duties that transcend state borders' (Wheeler and Booth, 1992: 52).
From this perspective national security policies and the state system remains an impediment to
the prospects for a more open and accountable system of multilateral global governance.
Because secrecy prevails in the security domain, it means that those responsible for decisions
cannot be held accountable for those decisions that profoundly affect people in the world
(Johansen, 1993: 217). Falk describes this as a 'presumed priority on nuclear military policy
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over and against the possible opposition of the citizenry' (1983: 200). When it comes to
nuclear weapons there is a general refusal to accept the idea of public accountability (Falk,
1983: 201).
It is therefore, assumed that security issues transcend the usual practices of accountability
including access to information and wider participation by NGOs in the policy-making process.
Non-participants are asked to trust in the self-preservation of participants and their rationality
(Bok, 1985: 713). It is widely acknowledged that trust is built upon public accountability in an
open and transparent manner. Claims that secrecy is justified miss an essential point about the
consequences of perpetuating an environment of secrecy. It is very hard to ensure secrecy is
simply functional. Institutional secrecy can become embedded and lead to productive secrecy.
This results in increased levels of secrecy
 in society, and reinforces the unaccountable nature of
the relationship between the governors and the governed (Bok, 1985: 717).
I will now return to the issue of whether secrecy can be justified in specific circumstances such
as multilateral arms negotiations. The argument in favour of concealment maintains that
secrecy in multilateral negotiations accomplish the greater 'public good', whereas too much
openness about the proceedings of meetings would compromise the negotiating process.
Alternatively, is it sensible to trust the rationality of negotiators without a full and open means
of accountability. Secrecy in the international context is more often than not justified on a
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis and does not address whether this is morally defensible or the
wider implications. (Bok, 1985: 718).
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Nuclear Weapons and a 'New Security Agenda'
In his 1992 work Risk Society Ulrich Beck maintains that because of the risks posed to society
by technological developments in the modem era, the traditional secrecy which surrounds
military security cannot be justified. Decisions must no longer be left only to scientists,
industry and government, but should include a better-informed public and open participatory
form of governance. What this amounts to is an appeal for a new type of accountability that
transcends the existing institutions of governance and is reflected in the beliefs of cosmopolitan
theorists (see Chapter 1).
The issue of security presents a set of wider concerns reflected in the report by the Commission
on Global Governance. Where it is claimed that 'the concept of global security must be
broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people
and the planet' (Commission of Global Governance, 1995: 338). From this perspective,
security cannot be conceived only with national interests in mind. Instead it needs to be thought
of in terms of 'the security of societies' (Waever, quoted in Shaw, 1997: 45). It is argued that
the state-centred view of security should be replaced with one which has at its core a
democratic conception of security which is open, transparent and participatory (Shaw, 1994:
45; Beck, 1997: 78). Shaw believes that indicative of this need for the increased accountability
is the emergence of new, often transnational, groups and institutions with security concerns
(1997: 45). This view is underpinned by a normative belief- shared by many NGOs - that the
issue of nuclear security is too important to trust to governments and diplomats: 'the most
potent antidote to war is to increase governmental accountability ... Thus an effective
democratic security program intentionally tailors all its policies to implement the principle of
accountability - internationally, nationally and locally' (Johansen, 1991: 226).
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The scope of NGOs in the disarmament process is largely ignored by commentators in the
security field. Lomas believes that NGOs can play a critical part in the evolution of the control
of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by challenging official expertise and fuelling an
informed public debate (1989: 123). The Australian representative to the CD acknowledges the
importance that these organisations play, and their value in keeping a wider set of interests on
the agenda and increase the accountability of participants (Starr, 1995: 74). A global network
of NGOs called 'Abolition 2000' is working towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. They
have called upon states to, amongst other measures, 'create mechanisms to ensure the
participation of citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of nuclear weapons
abolition' (MEDCAT, 1996: 5).
It has been suggested that the motivation for various non-governmental groups involvement in
disarmament negotiations is the use of secrecy by MOG. Many NGOs come into being to try
and open up hitherto secret political processes. Acting in opposition to secrecy, they act as a
counter balance to the overarching power of MGG. However, secrecy can have a negative
impact on these groups feeding what has been described as their 'over dramatic' response to
acts of concealment (Bloomfield, 1997). To overcome these deficiencies in NGOs it has been
suggested that the boundaries of what should and should not remain secret need to be defined
formally and arrived at by broad societal consensus (Bloomfield, 1997).
As discussed in the typology of transparency (see Chapter 3) the extent to which transparency
can become more substantive is bounded by differing ideological positions. Johansen believes
that security policy cannot be excluded from the processes of democratic decision-making and
that secrecy, if allowed to dominate, will lead to conflict (1991: 210). Tickner writes, 'attention
must be paid to democratic transnational social forces which are intensiMng the interplay
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between domestic and international factors...' (1995: 188). A global security is one that moves
beyond looking through a purely international lens, rather it starts from the individual and
moves up, encompassing a wide range of interests (see Walker, 1988; Falk 1991).
Global Security and the Origins of the Conference on
Disarmament
The 1990s have become known as the 'Third Disarmament Decade' (United Nations
Yearbook, 1995b: 162). The increasing optimism for substantive disarmament and non-
proliferation follows a history of failures and difficulties during the twentieth century. Of
particular note are the failure of the League of Nations after the 19 14-18 conflict and the
subsequent limitations of the United Nations (UN) during the period of the Cold War. With the
ending of the Cold War there is a belief that some substantive progress can be made limiting
the proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst hitherto non-nuclear states (Bennett, 1995: 215).
Since the 1970s, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has generally been considered a
success due to the adoption and implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (see
Wilmhurst, 1984: 21). Commentators have noted that stopping 'the proliferation of nuclear
weapons among minor powers is frequently pictured as the leading current issue of global
security' (White, 1995: 91). The importance of the NPT is reflected in the widely held view of
it as 'cornerstone of the worlds non-proliferation regime' (Simpson, Bailey and Howlett, 1996:
321; Muller, 1995: 21). Since the 1990s the NPT has become the key means of controlling
arms proliferation at the multilateral level (Simpson, Howlett and Bailey, 1996: 321).
By 20 March 1995 a total of 175 parties had joined the Treaty (UN DPI/1654, March 1995)
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Getting to the position of relative non-proliferation has not been a straightforward process.
Until the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament, the primary institution of
multilateral arms control was the UN. The weakness of the UN in promoting a more peaceful
world is, for some, reflected in the fact that the United Nations Charter does not contain within
it a specific commitment to arms reduction. Although this might be assumed by its commitment
to international peace and security in Article 11 (Bretherton, 1996: 132). For many the United
Nations represents a flawed means of ensuring global security, not least because historically
political realities have meant that disarmament issues are controlled primarily by the small
group that make up the Security Council. As result of this some critics of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty believe that it has been unsuccessful in its aim of restraining nuclear proliferation
amongst the nuclear weapons states (NWS) (Bennett, 1995: 224). Thus, there is an on-going
debate as to whether the UN is an effective multilateral forum for discussing disarmament
issues. There are increasing demands for international regulation of security issues in the post-
Cold War era, which reflects the globalisation of political issues. However, the UN as an
institution is perceived as inherentl y
 weak, lacking the legitimacy or authority to act effectively
(Mingst and Karns, 1995: 4). The failure to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons
horizontally (see below for elaboration) is, for many, a direct consequence of the international
state system.
Concerns over the proliferation of nuclear weapons have led to a number of multilateral
developments towards its global management. Following the end of World War Two the
Atomic Energy Commission was established: 'The commission was to formulate and submit to
the Security Council plans for eliminating atomic weapons, setting up regulations and
safeguards, and assuring the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only' (Bennett, 1995
ed: 219).
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As indicated, the issue of disarmament was sidelined as Cold War hostilities came to the fore.
Post-1945 there were periodic attempts to get the process of disarmament moving. In 1952, the
Disarmament Commission was formed which included both conventional and nuclear weapons
in its mandate. In 1969, the title was changed to the Conference on the Committee on
Disarmament (CCD), and finally in 1984, to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) (Bennett,
1995: 220). The Conference on Disarmament has now become the primaiy multilateral
negotiating forum for disarmament and non-proliferation.
The Conference on Disarmament and the NPT
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is based in Geneva and draws its membership from
both nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear states 78 . Over the past twenty years its
membership has expanded in an attempt to make it global in both geographical and political
terms. The CD is the only global bod y that can produce legally binding international
disannament agreements (Simpson, Howlett and Bailey, 1996: 326). Although the CD is not an
official United Nations (UN) body, the two are closel y associated. The CD has its own
procedures and agenda, but it takes into account UN resolutions and submits reports to the UN
assembly. In addition, the budget of the CD is included in the UN's budget; the conference
holds its meetings on UN premises; and its administration is undertaken by UN personnel
(Goldblatt, 1994: 8). Thus, in summary, although the CD is autonomous, it is closely
associated with the UN, and can, to a certain extent be copsidered as a part of that institution
" A full list of the 52 member states can be found at http://www.unog.ch/disann/cd.htm
Whilst being closely connected to the General Assembly itself the other UN bodies that have close ties to the CD are the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IEAA) and the United Nations disarmament Commission.
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The centre piece of the CD is the Non-Proliferation Treaty which came into force on the 5
March 197080. The Conference is the official forum at which the NPT is reviewed, and if
necessary amended or extended. The primary aim of the NPT is to stop horizontal proliferation
of nuclear weapons, and its existence represents a major achievement in this direction (Pearson,
1995: 79). The idea underpinning the NPT was to limit membership of the nuclear club in the
short tenn whilst in the long term to both reduce and eliminate some class of nuclear weapons
completely. It has been argued that: '...the conclusion of the NPT served to underline the
responsibilities [my italics], as opposed to the attractions, of the international political power
flowing from the possession of such weapons.' (Lomas, 1989:103).
As the above indicates the function of the NPT places a responsibility upon participants to
pursue a safer world free from the threat of further proliferation. The procedures of the CD
allow for the full participation of its membership which in 1995 stood at 38. In addition, there
are many observer states (who make up the other 179 signatories to the NPT) who have the
right to attend meetings and express their views on particular issues of disarmament (Owen,
1995: 69). The representatives of non-member states may attend plenary meetings, submit
written proposals and, at the invitation of the conference, express their views in both formal
and informal meetings (Goldblatt, 1994: 8). Once agreement has been reached in private, the
plenary meetings of the Conference are normally held in public with agreement, if' possible,
arrived at by consensus; in formal diplomacy this can take the form of either 'consensus with a
resolution' or 'consensus without a resolution' (Kauflnann, 1996: 28-29). It is argued that this
form of quiet diplomacy increases the flexibility of participants and avoids negotiators playing
to a particular audience.
The original NPT was signed on I July 1968 and formerly entered into on 5 March 1970 (Howlett, 1997). There have been five
review conferences one held in 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
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Without consensus and agreements amongst the participants the obligations of international
agreements are more difficult to enforce (Goldblatt, 1994: 9). In terms of neoliberal-
institutionalism, the NPT is premised upon co-operation around an agreed set of norms, rules
and values (see Chapter 1). The NPT is based upon transparency because without knowledge
of the intentions of states, the co-operation on which the NPT is founded cannot work (Van
Ham, 1993: 38). The NPT is a collection of treaties, agreements and voluntary guidelines, that
work towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Where agreement cannot be reached
voting plays a role and this will be examined further below in relation to the 1995 NPT
Conference.
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference
The Conference on Disarmament met for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty at the UN, in New York, from 17 March to 12 May 1995. The need
for the successful re-negotiation of an extension to the NPT was given added symbolism
coming as it did 50 years after the anniversary of the nuclear attack by the United States upon
Japan. The main objective of the Conference was to review the implementation of the Treaty's
provisions and to decide its period of extension. The original Treaty stipulated that after twenty
five years members should meet to decide upon a period of extension. A Review Conference
has been held every five years since the Conference's inception in 1970. The NPT is not
indefinite and so the 1995 conference was given heightened significance as one of its purposes
was to decide the period of its extension and renewal.
At the 1995 Conference there were primarily three choices that participants had to decide upon.
The choices being between, extending the treaty for a specific time period; continuing it
indefinitely; or letting it expire (Van Ham, 1993: 17). Pressure to complete the signing and
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extension and renewal of the Treaty was compounded by the knowledge that if it expired the
negotiation of a new treaty might be a complex and long drawn out affair. The fact that the
original Treaty took nineteen years to broker meant that each participant had a substantial
responsibility to extend the treaty (Graham, 1994: 90).
On the face of it, the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT was a
success with the Treaty extended indefinitely, and its extension welcomed by the UN General
Assembly (see Resolutidn 50/70 C). It was decided to extend the treaty indefinitely with review
conferences every five years to accommodate changing circumstances. The popular perception
of the 1995 NPT was that its success was based upon the Treaty gaining universal acceptance
amongst the participants. Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka (the 1995 Conference President)
claimed that the successful conclusions of the conference 'usher[s} in an era of stringent
accountability by the NPT states' (quoted in BASIC, 1996: 1). Despite the claims, the
undercurrent of discontent that pervaded the Conference was revealed in the failure of the
participants to agree on a final statement. Whilst the outcome might be considered positive,
however, the manner in which it was achieved needs to be examined further in light of the
earlier discussion on transparency and accountability.
The 1995 NPT Preparatory Committee
Prior to the Conference proper, representatives meet regularly at lower levels in preparatory
sessions. The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) plays an integral part in laying the
foundations for the Conference on Disarmament. The aim of these meetings is to pave the way
towards a successful outcome before the participants meet and the conference commences. The
hope is that the conference proper can then deliver on its stated aims, reinforced by the
authority of a consensus amongst the participants with disagreements kept to a minimum.
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The NPT PrepCom for the 1995 Conference took place between 23 and 27 January 1995. One
particular issue under discussion was the decision-making procedure that would be adopted at
the conference. Differences existed between supporters of consensual decision-making and
those of majority voting based upon a secret ballot (discussed in more detail below). Prior to
the commencement of the Conference, the aim of the nuclear states was to persuade the non-
nuclear states of the merits of agreeing upon an indefinite and unconditional extension of the
Treaty. It has been noted: '...the highly charged political nature of the Conference was
calibrated at an early stage. [The renewal of the NPTI was clearly established as a high-
priority objective of the Western and Eastern European groups...' (Dhanapala, 1995:2).
Non-governmental groups who also attended the PrepCom had different ambitions. These
NGOs and their representatives whilst not invited to participate (compare with the G-7
preparatory stage, see Chapter 5) attempted to lobby the participants and to make
recommendations to the delegates which they hoped would then be adopted. This included a
possible participatory role for NGOs in the NPT review process. This it was argued would
enhance the legitimacy and transparency of the review processes. In an interview Janet
Bloomfield, an NGO representative who attended the 1995 PrepCom, maintained that the
NGOs were there on sufferance and that all they could expect from the PrepCom was 'crumbs
from the table' (1997). At the PrepCom therefore, whilst NGOs maintained a high profile
outside the meetings they were not allowed inside to even view proceedings. The level of
participation was restricted to presenting statements of their aims and objectives to the media
and any state representative who would listen.
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Conference Proceedings and Political Manoeuvring
In the introduction to this Chapter 1 suggested that a key area to consider is the distinction
between the Conference outcome, and the process by which it is arrived at, and the implications
for accountability. As already indicated, the preferred outcome for the Conference was a
decision to renew and extend the NPT based upon a consensus without having to resort to a
vote among participants. Recognition of the importance of consensus was highlighted by the
Conference President Jayatha Dhanapala who stated that, 'the public display of a division in
the ranks of the NPT parties on the extension issue could have serious repercussions for
international security' (1995: 5). Of interest here is the recognition that public dispute might
put the outcome in jeopardy, and ultimately undermine global security. Even though a majority
vote would suffice, it would lack the moral authority of a decision reached by unanimous
agreement.
The difficulty of arriving at a consensus is compounded by the realisation that in the post-Cold
War era negotiations are no longer divided along ideological lines, and now rather than two
dominant views, there may be a diversity of opinions being expressed. This problem is
compounded by the composition of the NPT still based upon Cold War structures, resulting in
the need to create agreement betveen those groups who had previously been allied but who no
longer share the same ideological commitment81 . Secondly, there is a discrepancy between
those states which are the nuclear powers and the others. This discrepancy is well illustrated in
the debate over whether a secret vote should or should not take place. The nuclear weapons
states wish to avoid a secret ballot whilst the less powerful states favour it. Therefore, if
agreement by consensus cannot be reached and it goes to a secret vote then it may not become
'I The participants were grouped into four: the Group of Western States and Others; former Eastern European and Soviet countries;
the non-aligned Movement and finally China by itself.
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known which states are responsible for opposing a particular proposal (Dembinski, 1995: 53-
54). The implications of a secret vote at the 1995 Conference on Disarmament are discussed in
more detail in the next section.
An argument for more transparency in the NPT process is made by those who want to see
'transparency of attitude' (Ayewah quoted in United Nations, 1994: 120). This attitude referred
to the actions of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) towards non-nuclear states. Critics from
the non-nuclear states argue that the NWS do not make their intentions clear and that whilst the
NWS commit themselves to the discourse of transparency, in reality what is hidden is their real
attitude towards their nuclear capability and position on proliferation.
This view was reflected from the outset of the 1995 NPT with the United States government
advocating an unconditional, indefinite renewal of the Treaty. To achieve this they needed to
overcome the objections of about twenty developing nations who viewed the Treaty as
discriminating against them. The Conference on Disarmament, like many other multilateral
institutions is often perceived as an organisation dominated by a few states. The dominant
states being those that already have nuclear weapons. Their primary motivation in renewing the
NPT is to stop non-nuclear states obtaining nuclear weapons, thereby maintaining their
dominant position. There continues to be an on-going dispute between the majority of countries
and some non-nuclear states which view the Treaty as essentially favouring those that are
already nuclear powers.
Representatives at the Conference had a responsibility to ensure that the nuclear disarmament
process should be speeded up, with its scope deepened and widened (Ghose, 1996: 2). The
Indian representative observed that this process of deepening and widening requires greater
openness in the official committee of the Conference on Disarmament rather than an 'esoteric
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club of vested interests' (Ghose, 1996: 2). Greater openness amongst participants (internal
transparency) would facilitate the process of renewal. For example, the decision-making
procedures at the PrepCom for the NPT have been criticised by the Mexican Ambassador who
claimed that 'they [the NWS] want us to discuss the questions of procedures behind closed
doors and to take decisions by consensus' (BASIC, 1995a: 3); the implication being that
disputes remain concealed without the ability to resort to voting against the Treaty to register
opposition.
The terms of reference of the Main Committees (MC) at the NPT were to debate the contents
of the Treaty and this is where, it is said, the in-detail reviews took place (Kelle, 1995: 43).
Conversely the political manoeuvrings in the week leading up to the agreement of the NPT have
been described as 'committee discussions, corridor manoeuvring, hotel room bilateral exchange
and back and forth cable traffic' (Dunn, 1995: 6). This description highlights very well the
degree to which secrecy and restricted access acts as a lubricant to the negotiation process.
The accountability of the main committee was to be provided for in two ways. Firstly, any state
party could attend and participate in the Conference discussions and look at the working group
documentation. Secondly, the reports produced were then subject to approval by the
Conference committees. Other groupings relied upon President Dhanapala to ensure
accountability, which he did through the composition of committees to include a range of views
(Leigh-Phippard, 1997: 174). International diplomacy, however, can take different forms and
the CD is a part of what has been described as parliamentary or conference style of diplomacy.
Conference diplomacy has four main features: open, public debate; voting as a means to
terminate a debate; agreed rules and practices, and finally an agenda with scope beyond the
specifics under question (Kaulinann, 1996: 67; Bailey and Daws, 1995ed). This type of
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diplomacy has been differentiated from traditional diplomacy which is usually conducted in
private session. Critics, however, have noted that conference diplomacy rarely fulfils the degree
of openness that the ideal would suggest, rather it is replaced with what has been called 'quiet
diplomacy' (Kaufinann, 1996: 68). Quiet diplomacy whilst crucial for building up the
momentum for agreement and avoiding derailment did nothing to enhance the overall openness
of the NPT beyond a narrow internal measure of transparency (Dunn, 1995: 5). This is
evidenced by the lack of information about political proceedings that emerged and the exclusion
of interested parties other than states.
As noted above a key objective of the 1995 meeting of the CD was to ensure that a final
declaration was produced by a consensus. Without this, the Conference would be considered by
the majority of the participants to have failed in its aims of securing the moral authority of the
NPT82 . One strategy adopted to ensure this successful outcome was the use of group co-
ordinators who were encouraged to report on proceedings to separate representative bodies to
ensure 'transparency and accountability' in proceedings (Dhanapala, 1995: 9). This
transparency was assisted by weekly press conferences held by the Conference President and
thus there were elements to be found of internal and external transparency at the NPT.
As might be expected the associated press releases placed a positive gloss upon the
negotiations. For example, it was reported that the NPT has more signatories to it than any
other arms limitation and disarmament agreements (United Nations, 1 995b). This type of
benign information can be contrasted with the way in which other more sensitive information
was concealed from the public. One of the concerns of the Conference organisers was that the
delicate negotiations should not bejeopardised through the public knowledge of differences. By
As it happens the Conference did fail to produce a final declaration for the review aspect of the meeting. Primarily this was because
priority was focused upon the extension issue.
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keeping these differences concealed it was hoped an eventual consensus could be arrived at
amongst the participants.
Dhanapala asserted that the successful completion of the 1995 NPT would make the Treaty
participants accountable to the objectives of the Treaty (1996: xi). Conversely, critics argue
that the limitations of the NPT were primarily due to nuclear weapons states failing to
implement the terms of the agreement effectively by failing to halt the modernisation of their
nuclear weapons systems (van Ham, 1993: 18). There are two criticisms that can be levelled at
the CD negotiating process. Firstly, the purpose of the conference is to provide a framework of
co-operation among states in order to achieve a specific set of policy goals (Van Ham, 1993:
33). As a consequence the issue of accountability is a secondary concern, with the outcome
being more important than the process by which an agreement is arrived upon. Secondly, the
NPT allows for any signatory to the Treaty to withdraw at three months notice if the interests
of the country are threatened (Van Ham, 1993: 37). This has the effect of institutionalising
within the NPT a form of non-accountability to the wider world justified by the principle of
state sovereignty.
The NPT and the Secret Ballot
A lack of transparency in sensitive negotiations can cause a more desirable outcome than
would be achieved by greater transparency. Equally, secrecy can become a strategy adopted by
those who wish to hide their intentions to protect themselves from the pressure of other
participants in the negotiation process. Secrecy in this context as a means of protection takes
the shape of a secret ballot. Critics of the secret ballot claim that its use is a denial of
responsibility as participants actions are kept concealed. The secret ballot is an integral part of
221
procedural democratic practice (see Chapter 2), although full accountability is compromised by
the ability to keep behaviour secret.
In the procedures of the 1995 NPT there was a distinction made between the Review and
Extension components of the negotiations. As noted in the previous section under the rules of
the treaty the review was undertaken by consensus, whilst the decision to extend the treat, or
not, requires a majority decision (Kaufmann, 1996: 31). Although it is generally regarded as
desirable to achieve agreement through consensus, if this cannot be done then a secret ballot is
held. The non-aligned countries meeting before the NPT conference decided to instruct their
representatives to the NPT Review and Extension Committee to support rule 28(f) to the effect
that all proposals be voted upon simultaneously by secret ballot.
This is significant not least because there exists in multilateral disarmament negotiations a long
tradition of decision-making by consensus (Kaufman, 1996: 31). The nuclear weapons states
wanted a simple majority to be all that was necessary to renew and extend the Treaty. This was
because they anticipated resistance from some of the non-aligned states (NAS) who wanted
either a secret vote or agreement by consensus. This would allow the NAS either to vote
against the extension, or in open debate make their feelings known on what they perceive to be
the inequality of the NPT, which favours the NWS. Although a simple majority would suffice
in formal terms, it would mean that the NPT would not have the authority that would come
from agreement by universal consensus.
The contested nature of secrecy is writ large in the dispute over the decision-making procedures
at the 1995 Conference on Disarmament. The NWS favoured a final decision by consensus,
however as the Conference progressed this looked unlikely. Because of this, the next favoured
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strategy by the NWS was a vote. The US representative, Al Gore criticised those countries that
wanted to hold a secret ballot on the future of the NPT when he asserted 'nations who call for
accountability must accept the burden of accountability' (Financial Times, 20-4-95: 6). The
implication is that concealment of a secret ballot, undermines the argument of the non-nuclear
states by making them appear to want to avoid their own accountability in the NPT process.
Conversely too much transparency in the secret ballot would have left the NAS vulnerable to
pressure from the NWS (MUller, 1995: 22). Thus, whilst the focus of the Conference was upon
the outcome this does not mean that the importance of the political processes that lead to them
can be ignored.
The issue of full and open accountability had to be balanced against the concerns of the NAS,
many of whom had come under intense pressure from the NWS to agree to the renewal and
extension of the NPT before the conference had even started. Because of what many considered
to be unnecessary pressure, there was a refusal by some in the NAS to be subject to increased
external influence through open voting (Flowlett, Leigh-Phippard and Simpson, 1996: 15). A
tension existed between calls for a secret ballot and demands for increased accountability
amongst participants. Whilst the non-aligned states remained in favour, the NWS opposed this
on the grounds that a vote would undermine the legitimacy of the outcome (Dunn, 1995: 6).
In response to the issue of secret or open voting, a report by the British and American Security
Information Council (BASIC) states that the issues are different from the usual justifications
for secret ballots (see Chapter 2): '...the situation is of course different when representatives
vote on behalf of their countries on an international treaty like the NPT. Open voting is the
norm in the UN, and a secret ballot for the NPT would have created an unhealthy precedent.'
(BASIC, 1995b: 10). Despite the conflict over the open or secret procedures in the voting
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process, the final agreement of the NPT was adopted without a vote with delegates from 178
countries signing up to an agreement to renew indefinitely the non-proliferation treaty. This
included a commitment by the NWS to a program of nuclear disarmament. This declaration
would provide a source of accountability by which the NWS could be assessed (Alley, 1996:
2).
Access to In formation and NGO Participation
It has been acknowledged that NGOs have played a critical part in publicising how the NPT
contributes to global security (Dunn, 1995: 5). It is argued therefore, that the role of non-state
actors in the process leading to the successful renewal of the NPT requires consideration
(Alley, 1995: 15). Increased access to information would enhance the legitimacy of the NPT
and make it more difficult for countries to default on the Treaty conditions. However, in reality
at the 1995 NPT access to NGOs was limited by the concealment of information (Alley, 1997:
16). Whereas the application of transparency from below would ensure the participation of
citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of nuclear weapons abolition
(Abolition Caucus, 1995).
Under the provisions of the NPT there is no obligation by states to provide more access to
information or wider participation by non-state actors. In 1992 transparency was defined by
the United Nations as being the systematic provision of information under formal or informal
international arrangements' (United Nations, 1992: 75). In a sense the CD fulfilled this with
levels of external transparency. The NPT had a wide range of official documentation available
in the public domain, including terms of reference and organisation of work83 , summary
See for example, NPT/CONF. 1995 1.
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records of the meetings, verbatim records of meetings 85 , background papers 86 , and
provisional list of participants87.
The CD remains an explicitly multilateral organisation formed and sustained by its members
thus reflecting the existing state system. This traditional state-centred model has been
challenged by NGOs which have been accorded observer status (Mingst and Karns, 1995: 37).
Most specialised UN agencies make provision for limited NGO participation, and this includes
the CD. For example, before the NPT 1995 the NGO Committee on Disarmament (which
includes more than 200 NGOs) made a declaration urging governments to take action to ensure
the success of the NPT (United Nations, 1994).
Access and participation by NGOs and individuals, other than government delegations was
limited. Despite this, at the 1995 NPT there was evidence of more openness by some
delegations than others. For example, the Mexican and Malaysian delegations invited NGO
representatives to come and talk to them so that both groups could give mutual support to their
respective disarmament campaigns (Bloomfield, 1997). Here the move towards enhancing
transparency can be interpreted as a political strategy undertaken by governments to get their
point of view disseminating to a wider audience as well as acting to embarrass the more
powerful nuclear weapons states through their own domestic audiences.
Alley looks at the role of NGOs in the NPT and claims that they contributed to the treaty
renewal. He claims that the role of NGOs in this context is to 'alter priorities about nuclear
weaponry [and] go beyond most state-centred investigations of nuclear proliferation (1995: 15).
See for example, NPT/CONF. 19951MC.I/SR. 1.
" See for example, NPT/CONF.19951PV.18.
S6 See for example, NPT/CONF. 1995/2.
"See lbc example, NPT/CONF. 1995/Misc. 1.
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One person who did gain access was NGO activist Rebecca Johnson (see ACRONYM reports,
1995) who was allowed to view the proceedings although she was tied by Chatham House rules
regarding confidentiality. However, it was reported by Johnson (1995) that once the doors of
the committees were closed for drafting, the main source of information was 'the corridors and
coffee lounges'. As the Conference progressed Johnson found access to delegates and
proceedings became more difficult (20-4-95). In reaction to Al Gore's pronouncements about
increasing the accountability on the NPT process, Johnson maintains that this should be
extended into other areas and include access to information about the debates leading up to the
decisions (20-4-95).
It has been said that some NGOs that participate have been co-opted by the national
delegations. For example, the Office of Disarmament Affairs at the UN has been criticised for
representing governments more than NGOs (Bloomfield, 1997). Similarly, an NGO from the
United States called the Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been accused of being
co-opted into representing the United States government position (Bloomfield, 1997). This
raises the possibility of a 'double-movemcnt towards more accountable institutions of MGG.
The first movement is the discourse of accountability adopted by MGG, and the second
movement is the inclusion of NGOs 88 . However, problems arise when, NGOs become co-opted
by the institutions of MGG. The inclusion of NGOs gives the appearance of greater
accountability through greater access by non-state actors, whereas in reality these groups are
constrained by the interests of the most powerful states. Thus, the discourse of transparency
and the inclusion of NGOs can be interpreted as a 'double movement' towards accountability.
It represents the possibility of greater transparency through NGO access to information and
David Held wites about double democroti:ation which is about the independent transformation of both state and civil society
(1996:316).
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participation. Alternatively, the co-option of NGOs is one means of constraining critical voices
by integrating them into the political process.
Conclusion
The successful outcome of the 1995 NPT has been presented as a significant contribution
towards the building of a world secure from the threat of nuclear proliferation 89 . The signing of
the NPT produced a commitment to the goal of a nuclear free world. In view of this, it is
legitimate to ask whether we should be concerned about how that agreement was reached and
whether or not the process was transparent. It can be argued that its success was linked directly
to a lack of transparency (other than internal transparency, although even this was limited at
times). In fact, secrecy can be considered the necessary lubricant to diplomatic negotiations
that ensured its success. Furthermore, because there was no secrecy over the fact that
negotiations were under way, or about the parties involved, and the terms of the NPT extension
and renewal, it can be claimed that secrecy was a minimal concern.
Other factors contributed towards the levels of secrecy at the CD, including the desire for a
secret ballot, and the state-centred view of nuclear issues. However, NGOs and other interested
non-state parties believe that decisions about the security of the whole world should not be kept
concealed or dominated by the most powerful actors, reflecting state interests over more global
concerns. A more critical idea of security recognises the need for a plurality of participants to
increase the capacity for good governance. In this way it can be argued we can avoid the worse
consequences of living in a world threatened by nuclear risks (Coote, 1988). This would
require greater access to the decision-making process to ensure that the functional secrecy
'9 The recent conflict between India and Pakistan makes this an even more pressing concern.
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necessary for effective decision-making does not contribute to normalising an environment of
institutional secrecy and thereby increase the potential for productive secrecy.
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Conclusion
This thesis has addressed the issue of accountability in MGG. In Chapter 11 assert that
globalisation has enhanced the regulatory authority of MOG and that this has led to questions
about the extent to which these institutions can be held publicly accountable. Underpinning the
discussion are the concepts of transparency and secrecy, and a paradox: on one hand there
exists a discourse of transparency which promises to deliver increased accountability, but on
the other, secrecy remains a dominant feature of MGG. To explain the implications of this for
accountability I return to the three questions posed in the Introduction to see what conclusions
can be drawn from the research as a whole.
The Key Questions Revisited
How have different assessments and theories of globalisation
in formed the discussion of accountability in MGG?
To the first question concerning the way in which the literature on globalisation and
multilateral global governance has failed to engage fully with the complex issues of achieving
more openness and accountability in institutions of MGG. In Chapter 1 I outlined how the
processes of globalisation have created the conditions for the growth in authority and
regulatory power of MGG. As a consequence the ability to hold these institutions publicly
accountable is a significant concern. The rationale of the end of the state thesis implies that
accountability is undermined as states give up autonomy to autonomous market mechanisms
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and multilateral forms of global governance (Held, 1995; Strange, 1995). Accountability is
further weakened as governance mechanisms move further from locations of popular
accountability. Furthermore, the logic of the market de-politicising the political process and
undermines the idea of accountability in MGG. This view of a defective state is challenged by
those who believe that the myths surrounding globalisation act to reinforce a particular
ideological position and enable governments to hide from the negative effects of globalisation
(Cox, 1994, 1996a; Gills, 1992, 1995).
The evidence from the all the case studies, to differing degrees, supports the claim made in
Chapter 1 that the regulatory power and authority of MGG has grown and that states have had
to cede some of their authority to this institution (Drucker, 1993: 142; Williams, 1996: 115:
118; Held, 1993, 1995). This is illustrated firstly, by the ineffectiveness of isolated state action
in global affairs, for example the ability of the Mexican government to protect the peso, the G-
i's management of the global economy, and the need for co-operation in the extension and
renewal of the NPT. Secondly, common to all the institutions examined in the case studies is a
belief that globalisation is irreversible and that the function of MGG is to manage the process
as effectively as possible. Evidence can be found for this in the G-7 communiqué, the World
Bank and the Arun-3 Dam Project, the IMF's response to the Mexican Peso Crisis and the
desire to renew the NPT. Thirdly, in the IMF, World Bank and G-7 cases there is evidence of
the continuing dominance of market ideology with a corresponding de-politicising of economic
activity promoted by institutions of MGG. Fourthly, in three of the four case studies the
governance mechanisms are kept distant from locations of popular accountability by excluding
wider participation and openness. These findings support the claim I make in the Introduction
and Chapter 1, that the issue of accountabilit y needs to be placed at the centre of any analysis
of multilateral global governance to present it with a clear focus.
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In Chapter 11 surveyed four theories of global politics to see how each theoretical perspective
assessed the prospects for accountability in MUG under conditions of globalisation. From a
state-centred perspective the key factor limiting the idea of accountability in MUG is the
continuing primacy of the state. During the Mexican Peso Crisis the JMF proved to be a
powerful regulatory body underpinned by the authority of the United States. The Fund's
intervention to stop the financial crisis, and its ability to create confidence in the markets
suggests that global forces can be managed effectively. This supports Paul Hirst's assertion
that the ungovernability of markets is exaggerated and that state constituted institutions can be
effective (1997: 211). The CD and the renewal and extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) case study can be interpreted as the continuation of traditional power politics amongst
states, with the most powerful states using the mechanism of MUG to advance their agenda.
The world order remains dominated by states, and state interests make the possibility of wider
public accountability more difficult. In all four cases the institutions of MGG act to undermine
greater accountability by justi1'ing limits to transparency and denying access to information on
the basis that it would undermine the relationship between the institutions of MUG and its
members. The IMF, G-7 and Conference on Disarmament, reinforce the belief that
accountability in MUG is a concern only in as far as it refers to the internal procedures
between state participants.
The neoliberal-institutionalist perspective remains largely unconcerned about the issue of
public accountability in institutions of MGG. This is primarily due to belief in the primacy of
market mechanisms, the positive benign role of MUG and the view of accountability as a
technical as opposed to an ideological or political problem (Hurrell and Woods, 1995: 453-4).
For example, from this perspective IMF secrecy can be defended on the basis of market interest
and confidentiality (see Chapters 1 and 4). According to neoliberal-institutionalism the market
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is apolitical, and if market stability requires that the IMF acts in secrecy, then it does so not for
political or ideological reasons, but in the interests of a stable global market. From this
neoliberal-institutionalist perspective, the idea of transparency is applied primarily to the
information the markets require in order to avert a crisis and to ensure co-operation between a
multiplicity of actors. The issue of wider public accountability remains largely secondary for
neoliberal-institutionalism, with market efficiency and regulation given greater attention. In the
case of the IMF, the G-7 and the CD, the priority from the neoliberal-institutionalist
perspective is on reaching agreement and generating a successful policy outcome. This aim is
more valued than wider accountability, transparency from below or questioning the ideological
neutrality of economic process and institutions of MGG.
From the radical perspective the peso crisis highlights the unaccountable nature of the IMF and
the political implications of globalisation. The market is not apolitical and for this reason it is
vital that the Fund's policies and deliberation processes are open to public scrutiny. What is
more important is that the capitalist structures that underpin the global economy be brought to
account by civil society. It is questionable whether increased transparency could achieve this,
not least because it is an ineffective means to challenge global market forces. The peso crisis,
provides a good illustration of the reordering of global authority and the way in which
responsibility for public policy has ceded away from the national level to MGG. It is argued by
radicals that this reordering has resulted in the reconstitution of the state 'so that it behaves in a
market-friendly and business orientated manner' (Gill, 1997a; 14).
According to the radical approach, the secretive manner of the 0-7 reflects its central role in
the restructuring of world order. This perspective also views with pessimism the success of
social movements in holding the World Bank to account for its policies. In the case of the
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Arun-3 Dam Project the success of the counter hegemonic movement was not due to a
reconfiguration of structural forces; rather this case was a one-off with the Bank's President
Wolfensohn wanting to present himself as open to suggestions and flexible in his new job. It
also allowed him to stamp his authority on his new position by challenging the old order. Thus
the radical position remains pessimistic about the possibility for more accountability in MOG.
In advocating cosmopolitan democracy David Held does present the possibility for more
accountable institutions of MOG. The optimism of Held provides a counter balance to the
pessimism of the radicals approach and the lack of concern of neoliberal-institutionalism.
Whilst the evidence in the four cases does suggest that the cosmopolitan position has a long
way to go, there is evidence to suggest that it may be possible. For example, in the case of the
0-7, the Canadian government included a wider range of interested parties in the pre-summit
discussions on policy. This principle could be extended to all G-7 governments and include
more extended dialogue between groups, NGOs and state representatives.
The Arun-3 Dam Project offers an example of an institution of MGG responding positively to
the collective and individual opposition to one of its projects. The role of the Inspection Panel
gives recognition to a shift in the traditional relations between the World Bank, its members
and the public. The success of opponents of Arun-3 challenged the view that the World Bank
cannot be held directly accountable for its projects. In doing so they also challenged the moral
authority of the Bank to impose its world view on societies. This example gives the
cosmopolitan argument some substance; with the right of indigenous groups to challenge the
World Bank's policies through the Inspection Panel, thereby acknowledging the autonomy of
groups and individuals in society. Furthermore, it suggests that the process of MOO is more
than just a matter of intergovernmental or interstate co-operation (Holton, 1998: 78). In all four
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cases there is a case to be made to support the normative aspiration of the principles of
cosmopolitan democracy. For example, a rights-based agenda in MGQ might include a right of
access based upon the principle of an individual's right to know about the activities of MOO.
From this perspective information would only be withheld where it could be proved that
revelation would damage the public interest. Of course policing such an exemption would be
difficult. The answer might be the creation of more independent inspection panels reflecting the
World Bank model.
In the Introduction I articulated a distinction between multilateral and global governance. I
argued that by integrating the two ideas it suggests a normative framework for more
accountable institutions. From the radical and state-centred positions the prospects for this
appear to remain pessimistic. The case studies suggest that transformation from a limited and
exclusive form of MGG into a more inclusive and open global governance is still a distant
proposition. Neoliberal-institutionalism whilst more open to the idea of accountability in MOO,
limits its usefulness by its narrow focus on co-operation between states, the maintenance of
international agreements and its uncritical acceptance of market mechanisms. The limits of
these three perspectives should however (and I agree with McGrew here) not stop us thinking
about what a more open and accountable form of governance should be like (1997b: 241). The
possibility remains within the cosmopolitan perspective for the reconceptualisation of a global
society that includes a wide range of actors and more accountable institutions of MOO,
including more openness, resulting in a more complex idea of multilateralism (Shaw, 1994;
O'Brien, 1997).
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Does the discourse and practice of transparency enhance or
undermine accountability in institutions of global governance?
The second question posed was about the extent to which the discourse of transparency is more
than just a rhetorical device designed to placate the critics of institutions of MGG. The key
issue is whether the discourse amounts to more than grand words, or whether it is, or can be,
something more substantive. In the examples cited, the World Bank appeared to move beyond
rhetoric, whilst the IMF, which seemed to be willing to talk of the need for transparency,
remained closed and secretive. The 0-7 Halifax Summit and the CD present a set of less clear-
cut conclusions. Although both cases allowed for some limited transparency during the initial
stages, they still remained largely exclusive and closed to external access and participation.
An important consideration is whether the discourse of transparency has been utilised by
governing institutions as a useful device to legitimise their activities. By adopting the discourse
of transparency and giving the appearance of openness, a picture is painted of a more open,
accountable form of MGG that can be trusted to act in the interests of all. The discourse of
transparency promises more openness, however, the reality is that much of the information
released is either superficial at best and at worst non-existent (Lasch, 1995: 170). For example,
in all but the World Bank case, the institutions appear opposed to providing ready access to
information about the activities of internal committees and groups.
In Chapter 3 1 suggest that one way to explore the relationship between MOO and wider
society is to see to what the extent these institutions adopt the principles of good governance.
The argument follows the logic that if the institutions of MOO want their procedures to be
considered as good governance, then it requires them to act in an open and transparent manner.
The case studies support the assertion in Chapter 3 that institutions of MOO although
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advocating the principles of good governance are reluctant to apply them to themselves. Thus I
conclude that the case studies illustrate examples of the failure of institutions of MUG to
comply to the principle of good governance.
In the case of the G-7 Halifax Summit, the Canadian Government proved to be something of an
exception to the other participants, allowing transparency and participation in the policy-
making process, albeit on a limited basis. The Conference on Disarmament, like the G-7
Conference, exhibited a limited type of transparency by allowing a degree of openness at the
beginning of proceedings. The World Bank, by setting up the Inspection Panel, attempted to
introduce the principles of good governance but fell short of the expectations raised by the
discourse of transparency from below. During the Conference on Disarmament there were
limits placed on transparency, participation and accountability. This can be justified by the
need for the traditional secrecy associated with arms negotiations and reinforced by the
continuing primacy of state actors. Participation was limited and transparency diminished as
negotiations progressed, resulting in limited access to conference proceedings.
Considering the evidence here, the idea of good governance delivering greater accountability in
institutions of MUG is constrained by ideological factors. It is essentially premised upon a
neoliberal-institutionalist view of the world in which world markets are essentially benign and
the function of MGG is to help them work more effectively. The primacy given to economic
markets over the political content of good governance leaves the concept flawed as a means of
increasing accountability. For this to change, good governance would need to be
reconceptualised by putting society before economics, and wider public accountability before
the interests of markets.
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Critics of too much transparency in institutions of MGG claim it may generate negative
outcomes for accountability. Firstly, that by becoming more transparent the institutions of
MGG may in effect be externalising accountability to the institutions of MGG when it should
be the member states who are accountable and not the institutions themselves (Woodward,
1993: 6; Stevens and Gnanaselvam, 1995: 104). Secondly, too much transparency may result
in some member states concealing information if they believe its disclosure will harm their
domestic situation, and as a result there is a reluctance to apply these principles in practice.
However, this avoids the fact that restricting information insulates MGG from public pressure.
This becomes of even greater significance when the domestic reforms advocated by MCIG risk
being overturned by public pressure (Hildyard and Wilks, 1998: 51). From this perspective
better governance would follow from increased transparency because it would be perceived as
accountable, legitimate and as a consequence more effective.
In Chapter 3 I identified four types of transparency. Of these, internal transparency was found
to be of limited value for generating increased accountability. During the peso crisis there was
evidence of a lack of internal transparency which helped the IMF push through its largest loan
to date. By contrast, the success of the G-7 Halifax Summit was due to high internal
transparency which allowed participants to talk freely in the knowledge that their discussions
would remain confidential. In the Conference on Disarmament, the evidence is mixed, although
it would appear that the success of the CD was based upon encouraging internal transparency
whilst keeping strict limits on other forms of transparency. Furthermore, the discourse of
transparency was applied to put pressure on the non-aligned states to agree to a secret ballot.
The case against a secret ballot was fought in the name of increasing accountability.
Conversely, this call for greater transparency and accountability could be interpreted as a
device that suited the interests of the nuclear weapons states. It is difficult for less powerful
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actors to reject the idea of transparency and accountability as it would appear that they were
also rejecting the principles of good governance. The notion of good governance creates a sense
of self-evident legitimacy that makes the idea difficult to challenge.
Of the different types of transparency, external transparency has become the most widely used
within multilateral institutions. Its quantity and quality were found to vary between the
institutions and ranged from poor in the case of the IMF, to good in the World Bank with its
policy on disclosure. At the G-7 Summit in Halifax external transparency was exhibited in the
media briefing supplied to the press and the Summit Communiqué. Similarly at the CD, press
conferences were held to report upon the main developments of the negotiations. However, the
scope and quality of information released was mixed. In the case of the G-7 and the CD,
information was released after decisions had been reached. In the case of the World Bank it
was once the project details had been finalised; whilst in the case of the IMF much relevant
information has still not been released.
Top-down transparency vas found to be important as a source of discipline on domestic
markets and as a means of surveillance by MGG. The use of top-down transparency is widely
used by multilateral institutions as a means of ensuring the compliance of member states in
maintaining market friendly policies, and in the security sphere for constraining arms
proliferation. It conveys a degree of accountability, but in one direction only, and benefits the
most powerful states. In this sense MOO acts to 'polic[e] a new regime of market access,
economic and geopolitics' (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 165).
Transparency from below was found only in a limited form during the Arun-3 Dam Project. It
is an example of direct participation between individuals, groups and the World Bank.
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However, optimism for it must be qualified, as the evidence showed that the terms of
engagement were dictated by the World Bank, and that the inspection Panel remained closely
associated with the interests of the Bank. In the other three cases participation was either
limited or non-existent. Despite the energy and commitment of the NGOs at the G-7 Summit in
Halifax and the Conference on Disarmament they remained excluded from political process.
I conclude from the cases that without the political will to implement it a broad, undefined
discourse on transparency (due to its diverse application and interpretation) has limits as a
concept for increasing accountability. In principle transparency provides the means for
increased accountability. However, in practice it would appear that at times the different
interpretations and applications of its use allow the language of transparency to be open to
distortion. Thus although the discourse of transparency has achieved considerable prominence
in the rhetoric of MGG, the evidence suggests that its use as a mechanism for accountability
remains largely unfulfilled. This is reflected by Scholte who argues that 'no mechanisms have
been devised to guarantee transparency, open debate and accountability in relations between
states and their supranational constituents' (1997: 451).
However, this does not mean that transparency cannot be applied more universally and with
greater conviction by the institutions of MGG. Changes in society are often slow and at times
difficult to discern, but by keeping the discourse of transparency on the political agenda it
forces governing institutions to reflect upon and question their actual practices. It is possible
that the discourse of transparency may produce its own effect and become self-fulfilling. For
example, areas where transparency might be increased include the G-7, IMF and World Bank
publishing minutes of meetings; the release of documents relating to policy proposals and
detailing the reasons for a particular policy being chosen. Actions like these would represent a
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step in the right direction, reducing secrecy and giving greater substance to the idea of more
open and accountable institutions of multilateral global governance.
Is secrecy necessary for the effective and responsible working of
institutions of multi/a teral global governance?
The third question asks about the extent to which secrecy is necessary for effective governance
processes to exist. From the cases it is clear that whilst degrees of transparency vary, secrecy is
still a dominant feature of MGG. One reason for this is the presumption that too much
transparency may result in problems such as the undermining of institutional efficiency (see
Chapters 5 and 7). However, this view can be countered by the evidence in the case of Arun-3
and the World Bank where secrecy in the initial stages proved an impediment to effective and
efficient governance in what was ultimately an expensively flawed project. The argument goes
that with more public access to information and policy making processes will come greater
legitimacy and effectiveness (Coote, 1998: 130).
By contrast, Teft makes the point that because secrecy allows the attainment of certain ends, its
use in the governance process constitutes both instrumental and rational behaviour (1980: 321).
This gives legitimacy to the use of functional secrecy in the governance process. Conversely
critics continue to assert that secrecy acts to undermine accountability in areas which have a
profound and widespread effect on public interest (Teft 1980: 329). For example, at the G-7
Summit in Halifax, whilst the participants considered institutional and functional secrecy to be
an instrumental and rational part of the political process, the members of the Peoples Summit
considered it a barrier to G-7 accountability.
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As indicated there are those who believe that there may be occasions when secrecy is
legitimate, and is the responsible course of action (Bok, 1982: 18) Functional secrecy can be
justified where a financial crisis has to be overcome as in the case of the Mexican Peso Crisis.
Here advocates of the IMF's position believed that too much openness would undermine global
markets. In such instances too much transparency risks the de-stabilisation of world economic
markets. Also, limits to openness are required if the traditional relationship between institutions
of MGCI and their members is to be protected. The IMF continues to act as if state actors are
the only legitimate participants in the negotiating process.
The presumption of secrecy needs to be considered against other factors. During the peso
crisis, open debate and wider participation was not a consideration for the IMF rescue package.
The IMF justified secrecy and exclusion by arguing that its relationship was essentially with
the national government. I would argue that by incorporating wider agreement on its measures,
the IMF would have ensured a more legitimate form of MGG. The IMF as the lender of last
resort in times of financial crisis has important responsibilities both in terms of the
implementation and outcome of its policies. The Mexican Peso Crisis illustrates that it is not
possible to hold the IMF to account for the implementation or outcome of its policies due to the
level of secrecy involved. In this case the IMF was able to exclude critical voices from both
within Mexican society, as well as from a wide range of non-governmental organisations and
individuals from outside the country. In view of this, the need for functional secrecy needs to be
balanced against the legitimacy and effectiveness that might result from more openness. To put
It another way, the withholding of information and denial of access should be compatible with a
general increase in levels of accountability in institutions of MGG.
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In the case of the G-7, critical voices of the Summit process reasoned that the G-7 had a
responsibility to explain its actions through mechanisms of accountability that encourage
openness and participation. The extent to which the G-7 subjects itself to these ideas is
questionable, as illustrated by the dissatisfaction of NGO groups with the lack of access, and
the role of the media in Halifax. However, the desire for more openness conflicts with claims
by participants that the 0-7 functions more effectively when dialogue is undertaken in secrecy.
For the G-7 the role of secrecy as a mechanism of effectiveness is in direct conflict with the
notion of increased public accountability.
In the case of the Arun-3 Dam Project it would seem that the necessity for secrecy was to a
large degree overridden by other factors. Whether this constitutes a normative shift is debatable
due to the one-off nature of Arun-3 and the continuing secrecy at the World Bank. Cynics
might argue that it is possible that as the World Bank becomes more open there will be a
counter-force within the institution promoting different strategies of secrecy such as the co-
option of NGOs to promote productive secrecy.
Due to the sensitive nature of the 1995 NPT negotiations, the outcome was dependant upon a
secretive process. Of the cases used to illustrate the tension between openness and concealment,
the Conference on Disarmament highlights precisely the ambiguity that surrounds the use of
secrecy (see for example the discussion of secret voting in Chapter 7). This example highlights
one of the benefits of secrecy: namely it enables the less powerful to protect themselves against
the more powerful (Bellman, 1981). This prevented the non-nuclear states being pressured into
an agreement which they believed was against their interests. Interestingly, these same actors
who used secrecy to protect their interests also applied greater openness to NGOs to gain
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support for their position. Here we have a good example of secrecy and transparency being
applied as a strategy in support of actor's aims.
The legitimate use of functional secrecy is made more problematic if this type of secrecy
becomes productive. The existence of productive secrecy does not mean that external
transparency does not exist. Rather it questions the quality and nature of the information that is
released into the public domain (Cesareo, 1992: 91). Productive secrecy suggests that the
information is of a type that promotes a particular ideological position whilst concealing
alternative interpretations. The role of productive secrecy reinforces the radical's argument:
namely that there exists a hegemonic discourse of transnational liberalism that limits discussion
of alternatives and legitimates the shift of authority from the national to the global level.
As the example of the Mexican Peso Crisis illustrates, productive secrecy acted to legitimate
the belief that there was no alternative to the IMF's policy reforms, and it produced a
particular ideologically driven world view that denied alternative interpretations. Of course this
does not mean that this type of secrecy cannot be contested. However, by virtue of emanating
from an authoritative bod y, the information was in part protected from independent critique.
Similar points can be made about the Halifax Summit and the World Bank. In the former case,
productive secrecy helped maintain the legitimacy of reforms proposed by the G-7, reinforced
by a discourse of transparency. In the latter, productive secrecy did not stop the World Bank
from being forced to cancel the Arun-3 Dam Project.
From my findings it looks unlikely that secrecy will wither away. Tensions will remain and
arguments will continue over the relationship between transparency and secrecy. Whether,
however, the current level of secrecy in multilateral global governance can, and will, remain
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unchanged remains to be seen. As Mouffe argues, what is important is that different political
motives and interests are recognised and not concealed by a veil of rationality [functional;
institutional and productive secrecy] that excludes alternatives [bottom-up transparency]
(1993: 145). Adopting this kind of approach allows the debate about transparency and secrecy
to move beyond closed positions to embrace a wider agenda.
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Table 5: Summary of Conclusion: Key Themes and Institutions
Themes	 IMF & the	 G-7 & Halifax	 World Bank & CD & The NPT
Mexican Peso	 Summit	 Arun-3 Dam	 Extension and
_____________	 Crisis	 __________________	 Project	 Renewal Treaty
How have	 The actions of the 	 The behaviour of the 	 The conduct of the	 The actions of the
different	 IMF:	 G-7:	 WB:	 CD:
assessments of
globalisation	 Validate the claim of Internationalisation of Suggests that it is 	 Maintain the
and theories of end of the state thesis the state has led to
	 open to change and	 traditional
global politics	 that global regulatory greater significance of engaging with wider
	 distinction between
informed the	 bodies undermine	 the G-7.	 accountability. This	 states and society.
discussion on	 state autonomy.	 challenges the radical Wider society
accountability 	 Paradoxically, it also Promotes the idea of
	 and state-centred	 remains excluded
in MGG?	 implies that markets the market and denies perspective, 	 from the political
can be governed	 alternative	 process.
effectively,	 perspectives.	 Gives validity to the
cosmopolitan claim	 States retain power
Suggests governance Suggests governance
	 for an individual	 in the security
mechanisms remain	 mechanisms remain	 rights-based agenda in sphere.
distant from locations distant from locations
	 MGG.
of popular	 of popular	 The radical
accountability,	 accountability.	 The activity of the	 perspective is
Inspection Panel goes challenged by the
Reveals that effective Radicals believe
	 some way towards 	 resistance of the





ideological device to 	 radical's view of	 the overture of the
market confidence.	 obfuscate responsibility MGG.	 nuclear weapons
for decision-making at	 states.
Undermines the	 the global level.	 Possibility for greater
neoliberal-	 accountability through
institutionalist view	 The G-7 rejects the 	 the reform of current
of transparency.
	
claims of NGOs for	 institutional practices.
greater accountability.
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Does the	 Effectively closed to	 Internal transparency A degree of bottom- 	 Attempts by the
discourse and	 external actors.	 is good, enhanced by	 up transparency	 President of the CD to
practice of	 Transparency found	 limits upon other	 exists. The Bank has	 increase external
transparency	 in the shape of	 forms of transparency. opened information	 transparency. Other
enhance or	 internal and top-	 External transparency centres, increased	 forms of transparency
undermine	 down. External 	 is limited to	 access to information remain limited as
accountability transparency can be
	
Communiqué. At the	 and introduced an	 illustrated by the
in institutions	 interpreted in terms 	 PrepCom the	 Inspection Panel. 	 experience of NGOs.
of global	 of productive secrecy. Canadian government
governance?	 gave access to NGOs. 	 The principle of
The principles of	 Potential for more	 transparency
good governance	 accountability	 undermined by
adopted by IMF. In 	 Advocates good	 through the	 secrecy to secure
reality this is
	
governance principles Inspection Panel.
	
particular outcome.
undermined by the	 in MGG. This	 This gives some
1MF's relationship	 remains unfulfilled	 evidence to support 	 The implementation
with the market and	 with the limited	 the position that the	 of good governance
its members.	 exception of the	 World Bank has	 principles is limited.
Canadian	 adopted and	 Participation is
government,	 implemented the	 restricted to state
principles of good	 actors and
governance,	 transparency
diminishes as
_____________ __________________ ___________________ __________________ negotiations progress.
Is secrecy	 Secrecy is justified in Secrecy considered to The World Bank	 Nuclear security is an
necessary for	 terms of market 	 be an instrumental 	 cancelled the Arun-3 area traditionally
the effective	 responsibility;	 and rationale to the 	 Project. Secrecy in	 characterised by
and	 institutional necessity success of the G-7	 the initial stages	 secrecy.
responsible	 and relationship with summits.	 proved an
working of	 members. It is	 impediment to	 The ambivalent
MGG?	 argued that this ill	 Effectiveness	 effective and efficient nature of secrecy
result in increased
	 dependant on small,	 governance in what	 highlighted in the
market stability and	 private, confidential	 was ultimately an	 controversy over a
confidence from	 meetings.	 expensively flawed	 secret ballot. This can
inward investors,	 project.	 be contrasted with the
Too much openness	 apparent need for
Too much openness would lead to a
	 As the World Bank	 secrecy in
would lead to a
	 negative outcome for	 becomes more open	 negotiations.
negative outcome for the governance	 there will be agovernance process.	 process	 counter-force within 	 Too much openness
the institution	 would lead to aPotential for
	 Potential for	 promoting different
	
negative outcome for
productive secrecy to productive secrec' to
	 strategies such as the
	
governance process.
result from functional result from functional co-option of NGOs to
secrecy.	 secrec'.	 promote productive
secrecy.
Productive secrecy
did not stop the
World Bank from
being forced to cancel
the Arun-3 Dam
________________ ______________________ _______________________ Project. 	 ______________________
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